191333

30Jul'42



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/philosophyofgree0000alfr_n6f5

Logic, Deductive and Inductive.
By CARVETH READ, M.A. 6s.

The Evolution of the Idea of God.
By GRANT ALLEN. 20s. net.

Labour in the Longest Reign.
By SIDNEY WEBB. 1s.

Licensing Practice.
By O. F. CHRISTIE. 6s. 6d. net.

A Tabulation of the Factory Laws.
By EMMA BROOKE. 2s. 6d. net.

GRANT RICHARDS

HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE

CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE CHARACTER AND HISTORY OF ITS PEOPLE

BY

ALFRED WILLIAM BENN

AUTHOR OF

'THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS'

LONDON: GRANT RICHARDS

9 HENRIETTA STREET, W.C.

1898

180
B469p

Edinburgh: T. and A. Constable, Printers to Her Majesty

PREFACE

The object of this book is to show how Greek philosophy exhibits, under an abstract form, certain ways of acting and of looking at things which characterised the Greek genius before philosophy itself began; how, having come into existence, its evolution was determined by the history and geography of Greece; and how at every stage of that evolution it was influenced by the political, religious, and scientific culture of the Greek people; in a word, to consider philosophy—by which I understand a study of the most general relations between the world and human life—as a product not only of certain pre-eminent intellects, but also and above all as a product of the nation whence they sprang.

The idea of this method is not my own; I owe it to Professor Knight of St. Andrews, at whose suggestion the present work was originally undertaken as a contribution to a much more comprehensive scheme for rewriting the whole history of speculation under the form of a 'Philosophy of

the Nations,' to be carried out by himself, with the assistance of a numerous band of collaborators. Untoward circumstances have prevented this wider scheme from being realised, although we may hope that it will be revived with more success at some future period. Meanwhile there seems to be no reason why the new method should not be applied, as a first experiment, to the intellectual history of a people whose philosophy was, more perhaps than that of any other, a home-grown plant.

The novelty claimed is of course relative; it is a question of proportion and relief, of a prominence such as had not been previously given to this particular point of view. For, although first distinctly formulated by Professor Knight, the idea of philosophy as an expression of national life has long been in the air, and has been more or less consciously recognised as a guiding principle by the historians of thought, each in his own province—among others by myself in a work on the Greek philosophers published sixteen years ago, where some of the views embodied in the present volume have already been put forward. My object, however, at that time, was primarily to study Greek philosophy in its relations to modern thought, and incidentally to combat some prevalent estimates

and interpretations which I regarded, and still regard, as utterly mistaken. On the present occasion I have tried to avoid all controversy and all reference to modern interests, although perhaps neither the one nor the other has been so thoroughly excluded as I could have wished. At the same time, I have done my best to profit by whatever light recent investigations have thrown on Greek history in general as well as on the interpretation of particular philosophical systems; and I must ask the reader to believe that I am not necessarily ignorant of all the views, adverse to my own, which my limits have obliged me to ignore.

All notes and references have been placed at the end of the book. Those who wish to verify my statements will find it almost as easy to do so as if the authorities had been quoted at the foot of every page; while the general reader will be delivered from what my own experience leads me to describe as a most irritating disturbance of his attention. This arrangement, however, entails one serious disadvantage. It does not allow me to make my obligations to other writers as prominent as I should have wished. But any one who takes the trouble to glance over the references and to observe what names occur most frequently, will easily discover

to what sources I am most indebted for ideas and for facts.

I have to thank Mr. Franklin T. Richards, of Trinity College, Oxford, who kindly read through this work in MS., for some valuable corrections and suggestions.

A. W. BENN.

17*th September* 1898.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE v

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL FORM OF GREEK THOUGHT AND THE POSITION OF THE IONIAN RACE 1

CHAPTER II

THE IONIAN SCHOOLS OF ASIA MINOR 36

CHAPTER III

THE IONIANS IN ITALY 63

CHAPTER IV

THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHERS 93

CHAPTER V

THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE : HUMANISTS AND NATURALISTS 121

CHAPTER VI

SOCRATES AND ATHEN : THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION . 155

CHAPTER VII

PAGE

PLATO AND ATHENS: THE ARISTOCRATIC AND PANHELLENIC TRADITION 184

CHAPTER VIII

ARISTOTLE AND THE RETURN TO SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY 212

CHAPTER IX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD: THE STOICS, THEIR CRITICS, AND THEIR RIVALS 241

NOTES AND REFERENCES 271

INDEX 293

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL FORM OF GREEK THOUGHT AND THE POSITION OF THE IONIAN RACE

A TRAVELLER from the West when he visits some great monument of Mohammedan architecture in its prime can at first devote his whole attention to the structural details of the building, or to the picturesque groupings of arch and dome and pillar, the broad masses of light and shadow which no representations of animated creatures are suffered to interrupt. But after a time he will find that an ornamental motive, little known to Christian churches, has been most effectively employed by Oriental art for the combined purposes of decoration and instruction. Encrusted on the walls as in the Alhambra, or emblazoned under the cupola as in the Mosque of Omar, he will see drawn out like an army with lifted scimitars and slanted spears, in long-linked sinuous sequences, the unfamiliar characters of an unknown tongue; and on turning to his guide for an explana-

tion, he will learn that all the sentences into which they combine are but variations on one ever-recurring theme—the nothingness of man, the absolute self-sufficiency of God, God unipersonal, infinite, and eternal.

So must the universe be conceived by a race whose ideal of human liberty is the licence of a plundering nomadic horde, whose ideal of human order is the levelling sway of an irresponsible despot; a race to whom Nature has only revealed her full majesty in the desolating energy of the tempest, her vastness in the barren immobility of the desert.

Far different was the impression that a Tyrian or Babylonian stranger would have received on visiting the oracle of Delphi at the time of its greatest splendour. He too would have found himself in an atmosphere saturated with religious emotion; but it was an emotion of joyous confidence rather than of servile fear. He would have learned from his fellow-pilgrims that the divine being whom they came to consult was worshipped not so much under the jealous and exclusive attribute of creative power as under the more gracious and communicable attributes of knowledge and skill. He would have felt that the dedicated wonders of plastic and pictorial art which lined every approach to the chief sanctuary bore witness to the glory of man no less than to the glory of the god. But there also, amidst all that bewildering profusion of imitative representations, under the

shadow of Parnassus as still over the rock of Moriah, the supreme message was delivered, not through the symbolism of form and colour, but through the direct appeal of written speech. Our traveller, as he passed between the pillars of the great Doric porch, would have had his attention drawn to certain sentences inscribed on the wall of the vestibule; and his guide would have explained to him that the two most famous of them meant, *Be moderate*, or more literally, *Nothing too much*, and *Know thyself*.

These words, incomparable for dignity, simplicity, and depth, did not, like the flaming texts of the Koran, lay claim to divine inspiration. The Roman moralist was mistaken when he referred to the demand for self-knowledge as having come down from heaven. Rather was it taken up from earth to heaven, and returned to men with the stamp of a superhuman sanction. It was no secret that the Delphic priesthood did but repeat in their inscriptions what wise men of the Ionian race or of Ionian culture had uttered long before. In this instance, the voice of the god was avowedly the voice of the people at its highest and its best.

Self-knowledge and self-control—these two things constituted in their combination what the Greeks called Σωφροσύνη, the most characteristic of Greek virtues, the ruling principle of Greek life, Greek art, and Greek thought. Everywhere in their greatest

achievements we are met by the idea of a limit, a fine and just estimate of the available force, the available material, of the obstacles to be overcome, of the impassable barriers set against any further advance. And as with them the most perfect healthfulness was characterised by such careful balance and wise self-restraint, so also their periods of disease and corruption were marked by just the opposite manifestations, together with a conscious faithlessness of public opinion to the Greek ideal. Thucydides tells us how, during the frightful party dissensions provoked by the great conflict between Athens and Sparta, 'reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing; frantic energy was the true quality of a man.'

Yet observe how even amid this insanity self-knowledge still asserted itself as an advantage in the struggle for existence. For, as Thucydides goes on to observe, 'inferior intellects generally succeeded best. For, aware of their own deficiencies, and fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they were no match in powers of speech, and whose subtle wits were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, they struck boldly and at once.'

But the penetrating observations of the philosophic historian supply us with something more than an illustration of the transcendent value set by all wise

Greeks on Sophrosynê, on self-knowledge and self-control. They warn us against the mistake of supposing, like those frenzied revolutionists, that this moderation was the sign of an impotent or tame or unenterprising nature. Quite otherwise indeed. It was the overflowing inexhaustible energy of the Greek nature, intensely conscious of itself, that necessitated such sleepless vigilance, such unslackening self-restraint. At the very dawn of Greek literature we have an instance in point. In what is admitted to be the oldest portion of our *Iliad*, the great opening scene of the Wrath, we find Achilles, the strongest, bravest, most passionate of men, suffering deadly insult without being provoked to violence, restrained, as the poet puts it, by the warning voice of Athenê, the goddess of wisdom. And in one of the latest additions to our *Iliad* we find the same Achilles warning Priam to be silent lest the vindictive rage with which he is battling, which he feels to be almost uncontrollable, should get the better of reverence and pity.

It was indeed essential to the continued existence of the Hellenic race that the rule of moderation should be observed by its component members, whether states or classes or individuals. All the living forces of Hellenism would have perished by more or less rapid decay had a single ruler been allowed to establish a permanent dynasty in each city, had a single city or tribe succeeded in sub-

jugating or absorbing the whole nation, had a single uniform type of civilisation been imposed on all who spoke the Greek tongue.

To know yourself implied that you lived among other self-conscious beings with susceptibilities like yours, with like claims to an inviolable sphere of self-development. Thus moderation became convertible with justice, the recognition of the rights of others as a condition for asserting one's own rights. Nor was it only as between man and man or state and state that justice was held to be desirable. Within the sphere of human personality it was seen by the wisest Greeks that the various elements of man's manifold nature had rights of their own, that no one impulse should be entirely sacrificed to another, but that all should play their parts in due subordination to the welfare of the ordered whole.

Here again self-knowledge comes in as the necessary complement of moderation. Most men, or at least most gifted men, have some one faculty more developed than the rest, some line of action in which they were born to excel. This they should discover and cultivate up to the highest point of efficiency, for by so doing they will be most useful to the community, and win most credit for themselves and for their families. Experience showed indeed that, so far, not much persuasion was necessary, that every one tried to become still stronger in that art where he felt himself to be strongest. A system of competitive

games and exhibitions provided perhaps a little too well for the specialisation of the Greek genius. The danger to be guarded against was that inordinate conceit which makes a man think, which at least made many a Greek think, that to have one excellence is to have all, that to know one thing is a qualification for giving an authoritative opinion about others. Thus the wretched Dolon, because he is a swift runner, fancies that he could drive the horses of Achilles; while Achilles, here also a pattern of Greek virtue, knows that if he is first in the field, others are better in the council.

In communities where the magistrates and generals were chosen by popular election from among the whole body of citizens, and where their policy was subject to the control or criticism of a popular assembly, a consciousness of his own limitations was a matter of life and death in the first place to the individual, and, in the long-run, to the State. Accordingly where public opinion was most enlightened, this form of Sophrosynê was most severely enforced: historians loved to show how ruinous was its neglect; and we shall see hereafter how it formed a primary principle in the philosophy of Plato, to be set by Aristotle on a broader basis as the law of the physiological division of labour.

While each individual Greek was conscious of such an organic relationship to the larger whole, the city-state of which he formed a part, the city in turn

cherished a consciousness, though much less distinct, of living unity with a series of larger groups: with some rather loose confederacy gathered round a common sanctuary, with its Ionian or Dorian kindred, with the whole Hellenic race. We cannot blame the Greeks if, with their high and progressive civilisation, they felt themselves divided by a deep gulf from the rest of mankind, whom they called barbarians, using the word very much as we do, who have, in fact, inherited it from them. But the rudiments of a true humanity were present in Hellenism from the very first; and the noblest Greeks came to see in time, by virtue of their profound self-knowledge, that the qualities which distinguished their race from all others were not necessarily racial, not physical, that they could be communicated by education.

Beyond and around humanity lies what the Greeks have taught us to call Nature, the totality of existence, sometimes conceived as a growth, sometimes as an unchangeable reality, but always conceived as a whole, as one. With us moderns, in the present constitution of thought, this idea offers itself, to those who prefer abstract isolating methods, as the eternal and necessary correlative of their own self, the object of which their personal being is the subject, distinct from, yet somehow united with it—for otherwise how could it be thought?—while to those who prefer more concrete methods, it comes as an ultimate experience, won through the mediation of humanity,

as the theatre on which the human drama is played out. In either case, we are moving on lines already indicated by Greek philosophy; but the Greeks themselves had already reached the idea of Nature as a supreme and ordered whole long before they had risen to the stage of reflection which those methods imply. Their mythology had taught them, as many a less gifted race has been taught, to interpret the shifting panorama without them after the analogy of their own domestic relations, to think of the elements as animated by a common life, and making up a not particularly happy family. Some among them seem to have believed that the world was created by a god, or even by a man. But the critical habits born of free public speech, and the absence of a well-organised priesthood, were conditions unfavourable to the general acceptance of such a creed. In a society where, as we have seen, moderation and justice were the supreme ideals of conduct, men of great speculative genius would carry the same ideals into the material world. Preserving the mythological suggestion of unity and kinship, they would develop it, as their own governments had been developed, on republican rather than on monarchical lines. Their universe would be subject to what we still call the reign of law, not to a personal authority divided among many wills, or united in one will. Whatever might be their analysis of Nature, its parts would be thought of as observing certain fixed limits, or paying a penalty if these were trans-

gressed; while the parts so distinguished and reciprocally bounded would, just like the citizens and classes constituting a Greek commonwealth, combine to make up an orderly whole, but without the dissensions that so often marred Greek public life, with the perfection that belongs to eternal things.

That autonomous public life of the city-state, of the federation, in the light of whose ordered freedom Greek thought first interpreted the life of Nature, was itself, as we know, very largely the product of geographical conditions. The whole of European Greece, the entire coast of the Aegean Sea, and, going westwards, the coast of Sicily and Southern Italy, are subdivided by a network of long-backed mountains, or, still more definitely, by marine inlets into possible sites for independent communities, which were filled to overflowing by successive tides of Hellenic immigration. And while Nature had provided in this way so many various vital centres, she had also provided, by a coast-line of unparalleled development, by innumerable islands set like stepping-stones between the three continents, by a regular system of trade-winds, by an atmosphere through which the guiding stars shone with comparatively few interruptions, for the interchange of their products, material or ideal, for the healthy stimulus of rivalry and competition. Physiologists tell us that, quite apart from increased size of the brain, intellectual power increases with the number of the

cerebral convolutions, because thereby a greater surface of cortical tissue is made available for the stimulating action of the blood. Now Greece, with its islands and colonies, presents just the appearance of such a highly convoluted brain with the same accompaniment of high intellectual activity.

A physical environment so favourable to harmonious individuality, to what Greek thought afterwards called the union of the One with the Many, was in its turn more open to a rational interpretation, more manageable, so to speak, than an environment of vast plains, of iron-bound coast-lines, of impassable mountains and deserts, of destructive tempests and inundations. Nor was this all. The very aspect of Greek scenery, with all its wealth of delicate distinctions, with its curving outlines of ridge and promontory, of bay and island, with the fine gradation of tones in its far-drawn aerial perspectives, was an education to the thinker as well as to the artist. This 'thought-teaching form' which 'utters itself in firm unshimmering lines' gives the idea of a limit, but also the idea of a transition.

Greek thought, the Greek way of looking at things in general, has hitherto presented itself to us under the form of a sphere, or by preference some less rigidly determined figure, in which a number of units, each preserving a certain measure of independence, are grouped together so as to make up an organic whole, which again bears the same relation

to some larger group. But now we must note that the Greeks, who were a very witty people, and liked to put things in a brief, pointed, telling way, had a habit of ranging the units of each group under two opposite heads, so as to produce what they have taught us to call an antithesis. It must be confessed that they carried the habit to excess, that some of their best literature is rather spoiled by its abuse, and that it gives an undeniable stiffness to their greatest plastic groups. We find a good deal of it in Homer, especially in the more modern portions of the *Iliad*, where, within the general opposition of Greeks and Trojans, there are the minor contrasts, suggested rather than emphasised, of Odysseus and Diomed or Ajax, Alexander and Hector, Andromachê and Helen, or, among the gods, of Apollo and Ares, Athenê and Aphroditê. It is almost unnecessary to recall the great part played by such antitheses as Hellenes and Barbarians, monarchy and republic, aristocracy and democracy, Dorians and Ionians, through the whole course of Greek history. And we find Greek philosophy abundantly employing the same method, first in physics with its oppositions of wet and dry, hot and cold, light and heavy; then, in the subjective period, of Nature and Man, virtue and vice, prudence and valour, argument and intuition. But the higher and subtler intellects would by no means rest content with so crude a presentation of things ex-

perienced or imagined. They were always trying to bridge the chasm, to connect the opposites by a series of finely graduated transitions. Homeric critics believe that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were partly built up in this way, by the insertion of transitional links between the opening of those poems, as they were originally composed, and their catastrophe. So also the Olympian theology of Homer was reorganised by subsequent reflection on a mediatorial basis, Apollo, once an independent god, being regarded solely as a prophet who interprets the counsels of his father Zeus to mankind; and our supposed Semitic visitor to the Delphic oracle might have been struck by the difference between this view of the divine economy and that entertained by his own people, among whom the prophetic office was a human ministry, subject to all the limitations of humanity; while such personifications as the Face of Baal or the Maleak of Iahveh, though performing something of a mediatorial function, lacked the vivid, concrete individuality of an Apollo or an Athenê.

To condense and concentrate the whole series of transitions between two extremes into a single mean was indeed a besetting tendency of the Greeks, whose philosophic reflection was as much characterised by the plasticity of the creative imagination as their art by the severity and transparency of thought. And as the Greek virtue of Sophrosynê under its

most generalised aspect led up to the idea of a limit, so also it led up to the idea of a mean, the point about which extremes were balanced, the standard recalling them to moderation; in the case of a human being the true central self recognised as such, the reason that 'looks before and after' but does not, like the passionate poet, 'pine for what is not,' rather clings to its own eternal identity in the midst of uncertainty and evanescence. In this way mean and limit might pass for interchangeable notions, yet with a felt opposition between them, like the centre and circumference of a circle, suggesting also a possible identity of opposites.

Besides the insertion of intermediate gradations or of a single middle term, there is another method for the solution of an antithesis. We may assimilate the opposites by a process of transposition, altering the contrasted features into a slight resemblance, or transferring parts of the one to the other. Achilles gives his interest to the Trojans, Hector appears in the arms of Achilles, the rout of the Greeks is relieved by numerous gleams of success. Prometheus, though defeated, bound, and tormented, still holds the fate of Zeus in his hands. The Erinyes, just after Orestes has been rescued from their clutches, are compensated by receiving a position of supreme dignity in the very city that witnessed their discomfiture; while under the name of Eumenides

they are brought to entertain much wider ideas of moral obligation than in their first naturalistic appearance. Returning once more to Delphi, and accompanying our Semitic friend in his walk round the temple, we may perhaps hear his well-instructed guide explaining the subjects of the sculptures on the east and west pediments as symbols of two worships once widely contrasted but now combined, the Olympian religion of Apollo being so blended with the Chthonian religion of Dionysus that the one has gained a certain mystic enthusiasm, the other a certain luminous calm. And if our stranger had cared to continue his travels through Hellas, he would have been struck by something of Dorian steadiness in Attica, and something of Ionian brilliancy in Ægina; he would have found the rhetoric, the drama, the philosophy, the democratic government of the Ionian race flourishing in the Dorian colonies of Sicily.

It will appear hereafter how great a part this method of assimilation by transfer and mutual accommodation played in the evolution of Greek philosophy. But already at this stage we must glance at the results of the method, considered as a universal form of Greek thought, in reference to that primary antithesis of Nature and Man, the consciousness of which precedes and conditions philosophy.

We are sometimes told that the old Greeks felt

themselves at one with Nature, and that this unity was subsequently broken at a time and in a way about which our authorities do not agree, or which they cannot precisely define. Such vague phrases do not help us much. In point of fact, so far as their extant literature goes back, the Greeks were keenly aware of their separateness from the material world, from the lower animals, from children, from the savage races who lived under a patriarchal system, without cities or laws or recognised obligations of hospitality. And they found the distinguishing mark of humanity first in speech, then, at a higher stage of development, in the increasing sociality, the respect for public opinion that comes of speech. They knew also the peculiar unhappiness that accompanies this dignity like its shadow, the ultimate certainty and ever present danger of death brought home to man by his reason, the anguish of bereavement lasting longest with the noblest minds—an Achilles, an Odysseus, or a Menelaus. But assuredly this self-distinguishing consciousness implied, at least in the highest class, no absolute estrangement from Nature shown either by scornful neglect or by superstitious terror. Material objects exist to be made available for the service of human wants, for decoration, for intellectual delight; all three purposes being fulfilled by Homer's supreme work of art, the shield of Achilles, which is at once a barrier against death and a representa-

tion of the universal life. Here we see mind as form, as apprehension, extending to the outer bounds of Nature; while in the Homeric similes we find Nature as force penetrating into the depths of man's soul, so that his distracted purpose is illustrated by a wave torn between contending winds, his waxing wrath by rising smoke, his multitudinous thoughts by thick-falling raindrops or snowflakes.

This mutual embrace of Nature and man might be supposed to mean no more than that each was alternately the plaything of the other. But, in fact, it means something more. Looking into her eyes, he caught there gleams of a reason like his own. By this I do not mean the purposive constructive reason that adapts means to ends, making every part of an organism subservient to the good of the whole, or making all other organisms subservient to human uses. That was a much later point of view reserved for Socrates and his successors. I mean that sort of reason which, as we have already seen, is expressed by the term Sophrosynê, the virtue of wise self-limitation. Now this virtue, so characteristic of Homer's best men and women, is also characteristic of his gods, whose meaning as personifications of physical phenomena is never quite forgotten, and sometimes plainly transparent. There is a good deal of give and take among them, a more or less frank acknowledgment of each other's spheres and rights. Herê must have her revenge on the Trojans, though not so soon

as she could wish. Helios, the sun-god, must have his revenge on Odysseus, the beloved of Athenê, or he will go and shine among the shades below, to the great loss and confusion of the world. Even Zeus is made to see that to save his son Sarpedon from death in battle would be an undue stretch of favouritism; he must be content to give the fallen hero a splendid funeral. A still deeper appreciation of a law binding on Nature and man alike is shown in the episode of Xanthus, the immortal horse of Achilles, who is gifted with speech for a moment by Herê, that he may reply to the unjust rebuke of his master, 'after which,' says the poet, 'the Erinyes stopped his voice.' Now, we know that these Erinyes were primarily guardians of moral law in the narrower sense of obligations arising out of blood-relationship, and more especially out of motherhood, since the bond between a mother and her child seems the most intimate and certain of all. Accordingly, in Homer's version of the great Theban tragedy we find that Oedipus is pursued not by the Erinyes of his father Laius, whom he had killed, but by the Erinyes of his mother Epicastê, of whose death he had been merely the indirect cause. Again, in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus, the Erinyes, when asked why they did not avenge the murder of Agamemnon on Clytemnestra, answer, because he was not related to her by blood. Here, then, we have the recognition of an ultimate identity effected by an interchange of properties

between man and Nature; a certain morality being associated with the permanence of physical limitations, as in the case of Xanthus already mentioned, and still more explicitly by the great physical philosopher Heracleitus, when he says that the sun will not transgress his measures, or the Erinyes of Justice will find him out; and a certain natural necessity making near kinsfolk sacred to one another. Just in the same vein our own Wordsworth finds 'the root of all his moral being' in Nature, and tells Duty that she 'preserves the stars from wrong.'

Early Greek art also, no less than early Greek poetry, moralises or vindicates the preservation of physical distinctions. In the Heraeum of Argos stood a chryselephantine statue of Themis as the mother of the Seasons, wrought about the middle of the sixth century by Dorycleidas, a Spartan sculptor. More significant still is another work of the same period, still extant, a sculptured representation of the fate of Actaeon found among the metopes of Selinus. Legend told how, owing to some offence of presumption against Artemis, the goddess caused Actaeon to be torn to pieces by his own hounds. But while, according to the old story, the offending huntsman was transformed into a stag, the poet Stesichorus suggested that the goddess accomplished her purpose without any such gross violation of natural law, by the simpler method of hanging a deerskin about her victim; and this is the version actually adopted by

the Selinuntine sculptor. Such impossibilities as centaurs and other hybrid monsters do indeed keep recurring through the whole history of Greek art; but only, like the hardly less unnatural Amazons, that they may succumb in the battle with beings of normal human constitution, doing their proper work.

The word *hybrid* itself suggests an interesting reflection. We can hardly doubt that it is derived from the Greek word ὕβρις, which is used to express lawless excess at the expense of others, ranging from insolent language to licentious and brutal violence. Now, hybris in all its forms was the opposite of sophrosynê—it meant the overstepping of limits (from ὑπέρ, over), as sophrosynê meant their due observance. Thus, although hybrid is not a Greek word, we cannot doubt that it was constructed by the Latins on the lines of Greek thought, as if there were something morally offensive in the confusion of natural species.

We have seen how, at an early period, Themis was worshipped as the mother of the Seasons. This means that Greek thought spontaneously recognised a fixed order in the succession no less than in the coexistence of physical phenomena, assimilating it also to the moral order of human society. Here, however, in accordance with the necessities of the case, there is not so much a steady maintenance of rights, of mutual limitations, as a continual redressal of wrongs—a Nemesis, as the Greeks said, and as we

still say after them. Nemesis as a moral sentiment exactly answers to our word *reprehension*, and, like that, implies a tendency to take back what has been unjustly appropriated. It is important to bear in mind the ethical aspect thus associated with the vicissitudes of the physical world if we would understand how such revolutions were generalised and explained by philosophy.

Apart from all general interpretations of change, we have to note the definitiveness with which each event in a series is apprehended by the Homeric poets, its delicate articulation into successive moments, the care with which its causes and results are indicated. Here also the love of contrasts, of piquant effects, enjoys full scope, causal connexion taking the form of a generation of opposites from one another, or what we call the irony of fate, as when the generosity of Patroclus leads to his death, or the patriotism of Hector to the ruin of his country. And it is well known that Sophocles, working on Homeric lines in almost complete independence of abstract philosophy, exhibits the same tendency in a much more conscious and systematic form.

Standing sufficiently far from the material universe to conceive it as a whole, and sufficiently near to appreciate the distinction and detailed connexion of its parts, the Greeks had received a training of many centuries in technical industry, in fine art, in literary expression, before they entered on the field

of philosophy. By that time they quite understood the difference between fact and fancy, the need for exact reasoning and observation, the importance of verification, the occasional necessity for restricting inquiry. So much must be premised as a caution against current prejudices. There is a tendency, not perhaps so strong as it was fifty years ago, but still too strong, to regard their systems as so many crude guesses at the secret of the universe, thrown out without regard for the principles of evidence, sometimes hitting blindly on some side of the truth, but more often going wildly wrong. Now, it is not to be denied for a moment that the Greek philosophers generalised rashly, and consequently made many mistakes. The point is that they *generalised*, that they started from the data of experience, interpreting what lay beyond after the analogy of what they saw. Modern thinkers can do no more; and in dealing with objects very remote in time or space they have sometimes gone as far from the mark. Nor is this to be regretted: truth can be purchased at no less a cost. Indeed, we shall have to blame the Greeks for being too wary rather than for being too bold. Their thinkers, like their navigators, clung rather too timidly to the shore. Again and again great truths were caught sight of, but lost or neglected owing to the chilling criticism of inductive logicians. Mythology also must be taken into account as a force always ready to thwart or to warp the scientific spirit.

So far I have talked about Greek philosophy, as if philosophy, like architecture and plastic art and poetry, had been a common property of the whole Hellenic race, or at least of its two or three most gifted families. Such, however, is not the case. Philosophy owes its origin exclusively to the Ionians; and for considerably more than a century it was cultivated only by men of that stock in the strictest sense of the word—that is, by the Ionians of the Asiatic sea-coast, of the Aegean islands, and of their Italian colonies. A few Dorian recruits were drawn in subsequently, but they wrote in the Ionic dialect and attached themselves to Ionic traditions. Athens, where philosophy became centralised at a later period, still counted as the metropolis of Ionia; and it was not till after the death of Aristotle that the leadership in her schools passed to thinkers of a different descent. That the Ionians should have originated philosophy is not indeed surprising when we consider their immense intellectual superiority to the other Greeks, their primacy in all branches of poetry except the lyric expression of individual passion and the choral ode, in the earliest prose literature, in history and geography, in mathematics, astronomy, and physiology. But that they should have retained the lead in speculation so long suggests that a further explanation should be sought in some peculiar mental character, or in some exceptional conformation of their environment.

It has been maintained by some that the Ionians were not true Hellenes, like the Dorians, but that they represented the aboriginal inhabitants of what we now call Greece. Others again look on the Dorians and Boeotians as imperfectly Hellenised barbarians, and on the Aeolians and Ionians as the most genuine representatives of the Greek spirit. One scholar treats the whole Greek-speaking people as originally homogeneous, and makes the combining ingenuity of their own historians responsible for their subsequent division into three or four well-defined families. Another, without going so far as this, makes circumstances rather than racial idiosyncrasies play the greatest part in the differentiation of tribal groups. Fortunately, we are not obliged either to choose between these theories or to reconcile them: the points on which they agree will suffice for our purpose. Alike in Asia Minor, in the islands, and in European Greece, the people called Ionians occupied a central position, a position more accessible than any other to the forces making for progressive civilisation, and further removed from the falsehood of extremes. They were less exposed than any other seafaring Greeks to the contagion of barbarism, whether under the form of nomadic lawlessness or of organised greed and superstition. At the same time, their immense commercial activity enabled them to appropriate such elements of positive knowledge as had been acquired through millenniums of observa-

tion by the priesthoods of Babylon and Egypt, while it also enlarged their minds by familiarising them with the rudimentary forms of social organisation as exhibited in Thrace and Scythia. More than any other Greeks they despised alike the passion of the northern Europeans for war, and the passion of the Phoenicians for money-making. Meanwhile their immediate neighbours had departed less widely from the primitive type, or had developed it in directions most alien to true civilisation. We have reason to believe that the boasted Dorian institutions were old tribal customs brought with them from their northern homes by the conquerors of the Peloponnesus, and stereotyped by their isolated position amid a subject population. Being in a small minority, it was a matter of life and death for these armed settlers to keep up their military efficiency by a frugal diet, by athletic exercises, by constant drill, by inculcating habits of obedience to authority and custom. Thus law-abidingness became the most conspicuous characteristic of the Dorian race, not only in Lacedaemon, but in Corinth, and not only in Corinth, but in Tarentum. Thucydides, who had himself resided in Sparta, makes a Spartan king say that his people were brought up 'too ignorantly to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them.' 'Therein,' says Pindar of Corinth, 'dwell Order and her sisters, sure foundation of states, Justice and like-minded Peace . . . wise

Themis' golden daughters.' Aristotle describes the democracy of Tarentum as in some respects a model constitution; and modern historians call attention to the singular peaceableness of its political evolution. And to these instances of good government we may now add the Dorian island of Aegina, no longer on the doubtful authority of Pindar, but on the more unimpeachable attestation of the new-found Ionian singer, Bacchylides. In perfect harmony with this spirit of steady control we find the Dorians creating an order of architecture distinguished for its massive stability; remodelling sculpture through a study of the exact proportions and disciplined action of undraped human figures; and adopting as their supreme type of literary art the choral ode, which, though invented by Stesichorus, an Ionian, first reached its full development in their public festivities.

It might seem, and indeed it has been held by some, that the Dorian character, as thus described, offers the very type of that sophrosynê, that self-knowledge and self-control which was the ideal of Hellenic wisdom. This, however, is a mistake. Authority, after enforcing moderation, itself becomes immoderate when exercised, as it was at Sparta, to crush out the free play of individual spontaneity. Exclusive devotion to physical training, coupled with the idolatry of victorious athletes, such as prevailed through the whole sphere of Dorian influ-

ence, materialises life no less surely, if more slowly, than devotion to sensual pleasure. Man must be conscious of his own spirituality: nor could the injunction, know thyself, be more signally violated than by the habitual glorification of physical prowess, varied by the praises of lavish expenditure on horse-racing. Nor were such predilections any security against animalism of a grosser kind. Among the other splendours of Corinth, Pindar has not forgotten to celebrate its ministry of Aphroditê; and some of the loveliest verses that ever flowed from his venal pen are an apology for the votaresses of her venal love.

Even this was not the lowest depth. Things of which an apostolic writer has said that it is a shame even to speak, but which must be alluded to here, things unknown to the Ionian epic, singularly absent from Attic tragedy, and barely tolerated at Athens, were openly practised, approved of, and even enjoined at Sparta and in Crete. The promiscuity of the barrack and the palaestra led to the abnegation of natural modesty as a barbarous prejudice, and to attachments which in their highest forms can only be spoken of as evidences of morbid sentiment, while in their lower forms they cannot be spoken of at all. Unnatural passion brought with it the neglect of women; a fact so diametrically opposed to the current estimate of Dorianism that attention is only beginning to be drawn to it. Much has been made

of the athletic training given to Spartan girls, and of their comparative freedom, of the physical perfection of Spartan wives and mothers, the respect paid to them, their heroic patriotism, and their political influence during the period of Spartan supremacy. To take the last point first, their importance at that time may have arisen from the accumulation of landed property in their possession, an accident not foreseen by the old legislators, and probably not extending to other Dorian communities. During the mediaeval period of Greek history a Spartan lady must often have occupied the same position as a châtelaine during the Crusades, with the result that she was addressed by a title (*δέσποινα*) the equivalent of Madam, and sometimes also with the result that her morals were those of a feudal châtelaine. At a later period her chief glory was to abnegate the natural feelings of a mother. For the rest, much of what we are told about Spartan women dates from a time when a more romantic interest had begun to attach itself to the relations of the sexes, and when philosophers were rewriting early Spartan history as an illustration of their own ideals. At any rate, it has not been proved that the Dorian system ever produced such models of noble and gracious womanhood as the Andromachê of the *Iliad*, the Penelope and the Helen, the Nausicaa and the Arêtê of the *Odyssey*, the Oceanids of Aeschylus, the Jocasta, Deidameia, Tecmessa, Antigone, and Electra

of Sophocles, the Alcestis, Iphigeneia, and many more of Euripides,—all doubtless drawn from originals supplied by the Ionian race, a race still more worthily represented and still more highly honoured by the union of the Athenian Pericles with the Milesian Aspasia.

If the Dorians with their ineradicable barbarism, their stunted intelligence, and their unnatural institutions, were no true types of Hellenic sophrosynê, still less do we find it fully exemplified by the northern Greeks. There seems to have been among the Aeolians and Boeotians, as afterwards among the Macedonians, an absence of restraint, a powerful individualism, very conducive to creative originality, and occasionally soaring up to heights of the most exalted genius, as in Sappho, Pindar, and Epameinondas, but incapable of solid and enduring construction. Modern critics hold that Achilles was an Aeolian hero, and the original Wrath of Achilles an Aeolian poem. But what we admire most in Achilles, his reverence for law, his finely discriminating courtesy, his deep vein of reflection, seems due to an Ionian elaboration, the same elaboration to which the whole enduring fabric of the *Iliad* owes its existence. Prometheus also first meets us in the work of an Aeolian poet; but what a distance there is between the Prometheus of Hesiod and the Prometheus of Aeschylus! Greek lyrism of the most inspired sort first arose in Aeolian Lesbos: Dorian Sparta was the

source and centre of its importance as a social art. There was indeed a certain sympathy between these two opposite poles of Hellenism, representing respectively the wildest energy and the most rigid restraint; and the demonstrative passion of a Sappho or a Pindar seems instinctively to seek for a refuge from its own explosiveness in the labour of wrestling with metrical difficulties; just as the restrained passion underlying the ceremonial crust of Spartan life found a vent in the bacchanalian dances of Spartan maidens over the hills of Taygetus. And this kinship is exhibited in the aberration no less than in the intensity of those volcanic instincts. For we cannot forget that the primal sanctities of love, the natural law of sexual relationship, what Homer calls the Themis of men and women, were habitually violated, not only by the ordinances of Crete and Lacedaemon, but also in the schools of Lesbos and in the Sacred Band of Thebes. Boeotia too, like Lesbos, had her poetesses who competed with men in the public games, just as Macedonia had her maenads who competed with the successors of Alexander in the bloody game for crowns; but neither contest would, any more than the doing of field-work by women in Thrace, have commended itself to an Ionian imbued with the idea of measure and limit, of what we call the fitness of things.

Pindar had enough of the true Hellenic spirit about him to be profuse in his recognition of limit

and measure, including that opportuneness which is measure in time, as also in his confession of what is due to tradition and discipline. But, as a poet, he betrays the tameless northern spirit by his unconcealed scorn of studied art, his proud reliance on natural genius, on untutored spontaneity. And assuredly his abrupt transitions, his far-fetched imagery, his gaudy epithets, his contorted phraseology, are far enough removed from the delicacy, the continuity, the self-restraint of Ionian and Attic literature. Qualities like these are the result of schooling, of a certain submission to authority. Such intellectual loyalty coexisted, though of course in very varying proportions, with the intellectual originality of the Ionian race, and was essential to its complete expansion. We must think of Greek philosophy as flourishing in schools, as a nursling of continuous tradition, a joint elaboration of inherited ideas, with a continual search for and discovery of the same process in external nature.

Greek philosophy, in the periods of its first inception and of its greatest splendour, must be studied not only as the product of one particular Greek race, but also of one particular Greek polity, of aristocratic government and society. The Greek ideal of human nature, to which philosophy gave systematic expression, is an aristocratic ideal. Montesquieu has taught us that the animating principle, the master-thought of a republic, is virtue, and that in an aristocratic

republic this virtue takes the form of moderation. Set between the dangers of mob-rule and one-man rule, permanently threatened also by each other's ambitions, fears, and jealousies, the members of the ruling class, if they and their order are to survive, must early learn the necessity of conciliation and compromise. Extreme caution is imposed on the foreign policy of such a government, which indeed comes near to being a standing council of war, and shares its proverbial disinclination to fight. Neither victories nor defeats are very good for it; and an addition of territory dangerously increases the power of its agents. Again, aristocracies have always been noted for the continuity of their policy, being free by their composition from the personal passions and dynastic interests of a monarch, by their culture from the uneducated impulses of a democracy. In perfect accordance with these tendencies we find the Greek lyric poets, and especially the Ionian or Ionicised poets, for ever expatiating on the merits of sophrosynê, and for ever denouncing the horrors of hybris, the mother of tyranny.

On the other hand, aristocracies, by virtue of their fixed traditions, are apt to look with suspicion and contempt on speculative enquiries, a feeling still further aggravated among the Greek nobles by their devotion to athletic exercises; while at the same time the Ionians, among whom alone, as we have seen,

philosophy was possible, were early led by their restless and critical spirit to set up democracies or tyrannies in their city-states. But the aristocratic tone and way of thinking, though formed under the government of a class, long survive its fall; especially where, as in Greece, numerous examples of it continue to be offered by neighbouring states. And this tone, this way of thinking, long continued to penetrate Greek philosophy, more especially as its representatives were frequently men of high birth, thrown out of work, so to speak, by democracy, and spending their enforced leisure on studies into which they carried an aristocratic tradition, an ideal of circumscription and mutual limitation, to which their melancholy political experience sometimes contributed the additional element of periodical revolution.

But the monarchical and democratic forms of government were not without their own speculative suggestiveness. A king need not necessarily be a tyrant; and the primacy of some one substance or principle in Nature was quite compatible with the inviolable cosmic order; although to look on that order as the work of a divine mandate, a point of view simple enough to Oriental absolutism, was an explanation not congenial to the Greek republican mind. On the other hand, there was always a great charm in that equality under the law which the Greeks called *isonomy*, and which

was claimed by the friends of democracy as its exclusive possession; and we cannot but suppose that this also supplied a leading motive to philosophy.

To sum up: our investigation of the Greek character and genius has revealed the fact that its ideal lay implicit in the one word Sophrosynê, interpreted first of all as self-knowledge and self-control; and that this lesson of wise temperateness was inculcated by the physical environment and by the political circumstances of the whole Hellenic race, but that the treasures of its significance more particularly unfolded themselves to the keen intelligence and profound self-reflection of the Ionian family. Under their hands it extends itself ever more widely from a law of conduct to a law of things, and from a law of things to a law of thought; everywhere figuring that which exists as made up of definitely circumscribed and mutually related parts, as falling into opposed, connected, interdependent, and symmetrical groups—groups of noble chiefs and dames in the long-drawn rhapsodies of Homer; groups of marble knights and maidens in movement along the friezes, of marble divinities at rest on the pediments of Pheidias; groups of cities, tribes, nations, empires, banded and embattled across the shifting perspectives of Herodotus; groups of elementary concentric masses or of clustered elementary molecules whirl-

ing through the infinitudes and eternities of Anaximander and Leucippus; groups of warring interests and passions in man and in society as Plato knew them, groups of ordered activities in man and in society as Plato would have had them be.

CHAPTER II

THE IONIAN SCHOOLS OF ASIA MINOR

Philosophy has been governed through its whole history by three paramount influences: the influence of theology, the influence of positive science, the influence of practical life; and the position of thought at any time, at any point of its surface, may be roughly determined by reference to these three co-ordinates. By theology I understand men's beliefs about certain conscious beings, not accessible to ordinary observation, but credited with power over the phenomenal world; by positive science I understand men's knowledge of the uniform coexistences and successions, resemblances and differences given by experience; by practical life I understand the whole mass of institutions and activities which exist in any human society to meet the requirements of its component members. Opinions may differ with regard to the sufficiency of this analysis, but I think that any one acquainted with the history of modern philosophy who will take the trouble to apply the scheme, say, to Bruno or to Descartes, to Kant or to

Hegel, will find that the relative determinations offer themselves almost unsought. Of course it is not implied that the philosophy of a nation is the resultant of its theology, its science, and its practical life to the exclusion of all other antecedent forces; but merely that for descriptive purposes a philosophical system may be analysed and defined by reference to these three great contemporary interests. If we consider it as an organism, they constitute, so to speak, its intellectual environment; and, pushing the analogy a little further, we may say that its nutriment, its ideal content, is derived from the materials which they supply.

Again, history shows that philosophy is most susceptible to the influence of theologies in their decay, of sciences in their early growth, and of practical life in its most unsettled, restless, revolutionary epochs. In modern thought, for example, there is nothing comparable to the intense speculative movement that began more than a century ago with Kant; and this movement was preceded at its inception and at each fresh stage of its progress by a fermentation of equally unexampled intensity in theology, where it meant decay, in science, where it meant creation, and in society, where it meant a transformation of habits and a transfer of power. Nor is the reason far to seek. An accepted theology satisfies the intellectual wants of most minds, and is strong enough to put down the questionings of the few malcontents with a high

hand; while a decaying theology leaves the thirst for truth unslaked, and the search for new sources of enlightenment unrestrained. The two or three elementary truths that an infant science teaches seem fraught with far richer possibilities of application and extension than the mass of technical details into which the same science is subsequently elaborated. So also when human life is governed by a fixed law or custom, securing some rough measure of justice to all who obey it, there does not arise the need for a rational basis of conduct which is felt in times of anarchy or of revolution, and which it is the office of a perfected philosophy to meet. And by a coincidence fortunate for speculation, it is just when the theorists of a new order are most wanted that they are most likely to arise. When public life becomes so corrupt that wise and good men turn away from it with disgust, there is a chance that they may employ their leisure in tracing out the inviolable order of Nature or in constructing the ideal code of a regenerated humanity. Nor is this a mere hypothesis. Plato has more than once sketched the figure of a philosopher who, regardless of taunts and entreaties, turns away from the vulgarities of ordinary ambition to the contemplation of the Universe, and who then, under a high sense of duty, comes back from that ravishing vision to redeem his fellow-countrymen from the delusions of appetite and sense. Doubtless in these passages the Athenian

sage was referring primarily to his master Socrates and to himself; but his words are susceptible of a wider application, and throw light on the whole course of Greek speculation.

All the conditions above specified were realised about the beginning of the sixth century B.C., just before philosophy was born.

Throughout the Homeric poems we are struck by a singular absence of superstition, and a free handling of the gods of popular belief, which stands in marked contrast with the bigoted credulity known to have prevailed among the European Greeks at a much later period. We must look for the cause of this scepticism, not in any racial character or tradition, but simply in the shock to established usages, resulting from a great migratory movement. Primitive religion consists of local cults attaching themselves to fixed objects such as mountains, rivers, trees, caverns, and tombs. Hence the tendency to unbelief observed among nomadic hordes, their facile acceptance of new creeds, their reduction of theology to a more portable form, so to speak, to a more or less abstract unity of worship. But there are some physical phenomena that accompany the wanderer wherever he goes: the celestial luminaries, the upper atmosphere with its possibilities of wind, cloud, rain, thunder and lightning, the earth considered as a whole, frequently the sea. Whether or not the whole Aryan race had a common mythology connected with

these objects is doubtful; but that they furnished the materials for Homer's mythology, that is to say for the mythology of early Ionia, is as certain as anything of the kind can be. In accordance with his own social experience, Homer imagines the gods as a pleasure-loving dissolute nobility, distributing their favours according to personal preference or to the obligations of gratitude, and adjusting their differences by a rough rule of give and take; but he never forgets their naturalistic origin. It is just when they appear most detached from physical phenomena, as Hegel observes, when they meet in full synod, that the poet takes them least seriously, setting them even in a rather ridiculous light.

Nevertheless this half-ironical Olympian theology, continually vivified by contact with local cults old and new, continually purified by devout criticism, developed into a very noble faith, and supplied a bond of spiritual union to the whole Hellenic race. Its centre was the Delphic oracle where, as we saw in the first chapter, Apollo appeared only as an interpreter of his divine father's will, the mediator between Zeus the supreme god and all mankind—a near approach to monotheism. Unity of worship, here as elsewhere, carried with it a unification of the moral standard, and invested the moral law with a supernatural sanction. Like human rulers, the gods were made referees in questions of disputed right, and were not under the same temptation to give crooked judg-

ment. In particular they were chosen as witnesses to every important promise, thus converting it into an oath, the very basis of moral obligation among those who have learned to take a wider view of the social union than what is given by kinship and adoption. Now, witnesses feel aggrieved when a promise made in their presence has been broken; and indeed the only part of the *Iliad* where the gods appear as guardians of right, is where they punish Pandarus for his perfidious breach of the truce.

Gods represented in human form were not readily conceived as having existed from all time. They must be the sons of older gods; and as these were immortal, the reigning autocrat was held to have gained supreme power by dethroning his sire and predecessor, who indeed had been guilty of the same unfilial violence. It was thus that Hesiod, coming after Homer, accounted for the present order of things. His version was long accepted as authoritative by the whole Hellenic world, and formed the groundwork of that great trilogy in which Aeschylus strove to establish for ever the uncontested supremacy of Zeus. But neither Aeschylus nor any other poet could justify the means by which Zeus had originally acquired that supremacy; and the very purification of theology brought its assumptions into more and more irreconcilable conflict with the moral consciousness of a people most quick to seize the implications of its beliefs. A creed so divided against itself could

offer no serious opposition to a purely naturalistic explanation of phenomena; and its apologists, if there were any, perhaps found it convenient to forget the connexion of their gods with processes that could be interpreted in so scandalous a sense.

Zeller and others have convincingly shown that Greek philosophy was not an importation from the East. But it is equally certain that the vast superiority of early Greek to early Italian culture arose from the greater nearness and openness of its habitation to influences proceeding from the immemorial civilisations of Babylon and Egypt. It is especially evident that the rudiments of exact science, the first methods for calculating eclipses, for dealing with complicated numerical problems, for determining the sides and angles of triangles, were borrowed from the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile. It cannot be an accident that Miletus produced the earliest known Greek geometrician soon after the Milesians, first among all Greeks, were permitted to establish a factory in Egypt. For the rest, Ionian commerce and colonisation must have offered powerful incentives to the study of elementary mathematics and astronomy.

Ionian commerce and industry led also more directly to an increase of wealth, and indirectly to other consequences of a less gratifying character. Much to the confusion of old moral standards, men came to be estimated according to their money; through no fault of their own worthy citizens were

stripped of their all, and even sold into slavery; the old aristocracies were replaced by turbulent democracies, or, still worse, by tyrannies; and finally, all the cities on the coast of Asia Minor were reduced to vassalage by the Lydian monarchy.

Such was the world into which Thales, the founder of Greek philosophy, of all philosophy, was born. His native city Miletus, the Florence of Ionia, stood first beyond dispute among all the settlements on the Asiatic sea-board: first in industry, first in arms, first in science, first in serious literature. But none also was so sorely tried by foreign war, by tyranny, by furious faction fights between capitalists and labourers At last, to the great public benefit, supreme power was placed in the hands of the middle class, the small property holders. Then a Milesian poet, Phocylides, gave the earliest utterance to what had always been the guiding principle of Ionian wisdom, 'It is best to be in the middle'; to which he added, that 'an orderly State is founded on a rock,' and that 'justice includes the whole of virtue.' He also said that noble birth was nothing without persuasive speech, that wealth should be sought from agriculture, that the young should be trained to virtue. This was at a later period; but it probably shows what had long been the drift of public opinion.

Tradition tells us that Thales had it in him to be an excellent man of business; but, like Agassiz, he had no time to make money. As a politician, he

advised the Ionian cities to form themselves into a federated State with its seat at Teos, the central spot of Ionia; but the separatists were too many for him, and his energies were happily not distracted from the pursuit of knowledge. There is no reason to doubt the story that he sought for it, among other quarters, in Egypt. Modern researches make it highly probable that he and his countrymen were indebted to the Egyptians for their first knowledge of various elementary propositions in geometry as empirical truths, but that they stated those propositions in a more general form, and proved their truth by that method of deductive demonstration which has ever since been associated with mathematical science. In other words, they interposed a series of steps between the subject of their conclusion and its predicate—between, let us say, 'the angle in a semicircle' and its being 'a right angle,' or between 'the three angles of a triangle' and their being 'equal to two right angles.' Now this love of transition and mediation is, as we saw in the first chapter, a fundamental note of the Greek, or rather of the Ionian, character.

Besides his discoveries in geometry, Thales is credited with having predicted an eclipse of the sun, which the best authorities identify with one that occurred in the year 585 B.C. Indeed, it is on the strength of this date that we are enabled to determine the period at which he flourished. The Babylonian astrologers had discovered a cycle called the

saros, in which eclipses recurred, and doubtless the philosopher had access to their tables: the difference was that he almost certainly regarded the sun's temporary obscuration as an interesting astronomical phenomenon, while they registered it with fear and trembling as an omen of coming calamities.

If I broke off here I should have told all that most of his countrymen knew or cared to know about Thales during the two centuries that followed his death. To them he was the mathematician, the astronomer, the political observer, gifted with wonderful prescience in all fields alike. To us, to all since Aristotle, he has been the cosmologist who found in water the principle of things, thus opening a series of efforts to account for Nature as a whole by other than mythological causes. But there is no real inconsistency between the two views; they merely represent different aspects of one and the same mind, a mind filled with the thought of unity and order, conceived as the Limit and the Mean. His countrymen had long looked on the ocean as a circular stream by which the earth was encompassed and bounded. He may have learned on his travels, or if Herodotus was correctly informed in tracing his origin to a Phoenician stock, he may have learned by inherited tradition, that the Semites carried this belief in water as an enveloping element much further, placing it over and under as well as around the visible world—a theory adopted by the Priestly

Narrator of Genesis. Now, we have reason to suspect that Thales identified the limit of the world with its substance and first cause. Such a confusion might seem impossible did we not know that it was repeated over and over again by his successors, and not perfectly overcome even by Aristotle, who first clearly formulated the distinction between Efficient Cause, Form, and Substance.

A question which has not received sufficient attention suggests itself here. We may ask how Thales and so many of his successors came to plunge into the difficult question of what the world is made of and how it came into being, when they must have known that very much still remained to be learned about its actual constitution. Comparing them to children will not help us much. Children are in a state of continual growth, and their elders carefully impress on them the fact that they have only existed for a very short time. Hence they are naturally much interested in questions of origin. But even at the dawn of speculation the world must have seemed practically as old as it seems to us. Nevertheless, at that stage of reflection the search for beginnings dominates every line of enquiry, and impresses itself on us as a necessity of thought. It is by no means peculiar to the Ionians, for we find it in Hesiod, and afterwards in Pindar, nor to the Greeks, for we find it fully developed among the Hebrews. I am referring not only to the genetic stories of the Iahvist, but to

the general system on which the more historical narratives of the pre-exilian period are composed. In the Books of Samuel and Kings, the whole interest of the writer concentrates itself on such questions as: How came Saul to be elected? How came David to replace him? Why did Solomon rather than one of his elder brothers succeed David? How was the Temple built? What caused the division of the tribes? How was the house of Jehu raised to power?

Long before Thales, the Ionian, or possibly the Aeolian, mind worked on the same lines. If critics are right in their analysis, the original Wrath of Achilles assigned a space to the first cause of the Wrath much greater in proportion to the whole poem, though not greater in actual extent, than that which it occupies in our *Iliad*, where it fills half the first book. And throughout the Homeric poems, as we now possess them, descriptions are thrown as much as possible into causal form, into accounts of how things were made, how events began. This circumstance was first pointed out by Lessing, although it is not to be explained, as Lessing thought, by the superior artistic intuition of the poet, but by his inability to work under any other condition. For not poetry only, but also plastic art, followed the same law, delighting, whether in the Altis of Olympia or on the Acropolis of Athens, to exhibit some great beginning in the story of a religion, of a state, or of a land. And we find even so modern-minded a

historian as Thucydides expatiating at what would now be considered rather inordinate length on the causes of the Peloponnesian War.

We have, I think, to seek for an explanation of this tendency first of all in the original subordination of speculative to practical interests, knowledge being at first desired only as a means to self-preservation or to self-aggrandisement. To know the causes of things is to know how they can be produced or changed or obviated. Hence we say that knowledge is power. And when at a higher stage of intellectual progress knowledge is sought simply for its own sake, for the pleasure given by the disinterested contemplation of things in themselves, the habit of viewing them under the time-form, or, more particularly, the form of causation, continues to survive, and to keep alive the belief that nothing is really known until we know how it is produced. To an Ionian such knowledge would have the additional charm of supplying a limit in time, of marking off a group of events and combining them in one whole by their common dependence on a single principle, just as groups of objects in space are unified by a circumscribing outline, or by reference to a common centre.

Another influence tending to impose this form on the first efforts of philosophy will be found in the example of theology, which is preoccupied for the same reason, and to a still greater degree, with the search for causes. The historical narratives of Israel,

to which reference has been already made, were obviously thrown into their present form in a religious interest, their object being to exalt the power of Israel's God, and by implication the power of prayer. The Greeks too had this interest; and their anthropomorphism supplied another speculative motive which was wanting to the severer Hebrew faith. Their gods being human, were subject to generation, and reflected back that quality on the natural phenomena which they personified.

Yet the earth beneath and the starry firmament above seem the very types of eternal stability; and the sea, though superficially unstable, ever returns to the same level and the same limits—'the most just of all things,' as a Greek poet said, 'if the winds would let it alone.' It needs all our science to prove that these things also are born and shall pass away. How then did the Ionians, with their limited experience and their still more limited logic, reach the same conclusion? In this way. Seeing things truly as they appear, and reflecting them with perfect sincerity like the modern painter or poet, not like the ordinary educated modern, they discerned between earth and sky a middle region of equal or greater extent, the home of wind and mist, above all of cloud. Clouds were the true mediators between the solid structures above and below, and gave a clue to the origin of both. By their rain they fed the sea and the whole living population of the land; by their

lightning they fed the heavenly luminaries, or rather the vast sea of fire glimpsed through openings in the sky. A perfectly just intuition led Aristophanes long afterwards to pitch on the clouds as the goddesses of physical enquiry, and to make them the Chorus of his immortal satire on philosophy. But the clouds themselves are sprung from water, are a form of water; and so Thales, whether he started from the centre or from the circumference, from the mean or from the limit of things, would be equally led to the same fundamental substance.

We have studied the attitude of this wonderful man in reference to the practical life, to the science, to the theology of his time. As regards the last, we get one more tantalising gleam of light from a saying traditionally ascribed to him: 'All things are full of gods.' May we not see in this the evasion of a timid or captious question? as for instance, 'If all things come from water, what part do you leave for the gods?' Just so at a later time the great physiologist Hippocrates, or one of his school, in speaking of certain disorders commonly attributed to a divine visitation, declared that all diseases were equally divine, and that all were equally natural.

Thales apparently wrote nothing; and his work in philosophy might have perished had it not been carried on by a still greater man, his disciple and successor Anaximander, also a Milesian. Some of the views attributed to Anaximander were probably

held in common by the whole school, and as such have been anticipated in our study of his predecessor. We do not hear that he made any discoveries in geometry; but he created geographical science, and the first map of the world ever attempted was drawn by him. It was a performance more distinguished by its symmetrical distribution of land and water than by its exact reproduction of the surface of our globe, which indeed Anaximander did not know to be a globe at all. In strict accordance with his own experience, he figured the earth as a disc-shaped body with a slightly convex upper surface, floating freely in space. No doubt the varying elevation of the pole-star suggested this superficial curvature, while the apparent passage of the heavenly bodies under the horizon from west to east proved the insulation of the body round which they travelled. By another generalisation from the supposed shape of the earth, he conceived those luminaries to be cylindrical openings in the sky, letting through light and heat from encircling hoops of fire.

How did this compact structure, this orderly frame of things arise? Out of an undifferentiated indeterminate something, was the answer of the Ionian cosmologist, as it is still the answer of the modern physicist. Like his master, Anaximander attributed a great part to water in the original formation of the universe; and, with admirable sagacity, he conjectured that man in particular had been developed, not out

of a primeval baby, which would have been incapable of surviving, but out of an aquatic animal protected by a prickly husk. This, however, was a mere detail in the grand sweep of his thought. More enterprising than Thales, he passed beyond the flaming walls of the world and sought for its true limit and source in the illimitable space beyond. What did he find there? How determine the indeterminable? He could but call it the Infinite, without bounds in extent or in duration, producing and regulating all things. That which in his experience was most formless and incalculable, the whirlwind and the cloud-rack, offered some likeness of its activity. Yet, properly speaking, it resembled none of the elements, but was the neutral principle in which their differences disappeared. Here again, as with Thales, the mean and the limit are one.

Nothing but the Infinite persists. Our world, like numberless other worlds before and after it, must pass out of existence again—into nonentity, as would seem, for we are told that Anaximander proved the necessity of an inexhaustible source of being from the perpetual evanescence of things. This evanescence was to him no subject for regret, but rather a postulate of the moral law. In his own words, as we have them quoted from the first philosophical treatise ever written by a Greek: 'Things must give justice and satisfaction to each other for their injustice, according to the order of time.' 'Rather poetical terms,' says the excellent Simplicius, who has preserved them for

us. Yes, but it was the poetry of the whole Ionian race, the poetic belief in the ultimate identity of natural with moral law. Anaximander could not have meant that individual existence was a wrong; for then it could not be expiated by another wrong. He meant that turn and turn about was a fair rule; that those who temporarily occupy this bank and shoal of time were, so far, keeping others off it, but would soon be pushed over by the 'hungry generations' behind them, even as they had pushed others before them over the brink. As Marcus Aurelius said seven centuries afterwards, 'we must die that the world may be ever young.' Anaximander, a contemporary and fellow-townsman of Phocylides, was filled with the same reverence for justice, and believed it to be the sum, not only of virtue, but also of cosmic law. In theology he seems to have developed the half ironical scientific fetichism of his master into an equally ironical polytheism. The perishing worlds, he said, were so many gods: the Infinite alone was immortal.

With less genius and authority than either of his predecessors, Anaximenes, the third and last representative of the Milesian school, still marked an epoch in philosophy and exercised a far-reaching influence on subsequent speculation. He exhibits in a high degree the Ionian dislike for indeterminateness, the Ionian genius for definite statements, the Ionian search for continuity. But in him the ethical motive

is to all appearance wholly wanting. He accepted the infinite substance of Anaximander, but identified it with air—a preference of one form of matter over the rest, which the elder thinker might have considered unjust. But, besides being a return to the guidance of experience, his choice of air shows that philosophy was extending the suffrage to a new class of ideas. Where meteorological and astronomical points of view had hitherto reigned supreme, physiology now gained admittance. Air, Anaximenes argued, in the form of breath, is the unifying principle of the animal body: therefore it is the substance best fitted to hold together, to constitute the universe. Again, centre and circumference are one; but this time the centre becomes almost subjective, being found in our body, nay, even in what a Greek thought was our soul. This connexion between man and Nature was never again lost sight of, and may help us to solve some future problems.

Again, Anaximenes was the first to interpret all phenomena, as we say now, in terms of mass and movement. Anaximander had much to say about the qualitative antithesis hot and cold, as a world-factor, assuming it without more ado as a process for ever at work within the Infinite. His successor reduced it to a mechanical change in the elemental air which, according to him, becomes hot when rarified, cold when condensed. That is why people part their lips to blow hot and press them together to

blow cold. His reasoning is genuinely scientific, although science has reversed his conclusion.

Anaximenes may have lived to see his native city go up in flames after a heroic resistance to the Persian invaders. Miletus was subsequently rebuilt, but her philosophical school did not survive the catastrophe of 494. The scene now changes to another Ionian city, Ephesus.

Ephesus passed through the same political vicissitudes as Miletus, but at somewhat later periods, corresponding to the much lower civilisation of its people. Very little was done for literature, and nothing for science, on the banks of the Cayʼstrus. All the higher energies of the inhabitants seemed to be absorbed in building, rebuilding, and beautifying their famous temple of Artemis—not the chaste Greek huntress, but an Asiatic goddess of exuberant fertility, worshipped with passionate and orgiastic rites. At last the sombre enthusiasm maintained by this religion met and fused itself with the luminous, orderly genius of Ionia. From their union sprang the one great Ephesian, Heracleitus. Born of a highly aristocratic family, and sympathising neither with tyranny nor with democracy, he took no part in public affairs. He must have lived through the decisive struggle between Persia and Hellas, but there is no evidence that he ever gave it a thought. Yet the acquisition of knowledge as such, the gratification of intellectual curiosity for its own sake, did not attract him. What

he craved was wisdom, reason, life in and with the whole, such as no dispersed enquiries could give. Others feeling the same want, the same repulsion, have become mystics: they have sought, by prolonged torpor or by prolonged excitement, to lose their individuality in the All. Heracleitus was no mystic, no dreamer, not a *haschisch*-eater of any kind. It was just in their dreams, he said, that men enter each into a particular world of his own: the waking world is the same for all. Nor would any merely personal religion have satisfied him. 'The eternal order,' he tells us, 'was not made by any god or any man': in a sense it might be called Zeus, and yet in another sense it might not. Zeus, we may suppose, sounded too much like an individual, at best like a part of the whole.

In not one of the numerous fragments of his work on Nature that have been preserved does Heracleitus acknowledge himself indebted to other philosophers. Yet his system would be unintelligible as a historical fact without reference to the Milesian school; and it would have been more in accordance with his rule of living in the whole had he admitted the filiation—not that such candour was possible before the age of Hume, or, in the completest sense, before the age of Hegel. It will be remembered that the Milesians sought both at the centre and at the outer verge of things for their principle and substance, and that Anaximenes had found it in air. But Anaximenes

himself suggested the existence of a still remoter element when he said that the stars were fire, and that they did not heat us on account of their vast distance. And the phenomena of animal heat might suggest that fire rather than air was the central source of life, since the breath we draw in is colder than the breath we exhale. Guided, as we may suppose, by such reasonings, Heracleitus promoted fire to the place of honour. By this we must understand fire in the most literal sense, the same that burns on our hearths. A singularly picturesque anecdote of the philosopher may be quoted in illustration of his theory. Certain strangers, who came one day to see Heracleitus, found him standing and warming himself by a stove. Seeing them hang back shyly as if afraid to disturb him, the Ephesian sage exclaimed: 'Enter boldly, for here also there are gods.' The sensible fire was one god, but where was the other? It was in the soul of Heracleitus himself. According to him the dry soul, that is, the soul in which the fiery principle most completely prevails, is the wisest, the most in unison with Nature.

So far we have apparently no more than a fresh variation, not more fruitful than another, on the old elementary theme. What raises Heracleitus high above his predecessors, above all other early physicists, is that he could interpret fire, and through fire all Nature, no longer as a mere substance, but as a power and a process. Each thinker in turn had

exhibited the transformation of one element into another, tracking matter round a cycle of change back to its original source. Well, says Heracleitus, this process of change is the fundamental fact of Nature; nay, there is no other fact: all things flow, we cannot bathe twice in the same river. But one body exhibits the continuity and necessity of change more clearly than any other, and that is fire, for in it we have activity and transmutation combined. Earth, as a rule, seems neither to move nor change; water runs, but remains cold and fluid; air blows and varies in temperature, but remains the same soft, circumambient, invisible substance. Fire alone exists by seizing on and transforming into itself something which is not fire, and therefore from it all other things must be derived, 'as every merchandise buys and is bought for gold.' 'The universe always was and is and shall be an ever-living fire, kindled and quenched according to measure.'

According to measure, be it observed. The Ionian love of limitation, the saving sense of sophrosynê, reasserts its claims, and hangs a steady foambow above the roaring cataract of change. Limitation prevails not only at the centre and circumference, but through the whole course of Nature. For example, so much fire is allotted to the sun for his daily expenditure, and 'should he transgress that measure, the Erinyes who help Justice would find him out.' Along with this distinction and restriction

there is a thoroughgoing continuity and correlation, which Heracleitus expressed in the pointed paradoxical Greek way as an identity of contraries. 'Fire lives by the death of earth, and air lives by the death of fire; water lives by the death of air, earth by the death of water.' Not only so, but coexistent contraries maintain and condition one another. It needs a combination of high and low notes to make a harmony; but there is an unheard harmony still better than the heard; while the harmonious itself should be joined with the discordant for perfect musical effects. Following this method, he can say that good and evil are one; meaning that what is salutary for one constitution is fatal to another, but also that the pleasure of health is intensified by sickness, gratification by hunger, rest by fatigue. We should not know what justice was without injustice, nor what knowledge itself was without ignorance. Should it be urged that contraries also tend to destroy one another, Heracleitus fully admits the fact, and rejoices over it. 'War,' he says, 'is the father and king of all: some he makes gods and some men, some bond and some free.' For this reason he condemns Homer's prayer that strife should perish from heaven and earth. Along with strife generation would cease.

Yet the Ephesian sage was, as we have seen, no individualist, though a place might well have been found for individualism, or even for anarchism, in

so elastic a system. He had the true Ionian hatred for hybris, that outrageous bound-breaking which was the opposite of sophrosynê, and would have had it quenched with more zeal than a conflagration. He bids the people fight for the law as they would for the city-walls. But there is something still stronger and more sacred than any local rule, the common good, the supreme law whence all particular laws derive their validity, whose power, greater than that of Butler's conscience, equals its right. Identifying it with the highest human reason, he calls this law the eternal Logos—a name of which more was to be heard. And, like the religion of the future, he taught that some day all things would be swallowed up by fire.

Heracleitus was the first Greek philosopher who distinguished between sense and reason, giving the advantage to the latter. True, he preferred the evidence of one's own eyes to authority, to the reports of others; but the necessities of his system led him to distrust even this. We cannot see the universal flux of things; we cannot see the identity of contraries: we know by reason that they must be. And he who speaks in the name of reason does not ask to be believed on his own authority; he must not be called arbitrary or subjective, for what he appeals to is the reason in others, uniting him to them, uniting all to the One.

This philosophy of Heracleitus was the ripe fruit

of all that led up to it, the seed of all that came after it in Hellas. Whether men were stung into passionate contradiction by his paradoxes, or induced to mediate between them and their opposites, or to fill his formulas with a richer content, they did but confirm his doctrine of the flux, his defiant proclamation of war as the king and father of all. He was a thinker of that class to whom nothing thoughtful can be strange. Whatever notes were enumerated in the Introduction as characteristic of the Greek mind, distinction, continuity, antithesis, identity in difference, circumscribing and unifying form, constitute the very substance of his doctrine. But that which was its strength was also—to speak like himself—its weakness. It was too formal, too abstract, too elastic. Heracleitus cut himself loose from the science of his time. He contributed no new truth or method of finding truth to geography, to mathematics, or to astronomy. Indeed, the affinities of his philosophy are rather with the biological sciences. He constantly suggests such ideas as the synthesis of decomposition and recomposition, the consensus of the vital functions, the correspondence of organism and environment, the struggle for existence, the association of individuals for mutual defence. From this point of view we should perhaps look for his true successors in the great physiological school of Hippocrates. But this makes it all the more evident that with him the first direct line of Ionian thought had

reached its extreme philosophical limit. Speculation could make no further advance until it had been fertilised by contact with new wants and new experiences, with the new world of Western Hellas, and with the religious revival that was sweeping over the whole Hellenic race.

CHAPTER III

THE IONIANS IN ITALY

THE same century that witnessed the first birth and the provisional consummation of East Ionian philosophy, witnessed also three events of capital importance for the future fortunes of Greek thought. These were the rise of democracy, the development of a popular religion, and the drift of Ionian emigration towards Italy, consequent on the pressure of Asiatic conquest.

Democracy has been called a form of government. It is that, but it is much more—a form of society, one may almost say a form of sentiment. As such it may prevail in communities where political power has not yet been transferred to the people or to their delegates; indeed, this transfer is not permanently possible unless it is accompanied by a revolution in the distribution of property or in the trend of belief. And it is possible for truly democratic ideas to prevail among the classes which would most energetically protest against the surrender of their privileges to the majority.

Individuality is often claimed as a characteristic of aristocracies. But the claim seems to rest on a misconception. Powerfully organised aristocracies, like those of Venice or of the old Roman republic, are not favourable to diversity; they rather regard any departure from the traditional standard with not unreasonable dread. It is aristocracies on the verge of dissolution and permeated by the democratic leaven that evolve a rich growth of divergent types. We find great individuality in the Homeric poems; but at no time does the constitution of the Ionian cities seem to have been strictly oligarchic; and, on the other hand, the personality of the epic singers is kept severely in abeyance, a common type of composition being imposed on all, so much so indeed that their peculiarities only reveal themselves to the minutest criticism. What a contrast to the succeeding period, to the self-revelations of a Hesiod, an Archilochus, or a Sappho! It is the same in philosophy. An epic impersonality is the note of the Milesian cosmologists. Heracleitus detected the advent of individualism in philosophy, and repudiated it with a vehemence which yet, along with other indications, betrays a similar tendency in himself. And we shall meet with it to an even greater extent in the thinkers who will next come up for examination.

Persuasion is the instrument of popular government, and more or less of all governments where

the people are a force to be reckoned with. In consonance with an aristocratic tradition, the first cosmologists disdained to support their theories by argument—at least we hear of none that the Milesians used; and Heracleitus merely condescends to a few illustrations, such as that of the bow and its string, which, though drawn in opposite directions, combine to produce a single effect. Even here a good deal is left for the reader to supply from his own imagination, what I have just cited being an expansion of three words in the original; and Heracleitus was, in fact, proverbial for his obscurity. His successors leave much to be desired on the score of lucidity; but at least they are conscious of a call to prove their allegations. Another evidence of increasing popularisation is the use of verse as a vehicle of philosophical exposition. It is a mistake to suppose that this preference for metrical form, limited as it was to the Western Greeks, marks an archaic stage of thought, an inability to distinguish clearly between the provinces of poetry and science. It was an attempt to obtain wider circulation for speculations hitherto monopolised by the few. Even Lucretius, and long afterwards Voltaire, addressing themselves to highly educated audiences, found didactic poetry a useful instrument of propagandism: much more was this the case when readers and books were scarce, when memorising and recitation were the ordinary means for literary publicity.

So far the popular movement was not unfavourable to philosophy, which indeed had everything to gain from the breaking-up of conventions, and from the demand for lucid, convincing expression. But the profound religious movement which ensued on the emergence of a lower social stratum to power and influence was a more doubtful benefit. We saw in the last chapter what the religion of the higher classes in Ionia meant, how little belief in supernaturalism it involved, how little restraint it imposed on the scientific investigation of Nature. The pure and noble Apolline religion which succeeded it, while giving a new sanction to morality, was even less associated with superstitious practices. But they were not religions for the people, nor could its advent leave them undisturbed. Both had the same fatal gap. They were essentially Olympian religions, concerned only with light and life and joy, with the radiant powers of the upper air, not with the underworld, the abode of dead men and of the gods who send up food and drink to living men. Such faiths inculcated no duty towards the dead beyond the duty of putting their bodies out of sight as quickly as might be. After the funeral no further honours were paid to their tombs, nor were they supposed to exert any influence for good or evil on the fortunes of the survivors. Such had not been the religion of old Greece, if we may judge by the sumptuousness of the tombs at Mycenae, and by certain ceremonies

still practised after their original meaning had evaporated, as at the funeral of Patroclus. Such certainly was not the religion of Greece in historic times, as we know by literary and monumental evidence. And such, we may be sure, was at no time the religion of the poorer classes, of those who lived not by gifts and rapine but by manual industry, the folk for whom Hesiod wrote, whom Homer's 'shepherds of the people' sheared and slaughtered. In all ages and countries the labouring population have been remarkable for their worship of the dead, which they frequently associate with the sanctities of family life and the annual cycle of their rural occupations. And out of this worship has grown the idea of a future life, the religious doctrine of a divine retribution beyond the grave.

In the later portions of the *Odyssey* there are clear indications that the belief in man's immortality was growing among the Ionians, and had begun to affect that exalted circle to which the epic poets belonged. But it was not received with much enthusiasm, if we may judge from the words put into the mouth of Achilles, that he had rather live as a poor serf than reign over all the kingdoms of the dead. In truth the belief meant little enough when it was isolated from the worship of a whole cycle of divinities, about whom Homer knew or cared very little—the Chthonian or underground gods, as they are called: Hermes, Dionysus, Demeter and Persephonê, the Erinyes.

Not only were these the givers of food and drink, the guardians of order, and the avengers of crime, but two among them, Dionysus and Persephonê, like the Syrian Adonis or the Egyptian Osiris, sharing the vicissitudes of humanity, birth and early suffering, and death and descent into subterranean darkness, gave it also, by their resurrection, a symbolical assurance of participation in their perpetual bliss. And a communion with these gods would be still more vividly brought home by the fact that they entered into the very substance of their worshippers under the form of bread and wine.

As the old Olympian theology had received its literary expression from Homer and Hesiod, so the new faith was formulated by the Orphic poets of the sixth century, and became an Orphic theology. A forged revelation, ascribed to the mythical singer Orpheus, told how heaven and earth were created by Dionysus under the name of Phanes; how this Phanes was swallowed by Zeus, to whom he communicated his wonder-working power; how a second Dionysus, called Zagreus, sprang from the union of Zeus with Demeter; how when Zagreus was torn to pieces and devoured by the envious Titans, his heart was saved and formed into a third Dionysus, the son of Zeus and Semelê, the god of wine and of bacchanalian orgies; while the Titans, consumed by the vengeful lightnings of Zeus, were reduced to ashes, which were swept over the earth by the winds, and became a seed

of immortal life to the animals and men that inhaled them. The soul does not perish after death, but enters a new body, where she expiates by fresh sufferings the sins committed in her former incarnations. But Zeus has given power to Dionysus and Persephonê to deliver the tormented from the circle of metempsychosis, the endless concatenation of guilt and misery. For those who have been initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, there is a hope of deliverance held out. Pindar tells us that after passing three lives on earth in perfect innocence, they will be rewarded by a happy eternity in the islands of the blest, blown round by ocean breezes and glowing with golden flowers. 'Happy is he,' exclaims the same poet elsewhere in reference to the Eleusinian mysteries, 'who has seen them before descending into the hollows of earth. He knows the end of life, he knows its god-given beginning.' With more unrestricted spirituality, Aeschylus declares that there is another Zeus in the world below, who pronounces a final judgment on transgressions committed here; while Sophocles, returning to the older and narrower creed, is content to echo the sentiment of Pindar.

Doubtless the great poets here cited, and the Orphicists who preceded them, exhibit the popular faith, not as it originally emerged, but in the exalted form which it assumed under the influence of the Olympian or Apolline religion, just as the Attic drama itself was a product of the same two tendencies

combined. What interests us here is to note that the primary impulse came from below, from the sons of the soil. It was popular government that brought up this passionate personal religion, this apotheosis of Nature's reproductive powers, this hope of another world where wrongs should be redressed. Our evidence for the alleged connexion is more than presumptive, and does not rest entirely on juxtaposition in time. Attica, the citadel of democracy, was also the original seat of the Eleusinian mysteries, the scene of the most splendid Dionysiac celebrations, and the home of the Orphic religion. At a later period than that which we have reached, a reported violation of the mysteries, and a manifest outrage on the statues of Hermes, a Chthonian god, were interpreted as symptoms of a plot to overthrow the democracy of Athens. Still more significant is the fact that, about the end of the seventh or the beginning of the sixth century—that is, at a time when the tyrants were the armed champions of the poorer classes—Periander, tyrant of Corinth, fostered the development of the dithyramb, a hymn sung to Dionysus by the country people; while Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon, pursued precisely the same policy a few years later, as part of a systematic scheme for the elevation of the people at the expense of the Dorian nobility.

Not only was the new religion more in sympathy with popular instincts than the aristocratic forms of

worship and tradition had been, it was also more nearly allied with the cults and beliefs of the half-civilised or barbarous tribes to the north of Greece. This connexion was quite obvious to the Greeks themselves. They always associated the Dionysiac orgies with the wild scenery of Thrace; Orpheus, although originally a Greek god, became transformed into a Thracian by his rôle as a prophet of Dionysus; the introduction of the Eleusinian mysteries into Attica was ascribed to the Thracian Eumolpus; the worship both of Demeter and of Dionysus bore an unmistakable resemblance to the orgies of the Phrygian mother-goddess; and the passionate music of Phrygian flutes, hateful to Apollo and Athenê, became an indispensable stimulant in the new forms of Hellenic worship. And, significantly enough, Thebes, the connecting link between Hellenism and barbarism, counted also among the holy places of the Dionysiac myth.

Here then we seem to be confronted by a formidable combination of forces, seriously threatening the old Hellenic spirit, the old aristocratic self-restraint, the sophrosynê, the saved and saving reason to which philosophy was giving a world-wide expression. But this was not all. Older religions, when they are not utterly extirpated, always benefit by the competition of a new religion. We may reasonably suppose then that the Olympian faith received a great accession of force and fervour from the stimulating rivalry of

Dionysus and Demeter, that its scriptures—the poems of Homer and Hesiod—were more zealously studied and recited, and that it was thus brought into sharper collision with the rising rationalism of the philosophic schools. But before passing to the study of this inevitable conflict, we must glance at the third phase of the transitional period—the Ionian emigration to Italy.

Owing to geographical circumstances, the Ionians of Europe for a long time sent very few settlers to the west, and the Ionians of Asia Minor sent none. Sicily was chiefly occupied by Dorian, southern Italy by Achaian, colonies. But, towards the middle of the sixth century, the people of Phocaea left their home in a body in order to escape the Persian yoke, and, after various adventures, some of them founded a city called Elea on the western coast of Lucania, in Southern Italy. Besides this settlement there seems to have been a certain intellectual intercourse between Croton, the most powerful of the Achaian colonies, and Samos, one of the chief seats of Ionian culture. Crotoniate physicians ranked as the first of their profession in all Hellas; and one of them, the celebrated Democedes, practised for a time in Samos, while Pythagoras, the Samian mathematician, settled at Croton. Colonisation, navigation, and trade must have given a powerful impetus to the study of mathematics and astronomy. Knowledge of the stars is necessary in

finding the way over strange waters; knowledge of geometry is helpful in distributing allotments and raising public edifices; knowledge of arithmetic in exchanging goods. Hence, as we should expect, the exact sciences were cultivated with far more zeal and success in Italy and Sicily than in the older Hellenic lands. Hence at Croton and Elea philosophy leant on mathematics to a far greater extent than at Miletus, and concerned itself almost exclusively with problems of space. Hence also resulted a very curious consequence. The home-staying Ionians, occupied, as such people are, with the weather and with their health, took their speculative bias from meteorology and physiology; they interpreted the universe as a cycle of changes. The Italiote Ionians, on the contrary, generalising from the immutability of space, tended to deny change altogether.

One more element remains to be noticed. The occupation of civilising a new and barbarous country, when it leaves room for thought at all, seems to foster the most mystical kind of speculation, joined with a passion for new experiments in society. At the present moment the Far West is becoming what New England was fifty years ago, a home of transcendentalism; and there is no State of the American Union where theosophy and socialism flourish so luxuriantly as in California. Mysticism is also ready to ally itself with mathematical philosophy, as we

see from the case of Auguste Comte. It may be that the breach with fixed traditions involved in the foundation of new communities, and the seemingly magical power of going beyond experience conferred by deductive reasoning, are enough to explain these phenomena. It is certain, at any rate, that they meet us in Western Hellas. In this instance the release from the sobering influence of Semitic culture, and the exclusive domination of poetic literature, should also be taken into account.

Among the famous men to whom Heracleitus refers with curt scorn as not having acquired wisdom through much learning, occurs the name of Pythagoras. Such is the only contemporary evidence about one who, in later ages, became the hero of a vast fictitious literature, but of whom we know less than of any other thinker of equally high reputation. It is tolerably certain that Pythagoras was born in Samos, that towards the close of the sixth century he migrated to southern Italy, that he became the head of a powerful school in which mathematical learning was combined with aristocratic tendencies, and that he taught a religion either identical with or closely allied to Orphicism, a religion in which the doctrine of immortality and metempsychosis occupied a prominent place. Should this seem inconsistent with what has been stated respecting the democratic origin of the Orphic religion, it must be remembered that the action and reaction of opposite

tendencies was one of the great governing facts of Greek life and thought; to which it may be added that Pythagoreanism was associated with a peculiar devotion to Apollo, the central figure of the Olympian religion.

If the connexion between theory and practice, between cosmology and ethics, though always present, lies latent as an unsuspected motive in the earlier systems of philosophy, in the Pythagorean school it is overt and proclaimed. While the distinctions of right and wrong, after fading out of recognition in the public polity of Miletus and Ephesus, returned to a more glorious life in their philosophy as regulative forms of Nature, in the fresh and growing communities of Magna Graecia the same august laws came back to mankind from their heavenly refuge as principles of a high and severe legislation. Pythagoreanism failed indeed, as all such attempts to reform society by the methods of pure reason must fail at first. At a period of uncertain but probably early date the movement provoked a furious popular outbreak; the meeting-houses of the brotherhood were burned down, and they themselves were either massacred or hunted into exile. But the reforming spirit of the school lived on; it received a far more comprehensive expression from Plato, and was bequeathed by Platonism to the Stoics and to the Christian Church.

When the Pythagoreans passed to the study of

Nature they showed the same innovating and constructive tendency, the same disregard for superficial experience, the same love for ideal perfection. Like Heracleitus, they placed fire at the circumference, the outer limit of the universe. But it revolted their sense of symmetry that fire should not also occupy the inner and more important limit, the centre. They did not place the sun in that position; scientific imagination had not risen to such a daring defiance of sense. But they took the bold step of declaring that our earth was one of the planets, and that it revolved round an unseen central fire, the heat and light of which are reflected back to us from the sun. Doubtless the recent discovery that the moon shines with borrowed light gave a quite new importance to reflection, and suggested a wish to extend its range. Opposite the earth, and, as would appear, at an equal distance on the other side of the central fire, they placed an invisible planet called the Antichthon. This curious fancy has been explained by the necessity of making up ten heavenly bodies (the nine others were the starry sphere, the five planets, the sun, moon, and earth); but the mere sacredness of the number ten would not, I think, have been in itself sufficient to suggest so unlikely a manifestation of its importance. It seems more probable that there was an acknowledged gap waiting to be filled up. We are told that Pythagoras first discovered that the morning and evening star are the same, and

whether or not this be true, the fact itself may have become known to the Ionians about this time. Now, it must be remembered that Mercury, a sufficiently conspicuous object in southern skies, is, like Venus, alternately a morning and an evening star, and would be recognised at the same time with her as a single planet. Thus the heavens would at one stroke be robbed of two denizens, reducing the total number of luminous immortals from ten—counting the stellar sphere as a single orb —to eight. If the view propounded here be correct, a religious anxiety to complete the time-honoured dekad set the Pythagoreans speculating about unseen orbs, just as the perturbations of Uranus and the variations of Algol suggested the existence of such bodies to the imagination of modern astronomers. The result was the central fire and the Antichthon.

Aristotle is very sarcastic on the Pythagoreans for deserting the safe paths of experience, distressing themselves about the constitution of the universe, and rearranging it in accordance with their theories. But in point of fact they went no wider of the mark than he did, if as wide; and at least their 'questionings of sense and outward things' performed the inestimable service of clearing a way for more successful and even more paradoxical theories. Another point on which he attacks them is their system of deriving the more from the less perfect, the completed organism from the germ, whereas his own

principle was, conversely, to derive the germ from the organism. Here too their anticipation of modern ideas may be explained by the affinity of their ethics to the practical and progressive tendencies of modern society.

Speaking generally, their method was to derive the more complex from the simpler forms of existence. Their mathematical studies taught them to consider solid figures as constructed from surfaces, surfaces from lines, and lines from points; while numbers were still more obviously composed of units. Pythagoras himself is said to have discovered that musical notes are produced by the vibration of chords bearing to one another an exact numerical proportion, and to have demonstrated that most important of geometrical propositions — that in a right-angled triangle the square of the side subtending the right angle equals the squares of the sides which contain it. On this slender basis he or his disciples built up the theory that all things are made of numbers, just as the Eastern Ionians had said that they were made of water or of some other element.

It will help us to understand the Pythagorean paradox if we bear in mind, first, that at this stage of reflection knowing and being were very imperfectly differentiated, so that the first steps in exact science were easily identified with the first beginnings of Nature; and secondly, that the Greeks did not think of numbers as pure abstractions, but in the

most literal sense as figures—that is to say, limited portions of space, not only 'square' or 'cube,' as we still say, but also 'oblong,' and sundry other shapes. They were, in fact, feeling their way towards the general notion of space.

Anaximander had taught by implication the infinity of space from without, its boundless extension round the world. The Pythagoreans seem to have discovered its infinity from within, its capacity for being divided without end. This was a conclusion that necessarily followed from the famous Pythagorean theorem. If we take an equal-sided right-angled triangle, we shall find that the square of the hypothenuse (the side opposite to the right angle) is exactly double the square described on either of the cathetes (the sides containing the right angle). But this is equivalent to saying that the hypothenuse is incommensurable with either of the cathetes, for the square root of 2 cannot be expressed in finite numbers. That is to say, if you divide the hypothenuse into any number of equal parts, however small, you cannot divide the cathete into any number of equivalent units: there will always be a remainder. And this implies the infinite divisibility of space, which was already thought of as infinitely extended. Both extremes were alike repulsive to the Greek mind. Accordingly it took refuge in that which lies between them, in the Limit, first recognised as such by the Pythagoreans. They opposed it to the Unlimited

as good to evil: and on the type of this opposition they drew out a series of antithetical couples, such as unity and plurality, rest and motion, light and darkness, out of which they supposed the universe to be made.

It now becomes possible to conjecture why Heracleitus spoke so depreciatingly of Pythagoras. His philosophy was constructed on quite another principle —the principle of transformation, fluidity, evasiveness. Too much was made of mere antithesis in the school of Croton. Such sharply pointed contrasts do not express the truth of Nature with all her Protean metamorphoses. The extremes of every opposing couple are essential to each other's existence, and pass continually into each other: they are, in fact, one and the same thing. But there was another way of resolving the discord, to which our attention must now be given.

Xenophanes is mentioned by Heracleitus, together with Pythagoras, among those whom learning had not taught wisdom. They may possibly have met, for Xenophanes was born at Colophon, a city not far from Ephesus, and the two philosophers had a good deal in common. But both had passionate convictions which they were given to expressing in language of corresponding intensity, likely enough to cause quarrels. The one with whom we are now concerned shows, still more than his austere critic, the note of lyric individualism to which attention has already

been drawn as a characteristic of the times. We learn from the extant fragments of his poems that Xenophanes began to travel at twenty-five, and spent no less than sixty-seven years wandering about Hellas. It is possible that he earned money by the recitation of his own verses. At any rate, he speaks with what looks like bitter professional jealousy of the honours and emoluments heaped on boxers, wrestlers, racers, and chariot-drivers, who, as he naïvely puts it, were much less deserving of such rewards than he was. Like a true Ionian, he thought that mind should be preferred to muscle. Another annoyance was that the after-dinner and fireside conversation of his countrymen should turn on fictitious old stories of Titans and Centaurs rather than on improving topics. He liked people to talk about themselves and what they had seen, doubtless as a good opening for the introduction of his own views and experiences. History interested him intensely, and the past lived again before his imagination in a series of brilliant pictures. He saw the old Ionians, as yet uncorrupted by Lydian profligacy, and undegraded by domestic tyranny, walking gravely about the Agora in purple cloaks with their hair arranged in perfumed tresses. He describes such a banquet as would have delighted those ancient worthies, with the guests waiting for garlands to be put on their heads as they recline round bowls of odorous wine, not to be drunk without a copious infusion of clear fresh water; for modera-

tion, justice, and piety should be uppermost in men's thoughts. Perhaps, on the occasion of some such decorous festivity, he would ask whether it was right to believe things of the divine powers that would be a disgrace to mortals, and recite without offence the famous hexameters in which he denounces Homer and Hesiod for attributing theft, adultery, and mutual deception to the gods. If the company were not too sleepy, or if some one did not start a conversation about the next Olympic games, he might go on to explain that those old poets were simply making a pantheon after the image of their own society; that the great mistake was to indulge in anthropomorphism of any kind, a practice only worthy of barbarians—our philosophic poet would not miss the opportunity of working in his own observations as a traveller—for the Aethiopians, he would have them now, think of their gods as woolly-headed and flat-nosed, and the Thracians of theirs as blue-eyed and fair-haired; just as lions and bulls, if they could paint, would make gods in their own image.

We have one or two indications going to prove that the new Dionysiac religion, notwithstanding its great seriousness, pleased Xenophanes just a little as Homer's frivolous legends. Asked by the people of Elea whether they should sacrifice to Leucothea and lament for her, he bid them not lament for her if they thought her a goddess and not sacrifice to her if they thought her a woman. And

in general he held it as impious to believe that the gods were ever born as that they ever died. In truth, according to Xenophanes, there was only one supreme god, who never moved, who saw and heard and thought with his whole being, whose will was accomplished without an effort; and this god, returning to old and widespread ideas, he seems to have identified with the vault of heaven.

Xenophanes was not a pantheist. He did not deify the whole material universe. The exceedingly scanty information at our disposal makes it probable that he looked on the lower world as a realm of change open to strictly scientific observation, following, in this respect, the lead of the Milesian school. Like Thales, he derived the winds from the sea, and all other things from a mixture of water and earth. The earth he conceived as extending downwards to infinity, an idea perhaps suggested by the infinite air of Anaximenes. Like the Milesians, he was no abstracted dreamer, but a thoroughly scientific observer, who could quote the fossil remains found on dry land as evidences of former alluvial deposits, explaining them to be hardened impressions of animals taken on mud.

In the course of his travels Xenophanes visited Elea, an Ionian colony situated in what may be called the Maremma of Southern Italy, and devoted to the worship of Demeter. Among his hearers was a young man named Parmenides, of goodly presence,

noble birth, and high position in the State; like him a metrical rhetorician, but of more sustained declamatory fervour, like him a thinker, but of more penetrating originality and systematic completeness. As a philosopher, indeed, we can only compare Parmenides to his great contemporary Heracleitus; and he had, what Heracleitus wanted, a familiarity with the best science of his age, such as could only be acquired in the Italian schools. Undistracted by the infinite curiosity of the Asiatic Ionians, he concentrated his attention on the new astronomy, including, we may suppose, as much geometry as was available for its study. We are told on good authority that he discovered the sphericity of the earth, and first divided its surface into zones. The new views of geography, whoever may have been their author, proved no less suggestive to Parmenides than the heliocentric astronomy was destined to be, long afterwards, to another son of the same soil, Giordano Bruno, and fraught with no less momentous speculative consequences. But the suggestiveness was of a precisely opposite character. To Bruno the Copernican system was a revelation of infinity. It broke down the prison-walls of the universe, gave back immensity to space, and made room for innumerable worlds. At the same time, it opened up endless vistas in the other direction, the direction of sub-division and minuteness, giving rise to new atomic and monadic theories. The great discovery of the Greek geo-

graphers had an effect precisely the reverse. The doctrine of the earth's sphericity at once put an end to the doctrine of its downward extension to infinity, held by Xenophanes. Then, by an inevitable association, the same discredit attached itself to other infinities, and all the more so because of the habitual Greek preference for limitation, now expressed more strongly in the absence of Asiatic influences. The Pythagoreans had shared that preference, and had even been the first to formulate it in abstract terms; but they had placed an evil principle by the side of the good principle, and had made it a joint factor in their scheme of things. To Parmenides such rivalry was intolerable. With the discovery of the earth's true shape one great antithesis had already disappeared. Xenophanes, with his imperfect astronomy, might oppose heaven and earth, regarding the higher region alone as luminous, animated, and divine. But now that earth and heaven were shown to be concentric and contiguous spheres, the distinction vanished, and they melted into one, the perfect whole beyond which there was nothing else. And with the disappearance of this fundamental division, every other division collapsed. There was no need to puzzle over the infinite divisibility of space: space could not be divided at all. The distinctions associated with colour, resistance, and movement were illusory. Earth, in this system, acquires the transparency and homogeneity of heaven; heaven acquires the immobility of

earth. Both, in fact, are swallowed up in the intuition of absolute space.

From the identification of existence with body, and of body with extension, it followed that the earlier cosmogonies were unnecessary and delusive; the universe has existed eternally under the form of a finite sphere. It is absolutely inconceivable that the parts of space should be created or destroyed or moved about. They form a united, homogeneous, continuous whole. As Parmenides himself very finely expresses it:

> 'Therefore the Whole extends continuously,
> Being by Being set; immovable,
> Subject to the restraint of mighty laws,
> Both increate and indestructible,
> For birth and death have wandered far away,
> By true conviction into exile driven.
> The same in self-same place and by itself
> Abiding, doth abide most firmly fixed,
> And bounded round by strong Necessity.
> Wherefore a holy law forbids that Being
> Should be without a bound, else want were there,
> And want of that would be a want of all.'

But while the world of Parmenides can best be made intelligible as modelled, first of all, on the notion of pure space, it has other attributes which are not merely spatial, and one which is not material. To understand these we must study the historical antecedents of Eleaticism. Referring to the antitheses of rare and dense, bright and dark, light and heavy, by which the regions of heaven and earth had been

formerly distinguished, Parmenides admits that they contain an element of truth. But the truth is all on one side. The heavenly qualities alone are real, and these are the qualities which he ascribes to Being as such, to the sphere. Though not solid in the crass, earthly sense, it is no mere vacuum, but filled with light and fire. If, like Hegel, he 'defecated the universe to a pure transparency,' he left it *transparent*: his world is luminous through its entire extent. We must think of it as something like the dreamy space enclosed between that unislanded sea and that unclouded sky on which the low-lying shore of Elea's neighbour Paestum still looks out.

Thus, by a curious example of meeting extremes, Parmenides approaches and almost adopts the conclusions of his great rival Heracleitus. In truth, the aether-worship of these two high spirits was a survival of the aristocratic Olympian religion in which they were reared. May we not conjecture also that it involved a secret protest against the wild nature-worship of the Ephesian Artemis, and, at the other extremity of the Hellenic world, against the Eleatic cultus of Demeter, a goddess associated with all that the Eleatic school denied? Nor did the theological influence stop here. I have said that Parmenides gave his extended spherical world, along with certain material attributes, an attribute which was not material. This was no other than thought. He declares that Thought and Being are the same,

referring in proof or illustration of their identity to a casual resemblance between the Greek words that denote them, very much as if we should say in English:

'What *is* is what I *wis*, the name declares.'

This has been spoken of as a wonderful anticipation of modern philosophy. But the wonder would be if Parmenides had not practised a method perfectly familiar to his predecessors and followers, being, in fact, a sort of speculative animism. We have seen how Xenophanes ascribed perception and reason to his supreme god, who was nothing else than the overarching heaven, and how Heracleitus and Anaximenes chose for the ultimate principles of existence elements already identified with the source of life and consciousness in man, Heracleitus even speaking of the elemental Fire as a god. In each instance, what we have to deal with is, as I have said, a survival of the Olympian religion. The remarkable and truly original thing about Eleaticism is the severe simplification with which it reduces all mental phenomena to thought, just as it had reduced all material phenomena to figured and luminous extension. Nor is this all. Not content with asserting the identity of Thought and Being, Parmenides uses it as an argument for the complete elimination of difference from Being itself, for the thoroughgoing monism of his whole system. If Thought and Being are the

same, that which is not cannot be thought: we are shut up to affirmative propositions. But darkness, movement, variety, and infinitude involve an element of negativity, to predicate them is to deny their opposites, light, rest, uniformity, and limitation. Now, these are the most eminent types of reality, the constitutive attributes of Being. To want a bound, in particular, would be to want all. Therefore these attributes, the attributes of luminous and limited extension, alone exist, are alone conceivable. The Pythagorean system, with its co-ordination of opposites, and the Heracleitean system, with its identification of opposites, are alike unintelligible nonsense. A modern reader may say the same of Eleaticism; but, at any rate, it suggested two great truths—the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy.

In Parmenides we find the same ethical passion, the same belief in righteousness as a world-ruling power, that distinguished the Eastern Ionians. Justice and law conduct the ardent youth on his search for the reality of things. Retribution holds the keys of knowledge in her hands. A holy law 'forbids that Being should be without a bound.' But higher still than this moral feeling rises his religious enthusiasm, an enthusiasm even more radiant than that of his contemporaries Aeschylus and Pindar, as of one who had stood face to face with the gods. The daughters of the Sun emerge from the hall of Night, and unveil

themselves that they may conduct his chariot on its way. At their persuasion the barriers of light and darkness are unlocked. When he enters, the goddess of wisdom, unnamed, but recognisable as Athenê, meets him, clasps his hand with that noble gesture which the reliefs of the Cerameicus have made familiar to us, and reasons with him, in a tone of slightly feminine imperiousness, about the truth of eternal things and the falsehoods believed by men.

The paradoxes of Parmenides were received with a storm of ridicule; but he left their advocacy to an enthusiastic young friend, who defended his master's principles with an unflinching loyalty, afterwards displayed in much more tragic circumstances, when he refused to reveal under torture the names of his political associates. This was Zeno, celebrated as the author of certain puzzles relating to space and motion which have never yet been satisfactorily solved. In answer to those who dwelt on the absurd consequences resulting from the denial of motion, he urged that consequences equally absurd followed from its reality. Racing was at that time the chief interest of Western Hellas, perhaps of all Hellas. Accordingly, Zeno imagined a race between Achilles, the swiftest-footed of men, and a tortoise, the slowest of animals. Let the tortoise, he said, have a start and, on your theory, Achilles can never overtake her. Let us suppose the start to be ten feet. While Achilles is covering that much ground, she will have advanced, say, a foot, and

the tenth of a foot while he is getting over that one. Thus the distance between them, however much it may be reduced, can never entirely vanish, space being, as the partisans of common sense alleged, divisible *ad infinitum*. We are not here concerned to answer Zeno; what interests us is to note the increasingly analytical tendency of Greek thought, and also the 'questionings of sense and outward things' that were driving it to the study of reason and of inward things.

Some evidence has already been offered going to prove that towards the close of the sixth century a lively intellectual intercourse was carried on between Samos and Southern Italy. It seems likely that this interchange of ideas continued until at least the middle of the fifth century; for we find that the philosophy of Parmenides was taken up, and in some respects amended, by the illustrious Melissus, who, as commander of the Samian fleet, had the glory of defeating the Athenians in a sea-fight at a time when Athens stood at the zenith of her power and prestige. This sagacious and intrepid islander agreed with Parmenides in maintaining the unity, homogeneity, and unchangeableness of Being. But he put his finger at once on the weakest spot of the Eleatic thesis—the assertion that Being must be bounded. He seems to argue that, by general admission, it is without beginning or end, and therefore without limit in time. Why, then, not also without limit in space?

Once the *a priori* objection of Parmenides was removed, the considerations that made for an infinite extension in the order of coexistence came into play. Being could not be limited by another being, for there is only one; nor by the void, for it does not exist.

Again, Parmenides had spoken of Being as rare, thereby suggesting that it was material or corporeal. Melissus argues, with greater clearness, that it is absolutely incorporeal, for a body can only be conceived as made up of parts. Nevertheless, he continued to think of it as extended, though how he distinguished it from a pure vacuum does not appear.

Finally, he indicated, with far more precision than Parmenides, the illusions of sense as the source of that popular philosophy which they agreed to be the negation of the true theory of Being.

It was probably in the sober prose of the Samian admiral, rather than in the high-wrought hexameters of Parmenides, that the Eleatic philosophy first found an entry into Eastern Hellas, and there gave occasion for some of the attempts to reconcile it with the flux of Heracleitus, which are now to occupy our attention.

CHAPTER IV

THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHERS

The poem of Parmenides on Nature probably appeared a century after the solar eclipse predicted by Thales. We know not which most to admire—the rapid development of philosophy in those hundred years, the brilliancy of the intellects enlisted in its service, the variety of systems they constructed, or the boldness and originality of their speculations. But when once the supreme paradoxes of Elea had been proclaimed as with a trumpet-blast, there came a pause in the pace of production. This apparent barrenness was not limited to the field of speculation. Thucydides tells us that, before he wrote, Greek political history between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars was a blank; and the story of that period as he relates it shows a dearth both of great events and of great men. Nothing could be more obvious than to suggest that the national energies were exhausted by the death-struggle with Asiatic despotism, and that they needed a spell of rest and reparation. But the explanation would not be true.

That half-century witnessed unparalleled displays of national energy, but it was energy of a kind that does not loom large in the pages of history, that no history as such can make really interesting. It is the things themselves, and not mere accounts of them, that enthral. They do not make up into literary effects.

Perhaps it would not be too much to say that the Greeks spent nearly fifty years in celebrating and securing the victories which they had won in half as many months. Gratitude to the gods for their deliverance of Hellenic civilisation from Asiatic barbarism was the paramount inspiration of that great age. Pindar's epinician odes, reflecting as they do the increased splendour of the Panhellenic games, the tragedies of Aeschylus, the temples of Aegina and of Athens, and the statues that adorned their pediments, still survive to show in what forms the acknowledgment of divine favour found expression, how vast and many-sided was the energy that it absorbed. To this we must add the development and organisation of a democracy rendered inevitable by the exalted self-consciousness which their share in the victory had given to the masses; the raising of impregnable fortifications; the building, manning, and training of invincible fleets; the formation of maritime and military confederacies; the procuring of funds to meet the lavish expenditure which all these ideal and material achievements involved.

Religion and democracy were forces not very favour-

able to philosophy: nor indeed was the triumphant expansion of public life in peace or war particularly conducive to its cultivation. A better environment had been supplied by the old Ionian cities in their decay, and even by the young Italian settlements in their immaturity or weakness, than by the commonwealths of Sicily and continental Greece in the consummate efflorescence of their genius and power and pride.

Nor was this all. Philosophers had partly themselves to thank if at this period their speculations began to fall into contempt and neglect. At the present moment we hear a good deal about what certain persons are pleased to call the bankruptcy of science. A contemporary of Aeschylus might with better reason have talked about the bankruptcy of philosophy. The two greatest thinkers of the age, Heracleitus and Parmenides, had with equal confidence enunciated exactly opposite conclusions; and besides contradicting one another, both contradicted instead of explaining experience. Their doctrines were indeed polarised rays of a single truth; but the general public could not be expected to see then what we are only beginning to see now. Moreover, the difficulties raised at Ephesus and Elea only expressed in a particularly vivid way the growing estrangement between theory and observation, between the rash generalisations of fireside dreamers and the fragmentary but sure results of sifted experience. Instead of ambitious attempts to map out the entire

surface of the earth according to a symmetrical and entirely fanciful arrangement of land and water, we find from Hecataeus to Herodotus a decided preference for exploring and measuring certain limited portions of the known world; while precise chronological indications take the place of theories about the origin of the earth and man. A tendency to restrict investigation within more practicable limits, something that may almost be called positivism, becomes apparent. Even Xenophanes had declared in a moment of depression, that after all, what he said about the gods and things in general was merely conjectural; and Alcmaeon, the Crotoniate physician, a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, lays down with greater precision that certainty about the invisible world is for the gods, probable conjectures for men. Proceeding on this wise method, he surmised that brain is the organ of mind—a truth that Aristotle refused to accept — and established by anatomical demonstrations its connexion with the special organs of sense.

As a consequence, perhaps, of the new prejudice against all-embracing systematic speculation, philosophy for a time finds its chief representatives somewhat apart from the central stream of intellectual progress, in such amateurs as the Samian admiral Melissus, or altogether outside the Ionian race, as in the extraordinary and ambiguous figure that we now proceed to study.

Empedocles, born about 492 B.C., belonged to an illustrious family of Acragas, the most splendid among the Dorian cities of Sicily, but situated not far from the extreme confines of Hellenic civilisation. Its inhabitants were noted for the luxury and sumptuousness of their lives. Pindar was more than once employed to celebrate victories won by Acragantines at the great games; and their zeal for public worship is testified to by the row of temples, magnificent in ruin, that may still be seen stretching along the seaward-facing slope of a hill on which their acropolis once stood. It is conjectured that one of these temples was dedicated to Dionysus and another to Demeter and Persephonê, that is to say, they were sanctuaries of the Chthonian religion which had come to play so great a part in Greek life and thought; if so, it is significant that Pindar should have interwoven a reference to the new creed of eternal salvation in an ode commemorating a victory won at Olympia in 476 by Theron, at that time Prince of Acragas; and there was 'easy access to the hearer's grace' when on another occasion he saluted it as the abode of Persephonê.

By the time when Empedocles had arrived at manhood, the government of his native city had changed from monarchy to democracy; and he espoused the popular cause with an ardour to which the whole history of Greek philosophy offers no parallel. We are told that at his instigation two persons were

punished with death for an alleged offence against liberty equality and fraternity, committed at a private feast. After the manner of his kind, the eloquent demagogue subsequently set himself up as an object for public adoration, a god on earth. If we are to believe his own story, whenever he entered a town countless multitudes came to meet him, asking for oracles of wisdom and healing of disease. Like a genuine rain-maker and medicine-man, he undertook to teach the art of changing the weather and even of raising the dead to life. In no Ionian settlement, in no aristocratic society, in no land bathed by Hellenic influences on every side would such pretensions have been possible. In Empedocles we have the 'divine man' of the Dorian race, the popular orator with his promises of material felicity, deluding and self-deluded, the half-Semitised thaumaturgist reared on a reeking hotbed of Salvationist superstition.

Like Parmenides, more than Parmenides, Empedocles was a poet. Many of his verses still survive, and as didactic poetry they have never been surpassed or equalled except by Lucretius, who studied him with delight. He seems to have imitated the Orphic hymns, and it is certain that he was deeply imbued with the Orphic religion. Holding the doctrine of metempsychosis, he professes to remember the various forms of existence through which his own soul has passed: he has been a boy, a girl, a bird, a fish, and a plant. These changes are the penalty suffered for a

crime committed in some far-off age, a transgression through which he fell from the abode of the gods. To wash away this stain, the very first condition for him, as for all his sect, is to give up animal food, to cease from slaughtering animals, in whom the souls of our parents or children may reside. The pathetic exhortations of this vegetarian terrorist vividly recall Robespierre's horror of capital punishment.

But the Acragantine prophet was more than a mere charlatan. Without being a mathematician or an astronomer, he shows himself a wonderfully sagacious observer of physical phenomena, who in happier circumstances might have become a great scientific discoverer. He noticed that when a tube closed at its upper end is plunged into water the water is prevented from entering by the resistance of the air within; and that the same tube may be kept full of water by the pressure of the outer air against its inferior orifice. He divined, without the aid of observation, the fact that light travels with an appreciable velocity. He raised the question, why the heavens, at that time supposed to be solid, did not fall on the earth, and explained their stability by centrifugal force. He 'saw that the two sexes are combined in plants.' Physiology was evidently the special science to which he devoted most attention, and his theory of sensation is ingenious and partially true. We must also record to his credit that he applied his scientific knowledge to practical purposes,

such as constructing works for the sanitation of his native city, where his name is still held in grateful remembrance.

In philosophy Empedocles represents the dispersive and eclectic tendencies of his age. He avoids the unflinching monism of the Ionians, and their boundless confidence in reason. 'For us, the creatures of a day,' it is not lawful, he thinks, to know everything; we must pursue our enquiries with reverence; what little we may hope to learn must be sought after by combining all methods of investigation—the various avenues of sense together with probable conjecture. Among other resources, he made ample use of what his predecessors had written; his vanity prompted him to undertake a task from which his most illustrious contemporaries for the moment shrank back—the construction of a new system of Nature; his speculative incompetence obliged him to draw on earlier systems for his ideas. His first and greatest achievement in this direction was to combine and reconcile the flux of Heracleitus with the unalterable Being of Parmenides. Nothing, he says, is created, and nothing is destroyed; the assertion being supported by arguments taken almost in words from Parmenides. But when he adds that things perish into one another, we recognise the Ephesian style. How, then, is the contradiction eliminated? By explaining that what men call the birth and death of things is only the mingling and separation of eternal

elements. Empedocles speaks as if the vulgar opinion was different, as if he was the first to enunciate this truth; and, so far as we know, he *was* the first. Anaximander denied creation but not annihilation; Heracleitus denied that anything existed without change; Parmenides denied that anything existing *could* change.

In determining the elements out of which all concrete objects arise and into which they are again resolved, Empedocles is less happy. Instead of advancing, he retrogrades, and simply enumerates the substances each of which had figured as a material absolute in the old Ionian philosophies. In this way he arrives at the famous quartette, fire, air, water, and earth, which long before his time had probably been traditional among the Greeks and among their Indian kinsfolk. But this was not enough. A Greek was expected to tell not only what the world was made of, but how it was made. Here again the clever Sicilian combines the methods of his two greatest predecessors. At one time, he says, the four elements are compacted into a perfect sphere—the Being of Parmenides—then the sphere gradually breaks up and returns through successive phases of dissolution to a state of complete segregation; then the scattered elements once more recombine to build up the sphere—a process in which we recognise the double movement up and down as well as the fiery consummation of Heracleitus. And we recognise in

it also a projection of the philosophic process into the external world. As an account of cosmic evolution the system leaves much to be desired; as a self-reflection of Greek thought it is complete.

The severely scientific intellect of Ionia had conceived matter as assuming new forms by virtue of its own inherent energies, animated or otherwise. Empedocles, under the stress of the religious revival, introduces two mythological agents, Love and Strife, as the alternate causes of his twofold process; but, sharing the prevalent inability to dissociate mind from extension, he conceives them as not less material than the substances which they move; thus making up the total number of elements to six.

One can see how in all this, besides the literary interest which made for compilation, and the religious interest which made for personification, a physiological and social interest came into play. The Ionians began with the experience of an inorganic world, exhibiting the supposed elements in large distinct masses; and they represented this cosmic arrangement as far more definite and symmetrical than their observations justified them in holding it to be, spreading out spots into rings and rings into hollow spheres, until they had enveloped the whole universe with a shell of fire. Empedocles, on the contrary, taking the living body as his point of departure, and seeing that it existed only as a combination of the elements, came to look on union as their normal condition, and on their

comparative segregation in the inorganic world, particularly towards its circumference, as a result either of incompleteness or of decay. This is what we must understand Empedocles to mean by the flight of Strife to the extreme verge of the circle, and the conquering pursuit of Love. The circular motion of the heavens is a result of their opposing efforts. Strife is trying to tear the world to pieces, Love to draw the elements into more perfect union.

The Ionians attributed consciousness to some one element, as air or fire, which they also identified with the human soul. Empedocles attributes it equally to all six elements, and conceives the soul as a microcosm where each external principle is represented and recognised by a minute portion of itself, communication being carried on by means of effluences from the object, which pass through fine pores to the special organs of sense. To the historian this theory is less interesting as a partial anticipation of modern science than as illustrating the analytical tendencies of the age, and as a first step towards the atomism of Leucippus.

It is difficult to conceive how such a purely physiological explanation of consciousness could be combined with the belief in immortality which Empedocles professed; and we are tempted to ask whether his Orphic religion was really anything more than a mere profession, a means for exciting

the enthusiasm of the masses. Such an ambiguous attitude would not be inconsistent with the character ascribed in all ages to popular leaders and prophets, a character which in this instance may have been intensified by a general tendency of the Dorian spirit. For if Sparta may be taken as a type of the Dorian race, it was distinguished by a very repulsive sort of double-dealing and hypocrisy, markedly contrasted with the sincerity and comparative truthfulness of the Ionians—not the only instance in which mountaineers show to little advantage, morally speaking, beside their lowland neighbours.

Sicily, with all her splendid intellectual energy, produced no rival and no successor to Empedocles. But, immediately on becoming known in Eastern Hellas, his brilliant synthesis seems to have revived the speculative spirit among its ancient and only real representatives. The first to follow suit was his older contemporary Anaxagoras, an Ionian of Clazomenae, at that time domiciled in Athens. Born about 500 B.C., he had migrated to the imperial city when about forty years of age, possibly at the invitation of Pericles. At any rate, he became the intimate friend and adviser of that great man, an honour for which he had afterwards to pay dear. But his own pursuits would, in any circumstances, have made him a mark for popular suspicion. Attica was the most religious country in all Hellas, and its people the most credulous. A century before the time with

which we are occupied, a tall, handsome woman publicly and successfully personated the goddess Athenê in the streets of her own city, as a political manoeuvre on behalf of Peisistratus; and, although Herodotus, with his Ionian culture, speaks of the stratagem as extremely silly, it seems to have been planned with perfect knowledge of the people for whose edification it was designed. At all times prophecies and oracles were freely hawked about and greedily swallowed by the Athenian populace. As has been already observed, the cults of Dionysus and of Demeter had their centre here, and here also the Orphic religion arose. With the ascendency and supremacy of popular government the worship of the Chthonian divinities would become more ardent, as none were so intimately associated with the stability and splendour of the democracy. Busts of Hermes, a Chthonian god, were placed along the public thoroughfares; and their desecration provoked an unprecedented storm, just because it was supposed to portend an aristocratic conspiracy against the liberties of the people. Nor was the connexion between belief and conduct merely a political question. Parental authority and confidence between man and man were considered to rest on certain theories of the universe. Thus we find the most eminent Athenians and those least favourable to the rule of the uneducated masses, an Aeschylus and an Aristophanes, a Socrates and a Plato, unable to dissociate morality

from religion, or religion from faith in the divinity of nature-powers.

Among the material objects regarded as gods, the sun and moon held a conspicuous place, with, apparently, a decided preference for the moon, whose monthly vicissitudes perhaps brought her into closer sympathy with human life, and made her a sort of link between the Olympian and Chthonian religions. An attempt to rationalise the calendar by basing it on the solar, instead of the previously customary lunar revolution, provoked some murmurs at Athens; and all readers of Greek history will remember how Nicias, a general much admired for the exemplary performance of his religious duties, lost a whole army by delaying its retreat for four weeks in consequence of scruples induced by the occurrence of a total eclipse of the moon.

It will easily be understood that the new astronomy, with its scientific explanations of the moon's light and of eclipses, ran in the teeth of such prejudices. But in almost any other city an immediate collision might have been avoided through the reticence of the philosophers and the obtuseness of the vulgar. At Athens the extreme intelligence of the people brought about a very rapid diffusion of ideas, but also caused new ideas to be actively canvassed, and appreciated at even more than their full value in reference to established beliefs. Add to this the jealousy of intellectual distinction entertained by the democracy,

and the suspicious hatred of all pursuits that seemed to withdraw men from callings of practical benefit to the commonwealth, and we shall have some conception of the difficulties opposing themselves to the introduction of philosophy into the city which was afterwards to become so renowned as its chief seat, and as the centre of its world-wide diffusion. And we shall also understand why physical science, as such, never prospered in this environment, why philosophy had to be radically transformed and placed on a new basis in order to be cultivated with success by the Attic genius.

Anaxagoras was before all things an astronomer. For him, what made life worth living was the contemplation of the heavens. But his knowledge of them was less advanced than that possessed by the Italian schools: at any rate, he still clung to the Milesian idea that the earth was a flat disc. At the same time, in accordance with the analytical tendencies of his age, he had come to think of the sun, moon, and stars as really distinct bodies, not as the visible portions of invisible rings or spheres of fire. By a still nearer approximation to the truth, he taught that some of those luminaries were of the same composition as our earth, shining only because they reflected the light of the sun. In the latter class he placed not only the moon but even the Milky Way, which he regarded as being really a collection of dark stars. Space, he said, was full of flying stones,

which would fall on the earth if the whirling movement of the aether were to be arrested—a notion probably borrowed from Empedocles. When a large meteorite actually fell at Aegos Potamoi, he got the credit of having predicted its arrival. Probably the event did no good to his reputation for religious orthodoxy. We do not hear that Anaxagoras was accused of making the skies fall, although nothing would have been more consistent with human nature than such a charge. But, as part of a concerted attack on his friend Pericles, he was prosecuted, or threatened with a prosecution, for impiety, on account of his opinions about the sun and moon. This was in the year 434 or 433. The illustrious astronomer retired to the freer air of Lampsacus, an Ionian city, where he ended his days admired and loved by all.

The scientific views of Anaxagoras have to be gathered from late and uncertain reports; for his philosophy we have the much superior evidence of considerable fragments from a work of his on Nature, written probably rather late in life, with the addition of some information about the lost portions from Plato and Aristotle, who had doubtless read it. Although in some respects diametrically opposed to Empedocles, the system of Anaxagoras seems to have been constructed under his influence, and it occupies the same physiological point of view. We are told, almost in the words of the Sicilian poet, that nothing either begins or ceases to be: there is only composi-

tion and resolution of eternally existing principles. But these principles are not four nor any finite number; they are infinite and infinitely minute. The so-called elements, instead of being the simplest of bodies, are, in reality, the most complex; or, to use modern language which our philosopher would gladly have adopted, they are at once the most homogeneous and the most confused. Earth, water, and so forth, cannot be what they seem; for animal bodies are made up entirely from them, and yet exhibit appearances of which they offer no sensible trace. Here we find a multitude of quite distinct parts, as hair, skin, flesh, bone, blood, and all the various secretions, with distinct qualities of their own, involving innumerable shades of difference in form, solidity, colour, smell, taste, and temperature. But *nothing comes from nothing*, therefore these qualities must have pre-existed eternally; and, since there is no limit to the distinction of shades any more than to the division of quantities, they must be infinite in number; since the animal body can be nourished indifferently from any productive soil, in any air, under any sun, they must be as ubiquitous as they are infinite. In other words, everything is in everything, at least to the extent of a trace; each substance receiving its name from that element, as, for example, gold, which is most largely represented in the blend.

Empedocles, the active politician, the engineer, the thaumaturgist, introduced the idea of efficient

causation into philosophy. He first asked not only what the world is made of, but also what made it; and his answer was a new mythology, in which human passions figured as cosmic forces. Anaxagoras asked himself the same question, but his answer was that of a quiet student and a true Ionian. He said that what segregated the elements from their original confusion was Nous or Reason, the same power by which he as a philosopher assigned things to their right place in Nature. But self-reflection was not the only motive that determined his choice. He, too, had to reconcile Heracleitus with Parmenides, the principle of change with the principle of stability. The universal mixture, the presence of all things in each, recalls the Ephesian flux with its endless relativity, its baffling combination of predicates, which to the abstract understanding are mutually exclusive. Anaxagoras is reported to have said, quite in the spirit of Heracleitus, that snow was black, for was it not the same as water, and does not the water in deep wells look black? But the Reason whose function it is to separate these qualities, for which black remains black, and white white, which as a cosmic power brings order from chaos, must be of a directly opposite nature, must be itself entirely free from any alien substance. 'It is infinite and absolute, mingled with nothing, existing in itself alone.' We seem to be listening to an enunciation of pure spiritualism. But speculation had not advanced

so far. The words quoted are a distinct echo of the rapturous verses in which Parmenides had celebrated the pure Being which he identified with pure Thought. And, like Parmenides, Anaxagoras imagined Reason to be an extended substance. 'It is the thinnest and clearest of all things; in the beginning it set up a revolving motion, which has gone on extending ever since.'

If the Nous was not a pure spirit, neither was it a designing intelligence adapting means to ends. Anaxagoras does indeed associate its action in some special way with the structure of organic bodies, declaring that plants and animals all possess some share of reason. But this, we may surmise, is simply because organisms are the most differentiated of all bodies; indeed, it was physiology that suggested the law of differentiation and integration to Mr. Spencer. And it had the same suggestiveness in the age of Pericles—a time when the phenomena of life were beginning to be very attentively studied. Very soon the study led to a teleological theory so complete that little or nothing has been added to it by modern research; and so rapid was the advance that an interpretation came to be put on the words of Anaxagoras by Plato and Aristotle widely different from their original meaning; so much so that they bitterly reproached him for not consistently working out a doctrine of final causes, of providential design and adaptation, which he never really professed.

According to him, the Nous acts after a purely mechanical manner by setting up a vortical movement; and this movement sorts out homogeneous particles from the confused mass in which they have eternally pre-existed. That like should be drawn to like seemed to a Greek of that period so self-evident a process as to call for no further explanation. He had only to account for their being set at liberty to follow their natural affinities; and this liberation was precisely what the vortex of Anaxagoras effected. We need not suppose that the Nous only produced one such movement in the whole course of cosmic history: it seems likely that as the original chaos broke up into smaller and smaller masses the same sifting process repeated itself within each aggregate that had previously been exercised on the whole. In this way we can get an intelligible meaning out of Aristotle's complaint that Anaxagoras drags in the Nous like a *deus ex machinâ* to help out the deficiencies of his material causes. There was nothing unphilosophical about the assumption of such an intermittent action. Before a fresh vortical movement can be initiated there must be a distinct aggregate of particles ready to form rotatory rings in obedience to an impulse from without.

The differentiating and integrating function of the cosmic Nous is borrowed, as we have seen, from the logical operations of the human intelligence. But its purely spatial character, the attribute of extension

associated by Parmenides with Thought, is equally significant though less recognisable throughout its segregating operation. For the sifting out of the elements from the primary mixture means that they are rearranged according to a system of juxtaposition; as a chemist might say, they are graphically constructed. To a modern reader this may seem a distinction without a difference; for we think of the minutest particles of Matter as necessarily existing outside one another. But with Anaxagoras it was not so. He imagined the original interpenetration of the elements to be so complete that the division of matter might have been carried on to infinity without separating them; and it is only through the action of Nous—that is, if we accept the view here proposed, of pure space—that they come to be truly external to one another; the reciprocal externalisation being at first very imperfect, and only approaching completeness in the last or organic stage of evolution.

So far as physical philosophy ever became popular at Athens, it was through the teaching not of Anaxagoras, but of his disciple Diogenes, a clever superficial Dorian from Apollonia, in Crete. An eclectic, like Empedocles, he identified the Nous of his master with Air, the world-element of Anaximenes. This was the theory that Aristophanes satirised when he represented his typical philosopher as being drawn up in a basket to the higher regions of the atmo-

sphere, that he might imbibe intelligence in its purest form. It was, indeed, a popular belief that the Athenians owed their quick wits to the fine clear air in which they lived, and that the stupidity of the Boeotians was connected with their foggy climate. As an anatomist Diogenes seems to have done good work based on dissections of the human subject. But physical speculation in the grand style could not be carried to completion by a Dorian, nor in such a nest of bigotry as Athens. That triumph was reserved for the politically insignificant and despised Ionian settlement of Abdera, on the coast of Thrace. On that memorable spot the atomic theory of matter arose.

Emerson has called Socrates and Plato a 'double star which the most powerful instruments will not entirely separate.' The same might be said of Leucippus and Democritus. Leucippus indeed may be called a dark star, for not a line of his writings has been preserved, the time and place of his birth are uncertain, and his very existence has been questioned. But Aristotle and Theophrastus, our two great sources for the early history of Greek philosophy, agree in describing him as the founder of Atomism: he was certainly an Ionian, perhaps a Milesian; and he probably taught at Abdera during the latter part of his life, leaving his system to be developed and perfected by Democritus, who was a native of that city.

The Eleatic philosophy, as finally organised by Melissus, denied the reality of movement, because movement was not possible without a vacuum, and a vacuum, being nothing, could not possibly exist. Reversing this chain of reasoning, Leucippus boldly declared that as movement existed there must be a vacuum; and that, granting a vacuum to be nothing—why then, nothing, in that sense, existed just as much as something. In this identification of opposites one may detect the still surviving influence of Heracleitus. But in truth the mere dialectic development of their own principles had already driven the Eleates into a not dissimilar position: their absolute Being had been refined into a tenuity indistinguishable from the pure space which they professed to deny. All that remained was to take away its soul of reason and its vesture of light, which was just what Leucippus did, substituting Uranus for Zeus, infinite possibility for absolute and perfected existence.

The possibility realised itself in a universe of atoms. These are small, absolutely hard substances, uncreated and indestructible, like the Being of Parmenides, but, unlike it, infinite in number, and distinguished from one another by infinite differences of figure, magnitude, and velocity. Some are provided with hooks, by which in the course of their innumerable collisions they become permanently attached to one another, forming a chain in which the movement

of translation becomes transformed into a movement of rotation. Thus a vortex is set up in the ocean of atoms; a skin forms and grows by the accretion of successive layers into the revolving sphere within which our world—one of infinite worlds—is contained.

Our admiration for this atomic theory, and our recognition of its inestimable services to modern science, must not blind us to the fact that it was a mere collateral product of Greek thought, and thoroughly alien to the Greek genius. Neither the science nor the philosophy of Hellas had ever much to say to it. One man of extraordinary abilities and acquirements, the Democritus whose name has already been more than once mentioned in connexion with that of Leucippus, did indeed take up atomism and apply it to all orders of physical phenomena, recording his conclusions in a long series of publications; but he remained outside the central stream of philosophical tradition, and neither during his life nor after his death had he the fame that a Greek so passionately desired. 'I came to Athens,' he tells us, 'and no one knew me.' Like other disappointed men, he boasted about himself, expatiated on his vast knowledge and his extensive travels, but without success. Plato never once mentions or even alludes to him. Aristotle knew about him, probably because he came from the same part of the world, and thoroughly appreciated his value as a physicist, but

accorded less favour to his atomism than to some other much less important theories; nor was any room found for it in the comprehensive eclecticism of the Stoics. Epicurus, with wonderful insight, took up atomism as an offensive weapon against theology; but he had no word of gratitude for Democritus, and denied the very existence of Leucippus; nor was it any particular recommendation to their doctrine to be associated with his system, the least scientific of antiquity. Atomism does not seem to have been taught or in any way recognised by the great investigators of the Alexandrian Museum, nor, with one exception, by any of the noble Romans who devoted themselves to Greek philosophy. It is true that the exception was Lucretius; but that incomparable poet had few specific affinities with the Greek genius, and was utterly ignorant of what had been done by the Greek science of his own time. After him the atomic theory ceased to exercise any influence on Western thought, and had to wait seventeen centuries for its victorious revival during the later period of the Renaissance.

If now we ask what was the reason why so admirable and illuminating a theory was received with such indifference by the most inquisitive and quick-witted of all races, we shall find it, I think, in a certain fundamental incompatibility between the postulates of atomism and the general form of Greek philosophy, the mould into which Greek reflection spontaneously

ran. First of all, it assumed a number of infinities—an infinite space, an infinite number of atoms, an infinite variety of atoms, an infinity of worlds, co-existent and successive, with an infinitely infinite number of throws and shuffles, whence they emerged as the winning chances. Now, the Greek genius, as we have seen, had an instinctive aversion from infinity, an instinctive passion for limitation; and this was a tendency that grew on it with the progress of speculation, being far more marked among the Italian and Sicilian Hellenes than among the Eastern Ionians—whether, as a recent German critic suggests, because the Italian Hinterland was so much more restricted than the Asiatic Hinterland, or for some other more ideal reason. And, as we shall see, a similar preference was subsequently imposed on the schools of Athens by the ascendency of Western thought. Then, in the next place, there was something *gritty* about atomism; there was a violent unreconciled antithesis between the little impenetrable masses of matter and the absolute void through which they moved, which would render them singularly difficult of digestion to the Greek genius, enamoured of plasticity no less than of outline, pre-eminently anxious to soften down oppositions, to harmonise discords, to connect extremes by a series of subtly modulated transitions. Again, the Greeks, except when they consciously made a game of logic, never willingly deserted sensuous experience for the

guidance of abstract reasoning; whereas atomism avowedly treated all the sensible qualities of matter apart from extension and resistance as a subjective illusion; while even the extension and resistance of ordinary experience presented an appearance so different from what Democritus alleged to be the true constitution of bodies, that they also were little better than a fraud; the sole realities of Nature, the atoms and the void being, by hypothesis, inaccessible to direct observation. Nor, as Aristotle justly objected, was there any reason why the atoms should all be imperceptibly minute: the infinite possibilities of existence seemed to require that no restriction should be placed on the variety of their size, so that some at least should be large enough to come within the ken of vision.

So much for the philosophical difficulties of atomism as understood in Greece. But to such a religious people as the Greeks the theological difficulty was even graver. All other systems had left some halo of divinity, some glorified image of human feeling or of human reason in Nature; atomism turned her into a soulless mechanism, in which the chance collisions of inert particles had worked out a ghastly mimicry of law and love. Doubtless to some this was no unwelcome result. Finding themselves entangled in a rank growth of superstitious practices and beliefs, their surest chance of deliverance was to cut out mythology by the roots. But the highest

minds were already moving in a different direction, and either turning aside to an exclusive study of human relations, on which atomism could throw no light, or preparing for a reconstitution of religion on the basis of a new synthesis between Nature and Man.

CHAPTER V

THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE: HUMANISTS AND NATURALISTS

It will be remembered how great a part ethical considerations had played in the first century of Ionian philosophy; how the Cosmos, the universal order, was thought of as a more complete realisation of the temperance and justice which human societies recognised and imperfectly obeyed. But the reader may have observed that after Parmenides those considerations pass out of sight. With Empedocles the elements are swayed only by unmoral passions; with Anaxagoras they are dominated by a reason which is not their own, from which they are wholly distinct; with Leucippus it is from their limitless liberty that order comes forth. Our knowledge of Greek history does not permit us to say with confidence whether any lowering of the moral standard was, at least in part, responsible for this change of view: the materials for a true moral comparison between the age that preceded the Persian War and the age that followed it scarcely exist. A sufficient explanation of

the fact referred to may perhaps be found in the inevitable differentiation of physical from social methods as the study of Nature and the study of Man became more and more specialised.

Some glimpse of this progressive specialisation, this tendency to isolate human interests from the great forces by which humanity is hemmed in, may be won from the poetry of the time. A play of Aeschylus deals with much more than the characters and actions of the men and women whom he puts on the stage—it is frequently a lesson in geography and history; he seems, like Dante, to have absorbed all the knowledge of his age. At the same time, he looks on Nature with a poet's eye: all her aspects, terrible and tender, are reflected in his verses; and he loves to link her events together by bonds of family relationship, as brothers or as parent and child. Nor is this all. In perfect harmony with his pervading view of the world as made one by a sympathy that runs through all its parts, he represents the apotheosised powers of Nature, the gods of mythology, as vindicators of eternal justice; and, when there are doubts as to the side on which justice lies, he makes them submit their differences to the arbitration of a human tribunal. Heracleitus himself could not have more completely identified the law of Nature with the law of the State.

Pindar, with his half-barbarous adulation of high rank and wealth and muscle, and his ready excuses

for the foibles of the great, stands on a much lower moral plane than Aeschylus. But he also willingly carries us to far-off regions of time and space; he also, to the best of his lights, carries our distinctions of right and wrong into the dwellings and the dealings of the Olympian gods; he also, as we have seen, looks for future retribution at the hands of the Chthonian gods. And, as a more distinguishing peculiarity, he shows an especial regard for, an especial pride in that which is original or spontaneous; setting the first creation above the later development, the untaught gifts of Nature above the laborious acquisitions of culture. 'The inventor has done all,' he sings in praise of Corinth; 'whence came the graces of the dithyrambic hymn? who first set the double eagle on the temples of the gods?' 'He who has been merely taught has a smattering of many excellences, a mastery of none.' 'The man by nature skilled is truly wise; the learned are full of phrases about everything—mere chattering crows matched with Jove's bird divine.' Here we have something akin to the Ionian search for a primordial cause and substance, a scorn like the scorn of Heracleitus for a learning that wanders over the surface while it misses the heart of things.

Although primarily directed against Simonides, Pindar's sarcasms may have just grazed the far higher fame of Sophocles—the most consummate poetical artist of antiquity. But, so far as we can

judge, the second master of Attic tragedy could not be accused of shallow versatility. On the contrary, his range is much more restricted than that of Aeschylus, whom he equals or surpasses only as a delineator of human emotion, especially emotion of the tenderer and more feminine sort, variously manifested in chivalrous self-devotion, in the self-reproaches of a delicate conscience, or, as *amour rentré*, in the passionate explosions of a rage which is but the affection that has missed its expected return. These are modes of feeling that have an eternal value; they are only accidentally dependent on place and time, and can be portrayed without that elaborate historical and geographical setting in which Aeschylus delights; and although we know from the experience of modern literature that it is possible to combine the genius which can most faithfully observe and reproduce them with a sensibility to the aspects of external Nature no less keen than that of Aeschylus, in Sophocles, at any rate, this combination was not realised. He is interested only in human relations, and the references to physical surroundings in his extant plays and fragments are fewer than can be found in any other body of poetical work equal or at all comparable to his in merit and amount. Nor is this indifference accidental or unmeaning: it is but one phase of his general attitude towards existence, the aesthetic expression of his intense humanism, his implicit

protest against the cruel surroundings that are not human, against the gods. These are not for him what they were for Aeschylus, guardians of social law and guides of social life, but gloomy and vindictive daemons, who lure men to their ruin by enigmatic oracles, who never interfere to save the innocent and oppressed, but who punish with relentless severity every offence against their personal dignity, and, for that reason alone, every infringement of their ceremonial ordinances.

Such was the philosophy of Sophocles in his later years, but such it had not always been. His first drama, the Triptolemus, evidently continued the Aeschylean tradition. It must have dealt, in the grand historical style of his predecessor, with the introduction of agriculture into Attica, it must have associated religion with the joy of life, it must have represented the gods as allied with all that was best and most progressive in man. We know that Sophocles began his career as an imitator of Aeschylus, and that only after long practice did he elaborate that even and mellifluous style which won for him the name of the Attic bee. But it does not seem likely that his attitude towards the world was ever very original, or that it was much affected by his own personality. His gentle, easy-going character and the singularly happy circumstances of his life were not such as to suggest a gloomy and self-isolating view of human destiny. His later dramatic

method must have been imposed on him by the spirit of the age, by an increasing drift in the direction of subjectivity, a new interest in the inward life, a growing alienation from the outward forces that repress or destroy it.

Towards the middle of the fifth century philosophy had already begun to betray a similar tendency. The Nous of Anaxagoras was carefully distinguished from the confused mass which it reduced to order; the atoms of Leucippus stood at the farthest possible remove from human intelligence. Specialisation, as we have seen, was coming to be recognised both as the very law of cosmic progress and as the principle of scientific research. The new attention paid to physiology shows a wish to utilise physical knowledge for the service of man. But through it all man was still regarded as a part of Nature. The first who consciously and completely separated them, the first who turned his back on Nature, was Protagoras.

Born at Abdera about 480 B.C., Protagoras at the age of thirty took up the calling of what in Greece was called a Sophist—that is, a paid professor of the higher education. This business, which he was the first to practise, proved very lucrative, and he was able to carry it on for forty years. During that period he traversed the length and breadth of the Hellenic world, paying more than one visit to Athens, which had now become its intellectual centre, and where his services were enthusiastically appreciated.

But he was notoriously an agnostic; and the oligarchs, who possessed themselves of supreme power in 411, seem to have thought that an exhibition of cheap zeal for religion would strengthen their position with the people. At any rate, we are told that in that year the works of Protagoras were publicly burned, he had to fly from Athens, and was drowned on his way to Sicily.

According to Plato, what Protagoras professed to teach was not science or scholarship, but conduct. In this respect he stood alone among the Sophists. Many others had followed his example in becoming public and paid teachers of youth; but, like our own university professors and tutors, they held that a liberal education should include some knowledge of mathematics and astronomy, or of literature and the correct use of words. Protagoras, on the contrary, insisted that this sort of drudgery ought to be got through at school. What he undertook was to give a truly liberal education, to prepare young men for all the duties of private and public life, to train them to be good heads of families, useful and efficient citizens of the State. How he carried out this undertaking we unfortunately do not know; but we do know something of greater philosophical interest, and that is the general theory of man's relation to Nature which Protagoras was led to construct in support of his claim to be accepted as a teacher at all. For many good people thought that his promises were chimerical, that what he professed was an impossi-

bility, and that, in short, he was getting money on false pretences. Virtue came by nature, and could not be taught.

To understand this rather summary condemnation of the Sophist's art, we must remember that the Greek word *ἀρετή*, which we translate by virtue, had a much more extensive significance, and would sometimes be better represented by our word merit. It embraced both intellectual and moral excellence, which, indeed, were as yet very imperfectly discriminated. When Thucydides calls the ruthless conspirator Antiphon 'second to none in aretê,' he does not mean to set him up as a man of stainless moral character, but only as an able and devoted party leader. Now, abilities like those of Antiphon, although they may be improved by education, can certainly not be implanted by it; and an offer to confer them would justly be rejected as an imposture, nay, even as a rash attempt to interfere with the gifts of the gods.

Even understanding virtue, as we do, in a strictly moral sense, many Greeks denied that it could be taught. From the time of Theognis to the time of Isocrates it was a commonplace to say that by no art can a rascal be turned into a good man. Religion, which with us encourages the belief in such conversions, had an opposite tendency with the Greeks, who held that the gods, having given a certain character at birth, left it unaltered until death.

All the prejudices of an aristocratic society told, as they still tell, in the same direction. And philosophy, while it gave a new and enormous importance to theoretical teaching, so emphasised and exalted the name of Nature that her yoke seemed fixed more firmly than ever on the neck of man.

Such was the triple line of prepossessions against which Protagoras had to contend in his gallant struggle for the cause of education. It suggested to him a new and brilliant idea—the idea of humanity, of progressive civilisation, of moral training, as the indispensable condition of social union. He taught that what essentially distinguishes men and women from brutes, and civilised beings from savages, is their regard for public opinion, which is the ultimate sanction of good conduct, as good conduct is itself, in the last resort, that which conduces to the welfare of mankind. There is no standard of right and wrong but the will of the community, which must necessarily be the supreme arbiter of its own interest, as the individual must be the arbiter of his interest. Not that one person's opinion is as good as another's —quite otherwise, indeed—but all opinions are provisional and subject to perpetual revision in the light of new experience or of new thought. As to the objection that Nature cannot be altered, it only goes to prove that virtue is not a natural endowment but an artificial product. For otherwise punishment would be useless and cruel. To inflict pain on

criminals from vindictive motives is only worthy of a wild beast. To reform, or to disable, or to deter —such are the sole justifications of penal law. 'To suffer what one has done,' Aeschylus had said, 'is an old old tale'; and for that reason a poor one, the great humanist might have replied. For, according to him, the moral training given by each generation to its successor has a cumulative force, and is perpetually raising the more enlightened nations to higher levels of civilisation, more and more removed from the primitive condition of savagery and brutality; so that the very worst Athenian stood high above the average level of certain uncivilised tribes.

When Protagoras first visited Athens, it may be doubted whether her citizens would have generally accepted the humane idea of punishment assumed as self-evident in the discourse put into his mouth by Plato. We are told that he once spent a whole day disputing with Pericles on a question of responsibility which was just then attracting considerable attention. In the course of an athletic contest one of the combatants had been killed by the accidental cast of a javelin, and the question was whether his death should be attributed to the javelin or to the thrower or to the exhibitors of the games. In order to understand this discussion, we must remember that at Athens and elsewhere the notion of criminal responsibility was extended to inanimate objects, so

that even a stone was occasionally tried and banished for having caused the death of a man. We can imagine, then, that the clear-headed Abderite would first call his illustrious friend's attention to the absurdity of such a proceeding, and then lead on step by step to the admission that it was equally absurd to talk of blame or responsibility as attaching to any of the human beings concerned in the fatality, till perhaps a theory like that expounded by the Platonic Protagoras, and subsequently endorsed by Plato himself, had been reached. How quickly the new rationalism spread may be inferred from a comparison of the first with the second Oedipus of Sophocles. In the former tragedy the hero is represented as filled with self-loathing for actions no doubt dreadful, but committed in absolute unconsciousness of their character. In the latter, which was written much later—as some think, in the very year when Protagoras was driven from Athens—the same Oedipus vindicates his innocence on grounds of pure reason, drawing the sharpest distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions, and throwing the whole responsibility for his misfortunes on the gods.

We are now in a position to understand, or at least to conjecture, what Protagoras meant by saying that 'man is the measure of all things: of the existence of what is, of the non-existence of what is not.' He certainly did *not* mean that all individual

impressions are equally true in the sense of being equally valid. Plato, to whom we owe our whole knowledge of his thesis, expressly repudiates such an interpretation of it on his behalf. It seems to have been in the first instance a practical rather than a speculative principle—an answer not so much to the question, What is true? as to the question, What is good and right? A religious Greek would probably answer, what the gods have ordained, or what has always been received as such. But Protagoras shook his head when the gods were mentioned. 'I do not know whether they exist or not,' he wrote, 'life is too short for such a difficult investigation.' As to what had always been thought, experience showed that authority supplied no fixed standard: usage varied everywhere and was always changing. An alternative is constantly offered, and our choice must be determined by the necessities of the moment.

Again, the Greek word *μέτρον*, which we translate by measure, must not be understood in the strict sense of a standard, still less as a fixed standard. It means also a limit, and limits are not immovable. From this point of view we may regard man as the highest point that existence has yet reached, and human effort as creating new possibilities of existence through the development of civilisation. If the Sophist seemed to take away much that was precious by his scepticism about the supernatural, he

more than made amends by opening a more hopeful outlook on the future.

How high Protagoras stood in the estimate of his contemporaries is proved by his having been chosen to make laws for the Athenian colony of Thurii (B.C. 443). Either there or in the Periclean circle he can hardly fail to have met Herodotus. But the two illustrious contemporaries had little in common beyond their cordial acceptance of Pindar's declaration that law or custom is king of all—a truth which the historian could confirm by his own immense knowledge and experience of mankind. Their views of divine providence would differ widely; and the Halicarnassian's old-fashioned Aeschylean code of retributive justice would not commend itself to the teacher of humanity, any more than his inexhaustible curiosity about the causes of physical phenomena or his interest in the things of long ago.

Thucydides, on the other hand, is fully imbued with the principles of Protagoras. Whether he acquired them by direct instruction from the Sophist or from the general spirit of the age may be doubted; there can be no doubt that they permeate his history. His belief in progress is intense. Fully conscious of the distinction between his own countrymen and the barbarians, he attributes it to no racial difference, but to a continual development which has raised the Hellenes from the same original level where

their less fortunate neighbours have remained; from a condition, as he is careful to point out, not merely of ignorance and weakness but of lawless violence, to a condition not only of high culture but of internal security. True, he lays bare the moral corruption of his own times—the times of his later years—but he does not, like some modern writers, attribute it to intellectual progress or to the decay of faith. No, it is the long war of Greeks against Greeks, the internal faction fights, the plague with its accompanying dissolution of all social bonds, that have wrought the mischief. In other words, it is a return to the primitive condition of mankind. And even at their worst the Greeks have remained far better than uncivilised Thracians. To him the worst atrocity of the whole war was not the slaughter of the Plataeans or of the Melians, but the massacre of the school-children of Mycalessus by those cruel and cowardly barbarians.

It may be objected that Thucydides refers, or makes his speakers refer, to self-interest, to the identification of right with might, as the natural law by which human beings are governed in their dealings with one another. This is quite true; and Protagoras would have said as much in reference to men as they were at the beginning of history, or perhaps at any time when they relapse into a state of nature. But the author of the funeral oration put into the mouth of Pericles certainly thought

that self-devotion rather than selfishness was the law of civilised life.

Protagoras would be much less in sympathy with the physical philosophers than with the great historian of the age. To them his humanism seemed fraught with sceptical consequences; and so, no doubt, from their point of view, it was. Nature, considered as a fixed order of things existing apart from man's perceptions and volitions, did not interest him any more than the gods did; perhaps he did not believe in it. Like some moderns, he also objected to the alleged demonstrations of geometry, based as they seemed to be on abstract and unreal assumptions. On the other hand, he believed much that the physicists rejected. Their researches had induced them largely to discredit the evidence of the senses; and this was especially the case in the Atomist school of his own city, Abdera. Democritus wrote a book to disprove his alleged doctrine that things are just what they seem to be. We may suppose that it contained the first suggestion of Locke's distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter. But from the practical point of view there is no such distinction. To a moralist the whole content of a man's mind is real; it constitutes his world and determines his relations to other men. Even the delusions of the insane are not only true for them but true in a sense for the legislator and the judge, and justly enter into our estimate of their moral responsibility.

Democritus summed up his theory of seeming and being in the quaint formula that tastes, temperatures, and colours exist *by law*, but in very truth only atoms and the void. By this we see that Nomos, the Greek word for law, covered the whole field of subjectivity, the world of social conventions, of public opinion, common sense, and general belief. So interpreted it exactly designates the standpoint of Protagoras, and sums up his philosophy in one word. But Greek thought would never, any more than Greek life, submit to the rule of one, or accept any word, however great, as the last word that could be spoken on the subject, least of all when it seemed to sanction the public opinion that philosophy had taught men to despise. The absolute enunciation of any principle, were it even the principle of relativity, merely hastened the development of its contrary opposite and necessary corrective. Protagoras himself is said to have maintained that there was no proposition which did not admit of being contradicted, and he soon had to experience an application of the rule to himself. And just as his immense success as a teacher called into existence a host of rivals who sought to draw away young men from his lectures by a different method of instruction, so also the controversial weapons which they turned against his method seem to have been derived from the same great arsenal of ideas whence his own had been supplied. If the Heracleitean philosophy had suggested his doctrine

of relativity, it also suggested what was now to be set up in opposition to his watchword of Nomos or Convention—the name and notion of Nature.

We have seen how the early Greek thinkers habitually interpreted the material universe in the light of moral distinctions made familiar to them by the experiences of an ordered city life; and also how they sought in the waste welter of its phenomena for some underlying principle, uncreated and indestructible, which was to take the place of their discredited pantheon. Now, from the time of Anaximander they had all agreed in calling this principle by a name (φύσις) of which Nature is the literal Latin translation, and the meaning of which has been preserved with remarkable steadiness from their time to our own. It was, then, to be expected that Nature would become clothed with moral attributes from the very beginning, and would subsequently come to be regarded as the standard of moral perfection. In this way physical philosophy would repay with interest the borrowed fund of ideas which had enabled it to start in business as a reasonable interpretation of things. None came so near to this point of view as Heracleitus, when he said that all human laws derived their validity from the one divine law. But while in his system there is still an unbroken unity between the world of Nature and the world of man, in the systems of his successors the two came to be thought of more and more as severed and opposed. To them

it seemed that while the customs of Nature were uniform and constant, the customs of different nations disagreed widely and were not exempt from alteration. To Herodotus this was not an evil; to Protagoras and Thucydides it was even a good, being the very condition and consequence of improvement. To the new school, on the contrary, it was a proof that human laws could furnish no fixed standard of justice, except in those questions, if any, on which they were all agreed. The true standard must be sought elsewhere, in the order of Nature, or among the tribes or classes which had departed least widely from the natural condition.

Along with this enthusiasm for Nature as a moral guide there went a corresponding enthusiasm for the new studies that physical philosophy had opened up. At Athens in particular young men threw themselves with ardour into the investigation of such problems as the measurement of the earth's circumference, the constitution of the heavenly bodies, the cause of thunderstorms, and the circulation of matter—nay, even into the minutest researches of comparative anatomy. And, just as long afterwards, in the circle of Diderot and Rousseau, so also at Athens this thirst for natural equity, this insatiable curiosity about the mysteries of the material universe, were accompanied by a new perception of natural beauty, a strange longing to take refuge from the corruption of civilised life in the untrodden depths of forests, or on the slopes

of high hills in bright clear morning air—a perception and a longing such as we find expressed by Euripides, the favourite poet of the new generation; and also reflectively, as it were through the excitement of an inductive current, by Aristophanes, the great contemner and parodist of the new culture.

At the head of this, which, from its analogy with a similar tendency in the French eighteenth century, we may call the physiocratic movement, stood two younger contemporaries of Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus. The former, one of the very few non-Ionian thinkers whom Greece at this time produced, was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He was the first to our knowledge who distinguished between Nature and Law or Convention, taking the former as his moral standard. According to Plato, he held that men of the same intellectual tastes are 'by nature kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens,' however widely separated they may be in actual life by the artificial distinctions of government and society—a pregnant principle, from which the fateful triad Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity was afterwards destined to be developed. In direct opposition to Protagoras, he made mathematics and astronomy the basis of the higher education, and contributed some original researches to geometry, but without rejecting humanistic studies such as history and poetry. Prodicus, an Ionian from the little island of Ceos, was also famous as a teacher of natural philosophy, although

the bitter satire of Plato has made us more familiar with him as a somewhat pedantic lecturer on the accurate use of language.

After more than two thousand years of thought it has been found impossible to construct a complete and self-consistent system of ethics from the materials supplied by a study of natural phenomena; although when such a system has been once constructed from other materials it may be usefully illustrated by physical analogies. Little, then, can be expected from the first founders of the physiocratic method; and very little of what they actually taught has been preserved. Yet this fragment of a fragment deserves our attention from its great historical importance; for Prodicus, and still more Hippias, stand in the direct line of that great ethical tradition which afterwards culminated in the Stoic school. The Sophist of Elis, if we may trust a somewhat late authority, made self-sufficiency his watchword. People said that he used to boast of having wrought with his own hands every article of clothing and every ornament that he wore. The Greeks were fond of such characteristic stories, and had no scruples about inventing them; but we may take this particular one as a proof that Hippias was either self-sufficient, or ambitious of appearing to be so. Perhaps he taught that we may be arrayed like the lilies of the field at almost as little expense. At any rate, the connexion with naturalism is clear. For this sort of self-sufficiency,

this refusal to profit by the resources of civilisation, is a form of the return to Nature, an emulation of the dexterity attributed to savages; and as such it was sedulously recommended by the educationists of the eighteenth century.

Truth is just the sort of virtue that one would expect to find inculcated by the moralists of this school; for although lying is, in a sense, natural enough to human beings, in another sense it goes against nature by diverting words from what seems to be their original and proper use. It was, then, quite in order that Hippias should denounce calumny—a particular form of falsehood—observing that though worse than theft, it was left unpunished by the laws; and that he should exalt Achilles above Odysseus for being straightforward and truthful. In the same spirit, Prodicus distinguishes the approval that is given unfeignedly with the soul from the praise that is often given falsely in words; while in his famous apologue, known as the *Choice of Heracles*, he makes Virtue say that she will tell truly how things actually are as the gods (*i.e.* Nature) have made them.

Plain living and high thinking might have been taken as the motto of the physiocratic school. Like all intellectual schools, it drew away young men to a certain extent from the athletic contests for which there was such a rage in Greece, thereby incurring the vindictive hatred of the retrograde party; but Aristophanes himself in his most unscrupulous libels

cannot conceal the fact that poor fare and scant raiment were the first conditions of initiation into the mysteries of the new culture. And, in the apologue already cited, Prodicus proceeds on the genuinely naturalistic assumption that pleasure is altogether censurable when it has not been purchased by a corresponding outlay of effort and fatigue.

What the naturalists taught about justice may best be learned from the splendid reflex of it which has been preserved in the verses of Euripides. In his tragedy of the *Phoenissae*, that great poet brings together the two hostile brothers, Eteocles and Polyneices, to plead their claims to the Theban throne, in the presence of their aged mother Jocasta. Eteocles at once flings justice to the winds, and avowedly takes his stand on the ground of naked self-interest:

> 'Honour and virtue are but empty names
> That mortals use, each with a different meaning,
> Agreeing in the sound, not in the sense.
> Hear, mother, undisguised my whole resolve.
> Were Sovereignty, chief goddess among gods,
> Far set as is the rising of a star,
> Or buried deep in subterranean gloom,
> There I would seek and win her for mine own.
> . . . . . .
> Come fire, come sword, yoke horses to the car,
> And fill the plain with armèd men, for I
> Will not give up my royalty to him.
> Let all my life be guiltless save in this:
> I dare do any wrong for sovereign power,
> The splendid guerdon of a splendid sin.'

These words offer a singular contrast to the parallel speech of the Aeschylean Eteocles, in the Seven against Thebes, who places himself entirely on the ground of justice and patriotism—so much so indeed that, standing alone, they might be held to indicate a decline in the moral standard of the Attic stage. But they do not stand alone. The reply of Jocasta proves that morality was seeking a new basis in the order of Nature:

> 'Honour Equality, that binds together
> Both friends and cities and confederates ;
> For equity is law, law equity,
> The lesser is the greater's enemy,
> And disadvantaged aye begins the strife.
> From her our measures, weights, and numbers come,
> Defined and ordered by Equality ;
> So do the night's blind eye and sun's bright orb
> Walk equal courses in their yearly round,
> And neither is embittered by defeat ;
> And while both light and darkness serve mankind,
> Wilt thou not bear an equal in thy house?'

Here we have a glimpse of how the appeal to Nature was worked, for what noble purposes the Sophistic lessons in arithmetic and astronomy were used. Of course, such a method could be used for purposes the reverse of moral, as Aristophanes has shown with great humour and penetration. In the *Clouds* a creditor asks Strepsiades, who has been taking lessons in philosophy, to pay him the interest on a loan. Strepsiades begs to know whether the sea is any fuller now than it used to be. 'No,' answers

the other, 'for that would not be just.' 'Then, you wretch,' replies his debtor, 'do you suppose that the sea is not to get any fuller although all the rivers are flowing into it, and that your money is to go on always increasing?' Such arguments may already have been seriously advanced against the payment of interest, in the schools or out of them. But there never yet has been a moral principle set up that could not be used for dishonest or subversive purposes.

Attention has already been drawn to the sceptical and depreciatory attitude of Protagoras towards the naturalistic teaching of Hippias and the other Sophists. We can see in it the first beginning of the still enduring rivalry between a literary and a scientific education. But we can also see the profounder hostility which separates, at least during certain periods, the moralists who refer everything to humanity and its interests from the moralists who refer everything to the supposed intentions or analogies of Nature. At first Protagoras stood alone in his rejection of the latter principle, which, indeed, was far more consonant with Greek modes of thought than his exclusive humanism. But he was destined to receive a powerful support from Western Hellas, a quarter whence no great voice had long been heard.

Physical philosophy in Sicily had begun and ended with Empedocles, himself as much a poet and a

prophet as a thinker. But he left behind him one most brilliant pupil, Gorgias of Leontini, an Ionian settlement near Syracuse. This remarkable man created a totally new style of rhetoric, by carrying into prose the metaphorical, antithetical, and rhythmical diction which had hitherto been used for poetry alone. He may originally have been struck by the convincing force which philosophical opinions, in themselves of no great value, assumed when they were enunciated in the sonorous hexameters of Empedocles; and the impression may have been strengthened when, in the year 427 B.C., a diplomatic errand to Athens gave him an opportunity of studying the still more convincing eloquence of the Attic stage. At any rate, his life was devoted to cultivating and imparting rhetoric in the very strictest sense of the word—the art of persuasion, the power of winning assent, not by superior knowledge of facts or by dialectical ability, but by so putting known facts and obvious reasonings that the mind of the hearer is charmed into accepting them and acting on them as true. Such an art may be exercised without any derogation to the belief in a fixed order of Nature existing apart from our minds, and totally independent of what we may think or induce others to think about it. It may be used, and often has been used, to popularise the demonstrated certainties of science. But it will inevitably commend itself more to those who have little taste or talent for the laborious

ascertainment of facts, or for the rigid application of established rules, whose gift it is to play on the passions of an ignorant or prejudiced audience; and, as inevitably, such persons will drift into an attitude of scepticism, sometimes ending in complete denial of all objective truth whatsoever. To make belief perfectly plastic, it must be freed from the gritty residue of facts. Existence must be as variable as the appearance which their oratory controls.

Such, we may suppose, were the motives that led Gorgias to deny that there was any Nature at all, adding, that if there were any such thing it could not be known, and that the knowledge of it if obtained could not be imparted. He supported these conclusions, as rhetoricians still do, by turning against each other the arguments by which the physical philosophers had supported their conflicting theses, by dwelling on the inadequacy of ideas to represent things, on the inadequacy of words to represent ideas. If we allow for the paradoxical style habitually adopted by Greek philosophers, there is nothing in all this much more extravagant than the tone in which literary men, as such, habitually decry the claims of objective reality on our allegiance. And the positions of Gorgias might be maintained, in a modified form, as against the state of Nature formerly assumed by certain writers on morality. Such a state never existed: had it existed, we should have no authentic information about it; had we such

information, it would be useless as a present standard of conduct.

In his public declamations Gorgias gave evidence of a lofty Panhellenic enthusiasm, which at that time was equivalent to the enthusiasm for civilisation and progress characteristic of Greek Humanism: for the rest, his moral teaching, such as it was, seems to have been purely conventional; and, when we find his disciple Agathon observing in Plato's *Symposium*, that 'where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws, which are the lords of the city, say, is justice,' we recognise in his school, no less than in that of Protagoras, the adoption of Nomos instead of Nature as the ultimate standard and sanction of ethics.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that outside the schools, or even at all times within them, these two rival principles were regarded as necessarily antagonistic or mutually exclusive. For their influence was mingled almost indistinguishably in the current teaching, and practically tended in the same direction—that is, towards a constant elevation and purification of public opinion. We have seen how Euripides took up the application of physics to morality. But his place seems to be more generally among the Humanists. In his opinion, the first advantage of living in a Hellenic country is to be governed by law and justice instead of by brute force. Unlike barbarians, the Hellenes abhor incest-

uous marriages and reject polygamy, their custom being to cherish one wedded love. Within Greece itself he denounces the treachery and meanness of Spartan men, and the licentiousness of Spartan women. His Athens upholds against Thebes the Greek custom of giving up the bodies of the slain for burial; and the still better custom of sparing the lives of prisoners of war is violated against the wish of his Athenians, by the Theban Alcmênê. We have here nothing to do with the poet's patriotic prejudices, but only with the elements of that ideal superiority which, rightly or wrongly, he attributes to his native city; and these are just the qualities that a Protagoras would have singled out for praise. And we seem to hear the voice of Protagoras speaking through that of Tyndareus when, in the *Orestes*, he denounces the brutal and sanguinary custom of blood-revenge, which prolongs the effect of a first homicide through illimitable time, threatening nations with destruction and the earth with desolation. This view is the more remarkable in that Euripides presents it as an express defiance of the religious sanction given by the Delphic oracle to the matricide of Orestes, and as a covert criticism of Aeschylus, who had upheld the law of retaliation.

Similarly Alcidamas, who succeeded to the headship of the rhetorical school over which Gorgias had presided, seems to have felt no difficulty in combining the principles of his master with the principles of

Hippias. Like the Platonic Agathon (who, indeed, may have been meant to represent him), Alcidamas called the laws 'the lords of the city,' adding that philosophy is 'the bulwark of the laws'; but, in revolutionary opposition to what was then legal, he also pronounced the great word, destined to work thenceforth as an emancipating leaven: 'God sent out all men to be free; Nature has made none a slave.' And, in just the same spirit, Lycophron, while extolling law as the guarantee of mutual justice, and carrying scepticism so far as to deny the possibility of predication, nevertheless held that the distinctions of noble and ignoble birth were mere names having no basis in truth.

In these ulterior developments of the new morality we see philosophy abandoning its old aristocratic standpoint and going hand in hand with an ever-spreading democratic movement, which, but for the interference of Rome, might have resulted in the establishment of socialism all over European Greece, and which, carried across the Adriatic, threatened Rome herself with the same levelling catastrophe. But, if we go back to the first introduction of higher intellectual culture into Greek life, we shall find that it served equally as the starting-point of a widely different movement. To understand this we must cast a glance at the political circumstances of the fifth century B.C. In the Athenian constitution, which may be taken as the type of a popular govern-

ment at that period, while all legislative and judicial power was nominally entrusted to the numerical majority of the citizens, the administration, and practically the whole authority of the State, remained in the hands of the higher classes, who alone had leisure and ability to exercise it. But the reforms passed by high-born demagogues like Pericles had the effect of so raising the intelligence and self-confidence of the common people that mere audacity, combined with a gift of language often found among the poorest and least educated of mankind, seemed likely to become qualification enough for holding the chief magistracies and guiding the votes of the sovereign assembly. Alarmed at this unexpected development, the young nobles looked round for a means of recovering the authority that was slipping from their hands, and found it in the teaching of the Sophists. They alone had wealth enough to pay the high fees demanded by the professors of the new culture; and money would be well spent if its outlay enabled them to recover their former position in the State. Even as a matter of self-preservation it was becoming an urgent necessity to take lessons from experts in the art of words. Any one might be called on at any moment to answer for himself before the popular courts of justice (so-called), at the risk, in case of failure, of losing his fortune, his home, his liberty, or his life; and the most highly placed citizens were the most exposed to this danger, because their

inevitable errors, if they had held office, were liable to be put in the most odious light before a people who delighted in defamation; because their wealth, in the case of a capital sentence, went to replenish the public treasury; because of the bitter envy with which every sort of superiority is regarded by a southern European democracy. So keenly, indeed, was the danger felt that it called into existence a class of persons like the delators of the Roman empire, universally hated but universally feared, who lived by levying blackmail from the timid rich through the threat of a public prosecution. And what made the prosecution, when it came, particularly calamitous, was the law which at Athens forbade the employment of advocates in legal proceedings; so that the accused person, if not an orator, had no resource but to learn by heart a speech prepared for him by one of the professional rhetoricians. Thus the trained speaker rejoiced in personal immunity from attack, and rejoiced also in the power over others which his accomplishment carried with it—a power which seemed to bestow nearly all the privileges of a Greek tyranny while attended by hardly any of its risks.

It may easily be supposed that an education recommended and sought after for the purpose of acquiring the highest efficiency in wielding the forensic weapons of attack and defence would rapidly degenerate into a collection of tricks for making

appearances do duty for realities, and would ally itself with a philosophy which taught that appearances were in fact the only realities. It is unhappily also probable that the heads of rival schools would endeavour to fasten the charge of immoral teaching on one another, and that the enemies of serious thinking would involve all schools of philosophy in a common condemnation for frivolity and fraud. As usual, Greek public opinion expressed itself in a number of telling little epigrams. The Sophists were up in the clouds; they denied the gods; they made the worse appear the better reason. The last was actually quoted as a boast of Protagoras himself. He may among his other paradoxes have said something capable of being construed in that sense, as that there is no proposition to which some exception may not be taken, or that a trained debater will find something to say on both sides of every case. But if equals are added to unequals, the wholes are unequal. The same dialectical skill that makes a weak argument stronger makes a strong argument stronger still, leaving the disparity between them what it was. It may even be contended that the process is one not of addition but of multiplication, so that the advantage of the right side is even greater than before.

The charge of being 'up in the clouds' was, as we have seen, singularly inapplicable to the Humanist Sophists—that is, to Protagoras and Gorgias; and, in

fact, their names are never mentioned by Aristophanes and Xenophon, the two staunchest champions of old-fashioned orthodoxy. On the other hand, to charge the Naturalists with making the worse the better reason would be just one of those calumnies of which Hippias so pathetically complained. Nevertheless, their doctrine was capable of being used for a sinister purpose of which they little dreamed. Grant, as they contended, that Nature is the reverse of law, and grant, as their opponents contended, that law is the sole guarantee of mutual justice, then Nature is the very negation of justice, hers is a reign of violence, spoliation, and oppression; or, to put the same view a little differently, she has her law and her justice, which is the unrestricted dominion of the strong over the weak. Such was the moral drawn from the new philosophy by the young aristocrats who chafed under the restraints of Athenian democracy, who were too impatient or too contemptuous of the *canaille* to gain power by the weapons of persuasion, who once and again saw their noblest compeers driven into exile or made to drink hemlock by the senseless fury of the Demos. In the face of such a situation, their one idea was to seize the tyranny by any means that offered itself, by armed force, or, if need be, by alliance with the foreign enemy, and then to use it for the gratification of every animal appetite.

The Sophists were creating a public opinion which in time rendered the profession of such sentiments

impossible. But for the moment they were powerless to check this sudden outbreak of the savage and the brute, due not to their teaching but to the cumulative action of inter-Hellenic warfare, plague, and political faction-fights. Their amiable and ingenious apologues could no more draw off the young lions of Athens from their prey than the far-fetched physical analogies of Jocasta could turn her son from his impassioned wooing of Sovereignty, chief goddess among gods.

It has now to be shown how, amidst all this discord, confusion, and excess, the higher genius of Athens set itself to the task of restoring the lost harmony between man and Nature; how, in the Ionian metropolis, the old Ionian ideal of sophrosynê was developed into new conceptions of justice and of truth.

CHAPTER VI

SOCRATES AND ATHENS: THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION

We have seen how the new ideas which philosophy had made current were received by the different sections of Athenian society. The cleverest literary men absorbed them without discrimination, and reproduced them without systematic arrangement. The high-born and unscrupulous took them up as a weapon for the recovery of political power. The most advanced democrats perhaps saw in them an argument for the equalisation of citizens and slaves, of men and women, of rich and poor. The bulk of the people dreaded them as frivolous, unpractical, irreligious, and morally mischievous.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians were a very religious people—the most religious in all Hellas. They were also in all essentials a most conservative people, a fact which would be more generally recognised but for the modern tendency to associate liberalism with popular government and with intellectual eminence. Tuscany and Scotland, the two countries that most naturally suggest a comparison with Attica, resemble it also in this fidelity to old

traditions; and in all three instances physical causes may supply the needed explanation. A bleak but healthy climate, and a soil which, without being very fertile, yielded sufficient returns to assiduous and skilful cultivation, offered little temptation to the cupidity of settled neighbours or of wandering hordes, while it reared a hardy race, quite capable of repelling their occasional attacks. Thus, so far as history and legend went back, there was no breach in the continuity of their domestic and political life, of what, but for the impropriety of the word in reference to a city-state, we should call their national existence. Like other Greek cantons, Attica was originally divided among a number of independent communities; but, owing no doubt to the peculiar geographical disposition of the country, they were united at a very early period, and apparently by peaceful means, into a single commonwealth. Indeed, the leading city, Athens itself, seems to have begun, like Rome, as a miniature confederation, so that the habit of friendly union on equitable terms ran, as it were, in the blood of the people. The subsequent evolution of the government into a pure democracy took place step by step, accompanied by so little violence, and by such cordial co-operation of at least a large body of nobles with the people, that what has been said of modern Tuscany may be said with still greater reason of Athens: the proverb that revolutions are not made with rose-water does not apply to it.

As with Tuscany and Scotland, the admirable maritime position of Attica subsequently led to an extensive trade with the rest of the world, and, together with the mineral resources of the country, developed a certain amount of manufacturing industry. But in this respect there was a marked difference between Athens and the great colonial seats of Hellenic culture, such as Miletus, Samos, Croton, and Acragas. It stood at a little distance from the sea, and thus escaped from the disturbing and demoralising influences by which a great emporium of commerce is necessarily afflicted. An Athenian moralist might find the self-indulgence of his countrymen excessive, but it seemed moderation when compared with the revolting sensuality of Syracuse. An inland town was also less accessible to religious innovations than a seaport; and accordingly we find that some orgiastic cults were practised at Peiraeus which would have been discountenanced at Athens.

Reasoning and persuasion, exercised within certain rather narrowly circumscribed limits of traditional custom, were bound to be the keynote of the intellectual life of Athens. And this art, when practised with the utmost intensity, meant the study of mind as revealed internally by the analysis of consciousness, or externally by the interpretation of expression. No Greek sculpture can of course be compared with modern work for expressiveness; but it will be admitted that Pheidias made a great advance on the

Aeginetan school in this respect; and Mr. Ruskin has even placed him by the side of Dante and Michelangelo for depth of spirituality. But it is to the Attic drama that we must go for the very highest embodiments of mind to be met with in antiquity—of mind, that is to say, not only reacting on circumstances, but, in its most concrete form, as a number of human souls reacting on one another. And, in addition to the characters of the Attic drama, we have a most wonderful series of impersonations in the Attic oratory of the fourth century, particularly in the speeches composed by Lysias for delivery before the popular tribunals or dicasteries, as they were called. It has already been mentioned that Athenian law required that the parties to a suit should not employ an advocate, but should plead their own cause. Accordingly, it became a regular profession to write speeches for persons so engaged; and the great masters of this species of composition were careful, as we say, to write them in character, to give them the appearance of having been prepared by the litigant who actually delivered them. For this purpose it was necessary to make a close study of his personality, and even of his adversary's personality, in order to anticipate the tactics of the other side.

Recent researches have been tending more and more to show that the paramount authority in Athens and the pivot of its political life was neither the legislative nor the executive, but the judiciary. We

have seen how its procedure was a constant lesson in psychology. It was also a lesson in logic. Cross-examination was freely practised, not only to elicit information from witnesses, but also by the parties on one another, in order, if possible, to confute them out of their own mouths. With what interest it was followed by the audience, and how deeply it affected the current forms of thought, may be seen by a glance at the Attic drama. It will speedily be observed that, while the whole action is conducted in obvious imitation of a trial before the law-courts, especial prominence is given to the rapid interchange of question and answer as a means of defining and developing the mutual relations of the persons concerned. At a rather early period also it became a recognised game in private life to entangle an antagonist in self-contradictions by a series of skilfully arranged questions, or to entrap him into admissions very little to his liking or to his interest.

It appears, then, that all the elements of a new philosophy lay ready to hand in the thoroughfares of Athens, waiting only for a genius sufficiently powerful to combine and inform them with a common life. This philosophy must respect religion, therefore it must keep aloof from the physical researches which had proved so fatal to the old mythology; it must be democratic in the sense of imposing nothing on the authority of a teacher—indeed, it must rather veil the attempt to impart new truth under cover of a

continual deference to the opinions and wishes of the learner, representing each fresh proposition as elicited from the consciousness of the interlocutors in the course of conversation by their joint search after wisdom, rather than as conveyed into it from without; in order to this result, it must pay particular attention to the processes of thought, to the composition and connexion of ideas, and, that the agreement may not be illusory, to the exact definition of terms —and here its method will have to be modelled on the precedents of legislative enactments: finally, it must be practical, it must confer an ability comparable to that of the weaver, the sailor, the sculptor, or the general, but an ability accompanied by none of the discredit attaching to the artisan or of the unpopularity attaching to the rhetorician—an ability advantageous to the possessor, to his friends, and to the State, an ability that shall be in the interest of all to learn and in the interest of all to teach,—in one word, a principle of associated action, as the method by which it has been obtained is a principle of associated belief. After passing through the epic and lyric stages, thought has now to become dramatic.

That genius came in the form of Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus (469-399), that philosophy realised itself in the dialectic method with which his name has become for ever linked.

The name and features of this extraordinary individual are familiar to all, while the story of his life

and death is tolerably well known to educated people. Here the facts are admitted, although there may be different ways of looking at them. But there is a wide disagreement as to the nature and significance of his teaching, of what nowadays would be called his message. This is the reverse of what usually happens in the case of great leaders in philosophy and religion. Their doctrines shine out clearly, their personality is obscured or effaced. Three contemporaries have left us their impressions of Socrates. One of these was Aristophanes, the greatest comic poet of antiquity, perhaps of all ages. As such, it might be supposed that, although an acknowledged caricaturist, he would have produced a portrait preserving some sort of likeness to the original. Nevertheless, if the other witnesses are to be believed, he has only succeeded in hitting off some peculiarities of gait and manner; in all other respects his picture is the reverse of true. Those other two witnesses, Xenophon and Plato, were devoted followers of Socrates, and probably conversed with him during several years of the most impressible period of their lives. Between them, at least, we might expect a certain harmony as to the general drift of his teaching. Yet here also we are disappointed. For while their accounts of the master agree in absolutely contradicting Aristophanes, they differ from one another in some most important particulars. In the *Clouds*, Socrates is represented as absorbed in physical researches, as a teacher of

irreligion and immorality, and as most overbearing and brutal in his treatment of his pupils. In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon and the *Apologia* of Plato he repudiates the very possibility of a physical philosophy, shows the utmost zeal for piety and virtue as understood at Athens, and appears as a model of gentleness and urbanity. But in the *Apologia*, and indeed in the whole group of early Platonic dialogues, he professes universal nescience, being, by his own account, no less ignorant of scientific ethics than of physics, and makes it his principal business to convict the pretenders to knowledge of the same ignorance. He has been led to adopt this attitude of self-conscious and aggressive scepticism by a Delphic oracle (of which Xenophon tells us nothing) declaring him to be the wisest of men. It means, according to him, that true wisdom consists in the confession of man's absolute ignorance as opposed to the omniscience of God; and his own superiority to other men consists solely in his acknowledgment that he knows nothing. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, on the contrary, Socrates makes no secret of a very competent acquaintance with the whole circle of human interests, and is quite ready to communicate his knowledge of them to others.

That which is peculiar to Aristophanes must be rejected as against the weight of the evidence. But in one point he agrees with Xenophon rather than with Plato. His Socrates is a positive teacher of

youth, not a disagreeable person who goes up and down the streets entrapping people into admissions that make them ridiculous. So far from attacking the Sophists, he represents them, and therefore comes in for the largest share of the calumnies popularly repeated about them. But, to judge by his squalid appearance, the business is not a paying one in his case. This agrees perfectly with Xenophon's account, according to which Socrates differed from other teachers, including some of his own disciples, first and before all things in not taking money for his lessons; the reason given being that he taught them what it was for his own interest that they should learn—in other words, he taught them to be good citizens. Moreover, his lessons were given under the form of a friendly conversation; and to be paid for such intercourse would have seemed to a Greek nearly the same thing as prostitution.

But perhaps a more comprehensive view of what Plato tells us about his master's philosophy will show that the discrepancy between him and his fellow-disciple is less than would appear at first sight. To isolate some of Plato's Dialogues from the rest, and to speak of them in a peculiar sense as Socratic, under the notion that they convey a more accurate impression of his master's method than those written at a later period, is a highly misleading tradition of scholarship. In that way we get a thoroughly one-sided, and therefore false, conception of what Socrates

did, whereas the whole body of Plato's work, taken together, gives a glorified representation of the dialectic method which he initiated. This, as has been already suggested, was a study of mind in order to the development of individual character and capacity for the benefit of the individual himself and of the community at large. And this quite agrees with the impression left by Xenophon when he is studied in a liberal rather than in a literal spirit.

A good deal of attention has recently been given to the *Memorabilia* in Germany, and much ingenuity has been expended on the question of its historical value, resulting in the most remarkably divergent opinions. We are told that the ideas ascribed to Socrates are so poor that they cannot have brought about a great revolution in philosophy; that they are too much in advance of the age to have been uttered by Socrates at all, and must therefore have been put into his mouth by a Stoic interpolator; that Xenophon borrowed them from his fellow-disciple Antisthenes; that he got them out of his own head; that they belong to a great scheme for the moral and social reform of the Athenian State framed by Socrates in partial anticipation of Plato; that Socrates was not a moralist at all, but a much more purely intellectual thinker than Plato. Finally, the present drift of opinion seems to be that Xenophon may be taken as a fairly credible authority on the subject of his master's teaching—an opinion from which the present

writer, at least, has never departed. For what follows he is almost the sole source employed. Plato's attitude towards Socrates will come up for examination in the following chapter.

If the reader will excuse a somewhat scholastic expression, I would say that we must distinguish between the substance and the form, the matter and the manner, of the Socratic teaching; but that, at the same time, we must not overlook—what indeed it would be difficult to overrate—the essential analogy which connects them. Let us begin with the former. As a genuine product of the soil it was practical, moral, and religious all through. No less could be expected from an Athenian, and that, too, an Athenian belonging to the poorest class—a class always more susceptible of moral ideas than the rich, because to them injustice means being ruined by others, and intemperance means being ruined still more rapidly by themselves. On the surface there was nothing revolutionary about his ethics: Protagoras and Hippias were, in this respect, far more in advance of their age than he was. With his aversion both from physical studies and from rustic solitude he was not likely to fall back on Nature as a standard of conduct; nor did the fluctuations of custom impair his faith in the binding authority of Law. He seems to have thought that every country had the laws which suited it best. So far his views approximated to those of Protagoras, with whom indeed he may be

classed as a Humanist, and from whom his zeal for education was perhaps derived. But he had not the great Sophist's historical horizon, nor his idea of human progress; while, on the other hand, he had a much firmer grasp on the idea of utility as the deepest ground of all legislation, of all morality, and therein lay the secret of his ultimately more powerful influence on the development of both. In this way, again, he seems more nearly allied to the physiocrats, with whom he agreed in considering right conduct as founded on the nature of things; thus he could without difficulty appropriate and repeat the lessons of Prodicus.

Prodicus, however, had no more theological belief than Protagoras; he regarded the gods as simple personifications of natural objects. Socrates not only accepted the state-religion of Athens, but placed theology itself on a new foundation. There cannot, I think, be a doubt that he first put forward the famous argument from design. It was just the argument for one whose walks were among the work-shops, and whose talks were with the artisans of a great city; who, we must remember, had himself been originally a sculptor. Accordingly, he handled it with much more appreciation of its force and bearing than his successors, to whom mechanical contrivances were less familiar. As Macaulay correctly observed, nothing can be more like Paley's method than the reasonings in the *Memorabilia*. Anaxagoras may

have suggested the idea of a divine intelligence acting on matter; but, as we have seen, his world-process had nothing to do with the adaptation of means to ends. Plato professed to follow his master, but ended by drifting back into a position like that of the old physicists. Aristotle taught an immanent teleology which excludes creation and is independent of Theism.

It has been asked whether Socrates believed in one god or in many. But the question probably never presented itself to him in this clear-cut form. The popular religion recognised one supreme god; and down to the end of paganism, philosophers readily accepted a number of secondary divinities. As to the current mythology, no one was at any time obliged by popular opinion to believe more of it than he liked. Even such religious poets as Stesichorus and Pindar were at no pains to conceal their scepticism with regard to some of the old stories; nor did Aeschylus scruple to place some of the gods in an odious or ridiculous light. Conformity to the state-religion meant attendance at public worship and avoidance of expressions implying disbelief or doubt as to the existence of the deities to whom it was offered. In this respect the attitude of Socrates was unimpeachable. Had it been otherwise, Xenophon would not have been tempted to screen his shortcomings, for he would not, in the first instance, have listened to a heterodox teacher. If the facts were of

merely biographical interest, they might be passed over in so brief a review as the present; what makes them so important is that the predominatingly theistic character of philosophy ever since has been stamped on it by Socrates, as it was stamped on Socrates by Athens.

God, whether conceived as one or many, was the supreme artisan, the creator of manifold and exquisite utilities. In the same spirit, human life was, according to the Socratic view, an art to be studied and imparted like any other, not to be picked up at random; nor should its communication be entrusted to any but experts of the most approved efficiency. Therefore, he who professed it should be himself an object-lesson, combining in his own person the master and the masterpiece, the organiser and the consummate organisation of vital, social, and political utilities. This was the result at which Socrates aimed in his own self-discipline, and this he realised. It is well known how as man, friend, soldier, and citizen he passed scatheless through every ordeal, and crowned a happy life with a still happier death. When it was needful, he could resist the illegal clamour of the populace, and the illegal commands of a threatening tyrant; when needful, he could obey the law rather than the corrupt custom which had superseded it, and obey it once more when through that very loyalty he had forfeited his life.

Although for convenience we may provisionally

separate the individuality of the master from his activity as a teacher, yet the connexion must immediately be restored. The sculptor, weaver, shoemaker, and so forth, must acquire perfect proficiency in their respective crafts before they can impart their skill to others. But mastery in the art of life is like no other mastery. It lives, to a great extent, through the act of transmission, as the energy of the magnet is preserved and enhanced by the exercise of its own attraction. The thinker cannot tell what his ideas are worth until they have been reproduced in another mind as the result of its independent activity, so that, when merely accepted on his authority, to neither the originator nor the recipient can they be worth anything at all. And how can the spontaneity of the learner be assured and complete unless he in his turn evolves new ideas and submits them to the scrutiny of his teacher, so that their relations are inverted, the former questioner now becoming the respondent? Similarly with conduct in the more restricted sense, as the object of what we now call moral training. No man can be truly prudent, just, and beneficent unless he tries to make others equal in those respects to himself, while every step in their progress makes virtue more easy and delightful to him; and the more clearly he perceives this, the more clearly also will it dawn on him that the old conventional standards are verified and systematised in the conception of morality as co-operation for a

common good, which is also a separate good for every individual in the community.

Thus we return once more to the initial distinction between Socrates and the Sophists, which was simply this, that while they took money for their teaching, he did not. No doubt the Greek aristocratic contempt for paid industry had much to do with his original renunciation, coinciding, as it did in a wonderful manner, with the Athenian democratic dislike to the assumption of superior virtue and wisdom on the part of any single citizen. Towards strangers, like the Sophists, much greater tolerance would be shown in this respect; just as Demetrius Poliorcetes was afterwards willingly worshipped as a god by the Athenians, just as now a foreign dynasty is accepted when a native Greek king would not be endured.

Not every kind of education adapts itself equally well to the gratuitous system. That Prodicus and Hippias should charge for admission to their lectures was not more grasping or tradesmanlike than that Pindar should write odes for money. To them personally it was no gain that somebody else should know astronomy or philology. But this marketable knowledge was just the sort that Socrates neither had nor cared to have. He was too poor to attend lectures, and though rather fond of looking through books, which were both cheap and abundant at Athens, he found them unsatisfactory, because they could not answer his questions. Besides, being an

Athenian, he despised that kind of learning, and soon persuaded himself that it was illusory. His opinion of Protagoras and Gorgias is not recorded in any authentic source, but it may be easily conjectured. To be paid for teaching virtue was to be paid twice over, and therefore unjust; or, if it was permissible to a wandering stranger, who could hardly expect to reap the fruit that he sowed in a foreign country, it was not permissible to a patriotic citizen; and to avoid the risk of confusion with such irresponsible vagrants, he would make his method of instruction as different as possible from theirs.

A truly liberal education in the Socratic sense, although given gratuitously, was, after all, only open to the leisured class, to those Athenians whom there can be no objection to call gentlemen, since German scholars tell us that no other word so exactly describes them. Contrary to what is often stated, the bulk of Athenian citizens were, at least in their younger years, a hard-working people, very ignorant, very prejudiced, and very sordid. The prophecies of Bakis were their favourite literature; and even among the well-to-do middle class, to quote one of Aesop's fables was thought a rather brilliant conversational effort. Socrates held that such persons could, at best, be educated up to a sense of their own ignorance. Their sophrosynê would consist in not meddling with political questions far beyond their reach and comprehension, in leaving such questions

to those who had made a special study of the subject. Otherwise they ought to be restrained, if necessary, by force. In point of fact, if an obviously incompetent speaker tried to address the sovereign assembly, he was forcibly removed by the police, as happened to Plato's brother Glaucon, within the experience of Socrates himself. There was really no reason why an ignorant blacksmith, say, should meet with more consideration than a clever but imperfectly educated young gentleman. The election of certain magistrates by lot was a particular absurdity, such as nobody would tolerate in private business.

In his unconcealed contempt for extreme democracy, Socrates followed the almost unbroken tradition of Greek philosophy. But if an aristocrat, he was one in the literal sense of the word—not by any means a plutocrat. Government was to be exercised by the ablest and most virtuous citizens, and the object of his teaching was to furnish a test by which they could be singled out, a discipline by which they could be prepared for that high function. Obscure birth and poverty were not in themselves a disqualification for this more than for any other technical proficiency; and, as instruction was to be given gratuitously—an important point to remember in this connexion—the rich would not have that monopoly of power which they hoped to recover with the help of the Sophists. Still, as we have seen, it was practically to the higher classes alone that Socrates addressed himself, and

on them that his hopes for the immediate future depended.

Yet here once more the true democratic principle, the old Athenian spirit in its best form, intervenes. Socrates is and remains a man of the people, summing up in himself the inalienable functions of the sovereign assembly, the right to test the qualifications of candidates for office, the right to criticise them while they hold it, the right to examine into their conduct after they have laid it down, the right to accept or to reject new laws. And he points the way towards generalising these functions into a universal system of criticism, the criticism of philosophy on all belief, all art, and all life; a criticism which is nothing less than the self-realisation of mind, the elimination of inconsistency, the dialectic process by which all contradictions are resolved.

We have arrived at what is justly considered to be the great philosophical achievement of Socrates, his creation of logical method. Not, be it observed, the method of science in general, as some have erroneously held. Of physical science he, as an Athenian, knew only just enough to hate it; and his influence on it, so far as it went—happily not very far—was entirely mischievous. Mathematical reasoning, physical observation, and even experimental investigation, were already being carried on with success during his lifetime in the Ionian and Italian schools. His was the logic of psychology, ethics, theology, aesthe-

tics, law, politics, political economy, and education — all those studies, in short, where the subject-matter is supplied by everyday experience, and is viewed in constant connexion with the activity of mind reacting on mind. They are subjects in some or other of which most people are interested, and of which they think they know a good deal, but on which their ideas are generally vague and confused. We may readily suppose that at Athens the interest, the conceit, and the confusion were greater than anywhere else, or than any after age has known. It was the object of Socrates to do for this chaos what the supreme Nous of Anaxagoras had done for the material world, to bring order into it, to differentiate and integrate the contents of men's minds.

Socrates, says Aristotle, may justly be credited with having first introduced general definitions and induction. That is to say, he applied to words and to their correlative mental representations the old Greek method of limit and circumscription, imposing the duty of sophrosynê on thought itself. On thought, and also on the conversation which develops it. People cannot carry on a discussion profitably, or even decorously, unless they are agreed about the meaning of terms. If you and I are to play dialectic together, the pieces—in this instance words—must have the same value for us both, and we must stick to the rules of the game, otherwise, as Aristotle says, 'there will be a disgraceful scene.' Now the use of

induction was just to fix the definitions on which all could agree. We are accustomed to associate this method with the ascertainment of great general laws, but it had then and long afterwards a much more modest function. What the Athenians meant by it was bringing together a number of instances, the more varied the better, in which the same term occurred, and eliciting by comparison the point in which they agreed. Here, again, we may be sure that legal phraseology proved helpful and suggestive, and just for that reason the Socratic philosophy in its ulterior developments reacted fruitfully on jurisprudence.

In law and logic alike division goes hand in hand with definition. Socrates was always breaking up complex masses into their component elements, disentangling the separate issues involved in general questions, enumerating the marks of which a general notion consists. A good citizen, he would say, increases the national resources by his administration of the finances, defeats the enemy abroad, wins allies by his diplomacy, appeases dissension by his eloquence at home. One can see how in each instance the characteristic political virtue would be illustrated by contrast with an equally characteristic political blunder or crime. There could not be a better instance of that antithetical grouping which at the very outset was described as a pervading note of Greek thought.

Xenophon tells us that his master enunciated as a dialectic principle that reasoning should start from generally accepted truths. Indeed, one great object of his interrogative method was to bring the nature of this process into clear consciousness by securing the assent of his interlocutor at every step. But the clearer the process became the more wonderful seemed its final result. The evolution of the unknown from the known had the appearance of something magical, of a creation out of nothing. To us the discovery of new truth by deductive reasoning, and without the help of direct observation, has ceased to be a surprise, except when it is exemplified by some particularly arresting revelation. But to Socrates it was a paradox of the first magnitude, just as the *aperçus* of the physical philosophers had been to them; and, like them, he published his discovery in a paradoxical form, by proclaiming that, although reputed to be the wisest man in Greece, he really knew nothing. What he meant was that the dialectician, as such, need have no knowledge of material facts, that he is not concerned with the truth or falsehood of the premisses from which a certain conclusion is said to follow, but only with the logical validity of the inference itself. He may see that a particular statement is false, because on analysis it is found to involve a self-contradiction; or he may see that, being true, it involves other truths of which his informant is not in the least aware. Or,

like Socrates himself, by his definitions and divisions he may supply the blank forms into which new facts are fitted as fast as they come up. But in no case has he, as a logician, any knowledge of the material truth or falsity of the propositions with which he deals. Here, again, the immediate antecedents of the highest philosophical abstractions are to be found in real life. We hold that ignorance of the case is a positive qualification for a juryman, because his mind, being free from prejudice, is all the more accessible to just inferences from facts admitted on both sides. Socrates, with his experience of the law-courts, wished to put himself and his auditors exactly in the position of such a juryman.

This wonderful discovery that there was a well of truth springing up within the mind itself seemed to promise vast results in the furtherance of private and public welfare. Man need no longer look out, as in the dramas of Sophocles, on a strange or hostile world: he need no longer, like the Naturalists, turn his back on civilisation. Reason saw itself reflected in the divine government of the universe, in the written laws of the State, in the economic order of the city, saw itself enthroned as a divine principle of legislation within the human heart, dreamed of itself as working henceforward for the purification of morals, for the inspiration of art, for the redemption of love, for the reorganisation of Athenian power. The world was all but perfect: there remained such

a very little more to do, after all—only that men and women should take as much care of themselves, their children, and their friends, as they already took of sheep and oxen. Ignorance was really the only difficulty to overcome, and not a great difficulty either, since all had the key to knowledge in themselves, in one another, in their natural genius for conversation and co-operation. Let them take example by themselves in their most successful activities, preparing themselves for all the offices of life as carefully as they would for a lucrative profession, and placing their trust in none who were not similarly prepared; being not less fastidious about their counsellors than about their cooks, choosing their soul's healer as carefully as they chose a medical practitioner or a veterinary surgeon, and exacting as high a standard from their statesman as from their shoemaker.

As the theoretical philosophy of Socrates was summed up in the paradox that he knew nothing, so his practical teaching was summed up in the other great paradox that knowledge is virtue; and this saying has excited more wonder than the first, for it seems to be contradicted by men's whole experience of life. Doubtless, knowledge with him meant more than a mere verbal repetition of moral maxims; it meant a reference of every individual case to its law; it involved the same sort of ability to do the right thing that a draughtsman shows in managing his pencil. Doubtless, also, virtue with him meant

far more than our petty code of propriety; it meant the application of ideas to the whole field of practical activity. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to frame any definition either of knowledge or of conduct that would have justified him in ascribing the delinquencies of an Alcibiades or of a Critias to their intellectual deficiencies. Call it nature or will, there seems to be a residual element which his theory did not take into account. It will not do to shake our heads and talk about the dangers of Greek intellectualism, for the Greeks were just as much alive as we can be to the inadequacy of mere knowledge; and Aristotle has given a perfect scientific expression to the sentiment of his countrymen in this respect. But, in fact, if Xenophon is to be believed, Socrates did recognise the part played by natural disposition in the formation of character; and a careful study of natural aptitudes and inclinations was an article of his educational programme. If he really identified virtue with knowledge, it was probably as a consequence of having previously identified knowledge with consistency. To extract from sin a confession of its discordancy with the settled convictions of the mind was already a great step in advance. On the other hand, if we accept this interpretation of his words, he is open to the charge of great ambiguity in the use of terms. For if the consistency of the logician does not deserve to be called knowledge, no more does the consistency of the ethical practitioner.

Whether Socrates taught the ethics of enlightened self-interest is still a disputed question. In the conversations reported by Xenophon, he certainly appeals to egoistic or materialistic motives more and oftener than suits our standards, or than would have suited Plato's standard. But, assuming these conversations to be altogether authentic, we must make allowances for the flexibility of the dialectic method. An ethical logician may be permitted to point out the inconsistency of immoral conduct even with the principles of selfish materialism when no higher principles are granted by his opponent.

With Socrates himself, if we are to believe Plato, the root of moral obligation lay in a tacit contract between himself and the laws of the land. By residing all his life in Athens and enjoying their protection, he had virtually pledged himself to obey them even to the extent of giving up his life at their behest. This was the supreme logic of conduct, the practical syllogism whose conclusion he drew more than once at the risk, and at last with the certainty, of death.

Not many words need now be spent on the circumstances attending the trial and condemnation of Socrates, the most moral and religious teacher of the age, on a charge of irreligion and moral corruption. Modern liberalism need no longer burden itself with the defence of any democracy, least of all with the defence of the Athenian democracy at its worst.

The verdicts of the dicastery were repeatedly, flagrantly, and by universal admission, unjust. The ingratitude of Athens towards her great citizens is without a parallel in history. The religious bigotry and persecuting zeal of the Athenians are without a parallel in classical antiquity. It is an entire mistake to say that in no other Greek city would Socrates have been allowed to argue unmolested for so many years. In no other Greek city had a philosopher, as such, ever been attacked; while Athens had already expelled at least three philosophers from her walls. Neither is it true to say that the subjective method of Socrates was acting as a corrosive solvent on the traditional morality of his people, the principle of which was an unquestioning obedience to authority. Greek, or at least Ionian, morality had been at all times rational, and had always been growing and changing, generally for the better; nor is there any reason to believe that a whole community animated by the Socratic spirit would have been less prudent, less brave, or less patriotic than the generation that conquered at Marathon and Salamis.

It may be asked why Socrates was tolerated so long, especially as we know from the *Clouds* that the prejudice against him was of old standing. This immunity may be explained in great part by his extreme poverty and by his reputed mastery of argument. There was no money to be made by threatening him nor by bringing about his condemnation;

while his acquittal might have involved the disfranchisement and ruin of his prosecutors. He was also known to have friends among the oligarchical party whose interest, even under a democracy, would count for a good deal, and who, at any rate, were strong enough to avenge him if he succumbed. Such fears vanished with the overthrow of the Thirty. The nobles were decimated and cowed, the Demos triumphant and secure. An amnesty had indeed been granted, but there remained a certain soreness which had already betrayed itself in the prosecution of Eratosthenes by Lysias. There is also reason to believe that under the pressure of heavy and continuous disasters the tide of religious reaction was running high, and, if we may judge by the *Bacchae* of Euripides, had drawn even avowed freethinkers into its current.

Once brought before the court, the attitude of Socrates did the rest. We can imagine with what brutal satisfaction his judges looked forward to seeing the greatest thinker and teacher of the age suing humbly and with tears for mercy to them, the sovereign *canaille*, whose own children, as they suspected, were beginning to look down on them as cruel and ignorant dotards. Their rage must have been proportionately great when they found that he faced them with the same gentle but fearless dignity that had marked his whole life. We do not know by what facts or arguments the prosecutor supported

his indictment, for what Xenophon quotes as the speech actually delivered on this occasion was in fact a pamphlet published some years afterwards as a rhetorical exercise. But, so far as we can make out, the verdict of guilty and the capital condemnation were not determined by argument at all, but by the hatred of argument as such: they were the answer of the dicastery to the inflexible pride with which the old philosopher asserted his innocence, asserted his determination to go on delivering the same message as before, asserted his worthiness to be maintained for the rest of his life as a guest at the public expense. Such language may sometimes be addressed with impunity to an individual autocrat, but never to a crowd. The conflict which on that occasion first came to a decisive issue has often been repeated on a far greater scale and with far more piteous results; but the question in debate has never again been so dramatically exhibited, nor have the opposing principles been so ideally represented, in virtue or in vileness, on any other stage, as the principle of thought was then represented by Socrates, and the principle of collective unreason by the majority that sent him to his death.

CHAPTER VII

PLATO AND ATHENS: THE ARISTOCRATIC AND PANHELLENIC TRADITION

The personality of Socrates, the story of his life and of his death, exercised an immediate and lasting influence on philosophy. Redeemed from the bankruptcy of physical speculation, freed from the equivocal associations of Sophisticism, it tended henceforward to become the central interest of the Hellenic mind, under the form which it had received from the great organising representative of Athenian life and thought. Schools sprang up on all sides embodying the most divergent tendencies, but always claiming to continue the Socratic tradition. And, in fact, what constituted a Socratist was neither a set of opinions nor a particular mode of life, but the intimate connexion of practice with principle, the determination to set up a standard of perfection and to realise it in conduct. It was just this self-consistency that had distinguished Socrates from the Sophists. Prodicus preached submission to hardship, but he seems to have been personally a sybarite.

Hippias preached the return to Nature, while his appearance and pursuits bore the stamp of a refined and complicated civilisation. Antisthenes inherited their physiocratic system, and made Nature as against Convention the watchword of the Cynic school which he founded; but in the severe simplicity, the renunciation of luxury, the self-restriction to the bare necessaries of life which he practised and enforced on his disciples, Socrates was his avowed and only model. Aristippus adopted the sceptical subjectivity of Protagoras and worked it up into a more systematic form of agnosticism, severing the individual from the world, and giving him for an object in life the cultivation of his most agreeable sensations; but his steady pursuit of this ideal, the perfect adaptability that made him the master of circumstances when other men were their slaves, enabled him also to count as a disciple of the very Socrates by whom his cosmopolitan hedonism had been most severely condemned. Eucleides, an Eleatic dialectician, gave the absolute One of his masters a Socratic colouring by identifying it with the Good.

The two last mentioned thinkers were Dorians; Antisthenes was the son of a Thracian mother by an Athenian father. To complete the Athenian philosophy, and to develop its capabilities to their utmost possible extent, there was needed an Athenian of the purest race, and one who should represent the nobility of Athens in its spiritual form as perfectly as

Socrates had represented the spiritual form, the pure essence of its Demos. Such a successor was found in one high-born youth, who, we may be sure, would have become great anywhere or in any circumstances, but who needed the sunlike stimulation of the unequalled dialectical master to become what he is for us, the greatest thinker and writer of all time.

Plato (427-347) was descended through his father from Codrus, while through his mother's family he claimed kindred with Solon. He was also related on the maternal side to Critias, the head of the oligarchical party, and to Charmides, one of its brightest ornaments. At the time when they, along with others of the same faction, rose to supreme power and used it in such a manner as to sink their whole party in irretrievable ruin, he was still too young to share either in their brief exaltation or in their headlong fall; and the influence of Socrates, under which he had come at a still earlier period, served to alienate him permanently from practical politics in his native city. With the rarest endowments for dramatic art, and indeed for every species of literary composition, he was also induced to abandon poetry for the study of philosophy.

Plato responded with every fibre of his ardent and susceptible nature to the Socratic teaching. Religious belief was not fashionable in the society to which he belonged, and was indeed expressly repudiated by his kinsman Critias, who seems to have been in this

respect a Protagorean. But, as we have seen, a religious reaction was gaining ground towards the close of the century; and Plato threw himself into it with characteristic fervour. That affectation of ignorance known as the Socratic irony, which in its first intention was merely a paradoxical way of describing the new logic, or a polite way of taking the listener into partnership with the lecturer, received from him a more mystical interpretation. If the great religious poets had dilated on the powerlessness of man in order to exalt by contrast the divine omnipotence, this young intellectualist took away from him all knowledge, that the divine omniscience might shine out in greater splendour against the blackness of that night. For a time he represented Socrates himself, the great rationalist, as both the apostle and the martyr of this dispiriting revelation, put to death for trying to convince his fellow-mortals not of sin but of ignorance. And what he found so tragic about that catastrophe was not the fact of persecution, but the fact of its overtaking the wrong person. That a teacher of irreligion should be capitally punished seemed to Plato, the Athenian gentleman, as desirable as it seemed to the Deuteronomic legislator nearly three centuries before him; and towards the close of his life he sketched a plan for the suppression of heresy, breathing the same spirit as that which led to the condemnation of his master.

What Plato described as beyond the reach of

human understanding was the knowledge of ultimate realities, more especially the causes of physical phenomena. But the surfaces of things remained accessible to observation, above all, the phenomena of social life and of mind. With these, as his dialogues show, he made himself very thoroughly acquainted, learning all that could be taught by the workshop, the market-place, the gymnasium, the assembly, the law-court, the family-circle, the banquet, the love-talk, the sick-room, and the funeral. Socrates, too, had studied in that school of daily experience; but the position of Plato as an Athenian noble gave him far wider opportunities for observing men and things than had been within the reach of his homely predecessor. Always and everywhere the ruling class of a community are distinguished from the mass of the people by their immensely greater knowledge of foreign customs and international relations, by the insight into alien modes of thought that visits to strange countries and intimate converse with their most eminent representatives can alone confer—in short, by their relative familiarity with the social and political world in all its varieties and all its changes, as they are now, and as the course of history shows them to have formerly been. Now, this was a distinction that manifested itself more among the Greeks than among any other people of antiquity, and more at Athens than in any other Greek city. Her salvation at Marathon and at Salamis, her

imperial greatness, her fall, her retrieval from utter ruin, and her death-struggle with Macedonia, were all the work of statesmen either wary or adventurous, whose eyes habitually swept the whole political horizon on the look-out for every chance of danger or of aggrandisement for the State or for themselves. At times the people supported them loyally, at times it thwarted their ambition, at times it urged them on in the hope of gain for itself; but, as a rule, we may say that the impulse and illumination came from above, and the stolidity and fatuity from below: on the one side there was chivalry, romance, enterprise, self-devoted or unscrupulous daring; on the other, shrewdness and caution mixed with credulity and somewhat narrow greed. There was something of Don Quixote about the Athenian nobility, something of Sancho Panza about the Athenian people.

As Socrates had spiritualised the industrial habits and democratic traditions of the common people, working them up into a new philosophical method, so his brilliant young disciple spiritualised the daring adventurousness of the nobility, using it to accumulate fresh material for the dialectic method, the method of mind. While leaving the very limited purview of Socrates, he remained true to the Socratic system, his aim being by its help to understand all other systems, to reach their soul, the constitutive principle on which they rested; or again, by applying

the cross-examining elenchus, to expose what was hollow in their pretensions, inconsistent or inorganic in their composition. By virtue of the same sympathetic intelligence Plato throws himself into the part of every individual, even the most repugnant to his own nature, not only figuring his characteristic attitude and gesture, but adopting for the time his point of view, making out a better case for him than he could have made out for himself; impersonating every speaker with more than the dramatic art of a Euripides and more than the humour of an Aristophanes, pleading his cause with more than the forensic ability of a Lysias or an Isaeus. With the penetrating insight of a philosophical Alcibiades he sounds the polity, and makes himself at home in the customs, not only of his native Athens, but also of Lacedaemon and of Syracuse, of Persia and of Egypt, assigning them their place in the world's history or their rank in reference to the ideal State. So also with the philosophies of his predecessors and contemporaries. In each instance he lights with infallible accuracy on the one word that sums them up; and our best knowledge of Greek thought is merely a development of the pregnant hints that lie scattered through his writings.

If Socrates had done nothing else, it would have been an achievement of the first order to have given this godlike youth so clear a consciousness and so perfect a mastery of his proper powers, and to have

imposed on him, by an irresistible example, their lifelong dedication to the highest ends. Nor has the achievement gone unrewarded. The service thus rendered was repaid by Plato in an ideal form. His first and most successful use of the dialectic method was to reveal the potentialities of genius possessed but never disclosed by Socrates, to place his personality on a world-wide stage, and to prolong its awakening activity through all time. It may be that in his last years the plain old man felt this revivifying influence, and had a foretaste of this grander destiny. It may be that he was breathed upon by airs of immortality in the society of one who must have come to him as another, a greater, and a better Alcibiades, that he tasted the sweets of a final victory in the ready and rapturous responses of this beautiful youth, and caught a reflex of its glory in the light of his half-laughing, half-earnest eyes. It may be that this vision accompanied him as a solace and support in his final struggles, more and more perilous, more and more hopeless, against mob violence and oligarchical misrule.

Thus, even if Plato's earliest productions, the group known as his Socratic Dialogues, were authentic reports of conversations actually held at Athens, it would not follow that they represented the habitual teaching of the historical Socrates. Their tone might be due to a reaction of the mind of the disciple on the

mind of the master. But the probability is that they are entirely fictitious. The subjects dealt with were indeed familiar enough to Socrates. He is described as asking what the names of the various virtues mean, what is the true definition of Piety, Temperance, Valour, and Friendship. But no satisfactory answer is forthcoming. One current explanation after another is proposed, but only to be proved inconsistent with common usage. Throughout, the method employed is Induction, a method known to have been introduced by Socrates. But the real Socrates would not have been content to spend his life in pursuing a system which led to such purely negative results. Plato, on the contrary, welcomed them, just because he wanted to discredit Induction, for which he had an aristocratic dislike. To take the popular notions into account, and to use them as materials for a philosophic system, was doing far too much honour to the vulgar. Principles were not, any more than princes, to be elected by universal suffrage. His method was not to work up from particulars to generals, from the parts to the whole, but to work down from generals to particulars, from the whole to the parts. At this stage of his progress, however, he was not prepared to tell what that whole might be. But before considering how he found his way out of the difficulty, we have to note another bond of heredity by which Plato remained attached to the Socratic and Athenian spirit.

He from whose name the world has coined an adjective to express what is most impracticable and unreal, was through life the most in contact with reality, the most practical of all philosophers, differing from his master in this as in other respects only by the greater reach and depth of his views. Purely speculative problems occupy a relatively small part of his writings; and it was perhaps only as a means to the moral reformation of mankind that he ever studied them at all. He might easily have taken refuge from what seemed a hopelessly corrupt world in the contemplation of eternal verities or of eternal mysteries; but this, as he tells us himself, though a good life was not the best life. The best was to do his part towards the redemption of that world, by bringing down the eternal verities and forcing them on its unwilling gaze. His one ambition was to be the happier Aristeides, the wiser Pericles of an ideal State. And so in one of his latest writings he virtually identifies the genuine statesman with the genuine philosopher.

Of all practical problems the first to be considered was the educational question. At Athens the difficulties which now encumber it were unknown. It was strictly a matter for individual enterprise, far more being left to the initiative of private citizens in the Greek city than is commonly believed. No more was asked from the government than to let the teachers alone. But, as we have seen, public

opinion was rather sceptical about the possibility of teaching virtue, and inclined to look on those who professed to teach it as charlatans. We have also seen how Protagoras met the objection by creating a philosophy of progress, a philosophy known to us only through the statement of Plato, who, with his usual generosity, has here made himself the spokesman of the foreign Humanist. But it seemed to the young dialectician that Protagoras did not go to the bottom of the question. Virtue can indeed be taught—so much is proved by the experience of mankind—but how comes it to be teachable? The answer is suggested by the very process of teaching itself. Since the young, and indeed people of all ages, are disciplined by rewards and punishments, pleasure and pain must be the great motives of conduct. This holds especially of the typical Greek virtue, temperance, which habitually leads us to sacrifice a present pleasure through the dread of a future pain; and a scientific analysis shows that the same calculation lies at the bottom of all virtue. Observe how the two opposing principles of Nature and Law are reconciled by this application of the dialectic method. There is no attempt at a compromise between them, but when pushed to their logical consequences they turn out to be identical.

Thus for his first positive achievement, and under the pressure of practical needs, Plato constructed a system of utilitarian hedonism to which nothing was

added until a comparatively recent period. It did not always satisfy him; but to the last he continued to regard it as a good working theory for the mass of mankind. He tells us in the *Laws* that 'no one, if he can help it, will allow himself to be persuaded to do what is followed by more pain than pleasure'; and that 'pleasures and pains and desires are by nature the most human things of all, and on them every mortal necessarily hangs and depends.'

But with Plato every solution brings up a fresh problem or revives an old one. Virtue involves a knowledge of pleasures and pains; and he had lately declared that knowledge of every kind was unattainable. In basing right conduct on public opinion, Protagoras was building on a quicksand. He was appealing to the man in the street, or to such a majority as that which had found Socrates worthy of death.

Thus, as time went on, Plato found himself thrown back more and more on the alternative standard of truth. Nature rather than man became for him the measure of all things. Both the name and the thing come to occupy a more prominent place in his dialogues; and their chronological order may almost be determined by this single test. His first acquaintance with natural philosophy was indeed unfavourable to the formation of fixed principles, for he began as a Heracleitean, and the flux of Heracleitus easily allied itself to Protagorean scepticism.

At this crisis of his mental development, when or where we know not, but possibly during his travel in Southern Italy, Plato learned geometry. Its demonstrations acted on him like a revelation. Here he found a method for evolving objective truth from the operations of consciousness, and without any direct measurement of the figures under consideration, which fitted in admirably with the dialectic of Socrates. The deductive discovery of new truth suggested a secret kinship between the human mind and the nature of things, a radical identity in their ultimate constitution. If the gods had reserved all knowledge for themselves, man was not therefore excluded from participation in the privilege, for was not man himself of divine race?

Two centuries before Plato's time Greek religion had undergone a momentous transformation through which the worshipper came into closer communion with the gods, and received an assurance of sharing in their immortality, as they also had shared in his sufferings and death. After having been embraced by the noblest minds in Greece, this doctrine seems to have fallen into the hands of ignorant and degraded impostors, who made a living by retailing the means of ceremonial purification to persons whom they had succeeded in awakening to a sense of the dangers that awaited them in the future world. In the highest circles of thought, including even the Pythagoreans, who had once been its most conspicuous

defenders, the belief in man's immortality had ceased to exist, being, in fact, incompatible with the Ionian physics. At this conjuncture Plato, with the intuition of a commanding religious genius, seized the whole metaphysical and moral importance of the discredited dogma, and enforced it with a definiteness that had never been known before. Modern researches have made it extremely doubtful whether he personally accepted those notions of antenatal existence and future retribution to which he has given such eloquent expression. One who assumes, as he did, an unlimited right of deceiving the people for their own good can hardly escape the suspicion of having occasionally left the line that separates reasoned truth from edifying allegory a little indistinct. The victories of Sparta tended to bring Dorian habits into fashion, and among these Dorian hypocrisy would not be the hardest to acquire, especially under the stimulus of a religious reaction at home.

Be this as it may, Plato was beyond doubt most sincere in his professed anxiety to discover some means of communication between thought and things, between the world of human consciousness and the eternal realities that underlie the fleeting phenomena of sense. It seemed to him that there were three occasions on which the soul's connexion with that transcendent universe became more than ordinarily distinct. These were the crisis of birth,

the crisis of love, and the crisis of death. Of all incidents they are the most intensely interesting to the popular imagination; and Plato was always willing to enlist popular imagination on his side: he had that hold on it which marks the born poet, orator, and statesman. Therefore he represented the newly embodied soul as bringing with her a latent knowledge of ideal truth gained by antenatal converse with the gods themselves; he represented love, and in general the passion for beauty, as an endeavour on the part of the same soul to recover her lost harmony with Nature, to pass from the life of the individual into the life of the species, of the whole; and he represented death as a final deliverance from the vain shows of sense, and not only of sense but also of mere respectability, an appeal from the corrupt judgments of earthly tribunals to the eternal justice of the gods, or of Nature.

In the use which he makes of amorous passion, and in the romantic colouring which he gives to its unnatural excesses, Plato no longer reflects the genuine Athenian spirit, which, like that of the whole Ionian race, discountenanced erotic relations between persons of the same sex. Here, as in other matters, he reproduces the characteristic tone of his own class, on which the example of the far less civilised Lacedaemonians and Boeotians had acted with fatal effect. But the prolonged study of physical philosophy in its bearing on social welfare brought

him at last to repudiate all such compromising associations, and to condemn every species of voluptuous indulgence that does not contribute to the perpetuity of the race and to the sweetening of conjugal ties.

In the struggle towards Nature, Plato was actuated above all by the desire to gain a solid foundation for his ethical theory, a basis for conduct surer than the popular feeling of the moment. He expresses this demand by assuming the existence of absolute Ideas, which are to the world of things what the Socratic definitions were to the world of thought, among others a Justice and a Temperance, by participation in which the human soul becomes just and temperate. To postulate the separate reality of as many entities as language has common names is rightly considered a grotesque and impossible theory; nor should we lightly attribute such an absurdity to Plato. But to say that there are certain unalterable and inevitable fitnesses arising at certain moments from the mutual relations of things in themselves, is a perfectly tenable position; and how deeply, thanks to Plato himself, such a conviction has passed into common thought is proved by our use of the word ideal, as when we say an ideal statesman, an ideal marriage, or the ideally best thing to do. And the theory is just what would occur to a great practical and moral genius with his thoughts incessantly fixed not on what was, but on what ought to be. Perhaps

the very notion of what 'ought to be,' in its supreme generality, could not at the moment of its first conception be expressed in any but very figurative language. But Plato himself, by his free use of mythological expressions, by his projection of the ideal universe beyond the limits of space, and by his subordination of it to a principle—the idea of Good —which is avowedly above existence, seems anxious to guard against the crude materialism into which his followers fell. It is so hard for little children to keep themselves from idols!

By a brilliant application of the dialectic method Plato had shown that the humanism of Protagoras led back to Nature. He had next to perform the converse task, to show that Nature leads forward to civilisation and law. Here he found himself met on the very threshold of enquiry by a doctrine which some of his own class privately professed, the doctrine that there was indeed a 'law of Nature,' but that it was the right of the strong to rule for their own advantage over the weak. He meets and fully discusses it in one of his most splendid dialogues, the *Gorgias*. Gorgias himself and his disciple, the rhetorician Polus, have nothing to do with Nature. They do not profess to be moralists; and Polus, for one, would gladly use his oratory to win absolute power, or what the Greeks called a tyranny, in the State. Socrates shows by analysing the connotations of words that language itself and the popular sentiment

to which oratory appeals embody a condemnation of injustice. Then the oligarch Callicles steps in with his claim of an inherent right to rule, and his undisguised intention to use power when he gets it for the satisfaction of his animal appetites. Socrates shows in reply that, putting the valuation of superior force in its roughest form, civil law is justified by Nature. Being framed in the interest of the majority, who, though singly weak, are collectively strong, it represents the will of the most powerful party in the State. When Callicles changes his ground and urges the right of the best and wisest men to rule over the incapable, Socrates quite agrees with him, but by a bold generalisation he extends this principle from society to the individual, asserting the right of reason, the best thing in the soul, to rule over the lower elements of sensual appetite and passion. Then, at the close of the dialogue, by a still higher generalisation he passes again to the outer world, and asserts the dominion of reason and justice over the whole of existence, as displayed in the retribution dealt out to human souls after death.

In disputing the right of brute force to supersede law, Plato was facing no imaginary danger. The long internecine conflict between the great sea and land powers of Hellas had brought the art of war to a perfection hitherto unknown; and its close had flooded the world with disbanded soldiers, ready to sell their newly acquired skill to the highest bidder.

Quite recently the destruction of a Lacedaemonian mora by Iphicrates had shown what havoc a tactical reform might play with recognised superiorities and traditional arrangements. In these circumstances, it was becoming vitally important for every State to supply itself with a force armed and disciplined on the new model; and, when this was done, to solve the equally vital problem, how to keep the military in due subordination to the civil power, under pain of succumbing to such a tyranny as that which Dionysius had recently established at Syracuse. It seemed as if the government of the future was to be disputed between the flashy rhetorician and the brutal soldier, with the odds heavily on the side of the soldier.

At this conjuncture Plato brought the methods of physical philosophy to bear on the political problem. Accepting the idea of Nature as an ethical standard from the physiocrats, he interpreted Nature in a sense differing widely from theirs. Hippias had set up self-sufficiency as a principle; and his successor Antisthenes taught the return to Nature in the sense of a return to the simplicity of a savage life. To Plato, with his luxurious habits and his intensely social disposition, such a simplification seemed repellent, degraded, and untrue. His dialectical studies had taught him to consider the world, not as an aggregate of independent and homogeneous units, but as an ordered system of heterogeneous kinds connected with one another by graduated relations of

resemblance and difference; and he saw this differentiation of parts concurring towards the maintenance of the whole repeated within every living body, within every reasonable soul. This law of classification gave him a type for the reconstitution of the State. Division of labour was the very condition of social progress; it only needed to be carried a little further, to be pushed to its logical consequences. To begin with, the classes engaged in industrial pursuits must for the future be restricted to those pursuits, and must abstain from meddling with the art of government, for which Greek experience of democracy had shown them to be grossly unfit. Their place is, like that of the organs of nutrition in the body, like that of the animal instincts in the soul, naturally and rightly one of subordination. Above them stands the ruling class which, by a correlative specialisation of functions, must have nothing to do with pecuniary profit, being wholly devoted to the administration and defence of the commonwealth. As a guarantee for their disinterestedness, its members must renounce both family and property, they must have their wives and children as well as their material possessions in common. Their temporary unions are to be arranged by the chiefs of the State, with a view solely to the production of the healthiest, the most intellectual, and the most virtuous offspring. The education of their children is to be conducted on the same principle, with the aid of a purified religion and a

puritanical art—an art cultivated not for its own sake, not for the sake of pleasure, not for the sake of beauty, but for the sake of edification alone. Set free from family cares, women, though according to Plato on the average inferior to men, are to be educated like them, and to perform the same military and political duties. From the whole communistic body so bred and so trained a smaller number are to be selected and prepared by a philosophical education for the supreme control of the Republic, on which they must not enter before their fiftieth year. These last correspond to reason in the soul, and to the head in the body, with its organs of mind and of special sense: their proper virtue is Wisdom. The armed force of younger citizens on which they rely for the control and defence of the commonwealth answers to the heart. We have no single word describing their psychological counterpart: it may best be represented by the mediaeval sense of personal honour or by the pride of modern women, a feeling equally ready to resent disrespect from without, and prompt to fight down irrational or undutiful impulses proceeding from the lower nature within. The virtue of this class is Courage, a quality which, after the example of the Greeks, we still connect with the heart. Sophrosynê, now taken in the narrow sense of Temperance, belongs to all three classes, but being the sole virtue of the industrial population, it may be described as characteristic of, though not peculiar to, the lowest

class, physiologically represented by the organs of nutrition; while Justice is diffused over the whole community as the virtue which gives every one his own, in the sense of assigning to each his proper function and limiting him to its single performance.

Thus the Delphic precepts, *Be moderate,* and *Know thyself,* receive in Plato's *Republic* their complete application and their ideal expression. In it we find fully exemplified the mutual limitation of spheres and their subordination to a comprehensive whole. We find an antithetical arrangement whereby the ruling class is opposed to the producers, and the mediating or transitional link by which that antithesis is resolved into perfect union, represented by the military class, the armed protectors of the State. Finally, we have the symmetrical disposition by which the community is brought into complete parallelism with the individual, and, within the individual, the body into parallelism with the soul. It remains to add that a similar parallelism obtains between the purely intellectual sphere and the universe which it reflects. Corresponding to the general distinction between reason and sense, the objective world consists partly of the eternal Ideas, partly of their sensible copies; while true opinion or unreasoned knowledge occupies a middle place, answering to the relations by which phenomena are connected with one another.

All this may seem nothing better than ingenious trifling, but to Plato it was intensely serious. Throughout it he is 'driving at the practice'; he is using the traditional ingrained forms under which his people thought to overcome their selfishness and self-conceit, to break down the barrier that had been raised between the part and the whole, the interest of the unit and the interest of the community. He does this on the one hand by resolving that unit into a plurality, the very condition of whose healthfulness and happiness is virtue, and on the other hand by showing that the community is no mere aggregate of warring atoms, but an organic whole, from which the parts cannot be detached without misery and ruin to themselves. Nor will he allow his opponents to take refuge in Nature, as something that justifies the insincerity of their rhetoric by her illusiveness and unreality, their self-seeking fraud and violence by her internecine war, in which the strongest or craftiest are the fittest to survive. He shows, or attempts to show, that Nature too is an ordered whole, where illusions and imperfections have indeed their appointed place as connecting and harmonising links between the splendours of absolute existence and the utter blankness of inconceivable nonentity, but where the hierarchy of species, mineral and organic, bodies forth a living concrete dialectic from which the dialectic of philosophy must take its cue; and where the uniform revolutions of the starry

sphere reflect the Idea of Sameness, the immutable return of Reason on itself.

In his communistic programme it would seem as if Plato was not so much propounding a new scheme of his own, as framing a compromise with the much more radical views held by some of his contemporaries. Everywhere unlimited democracy tends towards the abolition of marriage and of private property; and the *Ecclesiazusae* of Aristophanes, a comedy in which not the faintest reference to Plato can be detected, points to such a consummation as the final outcome of Athenian revolutionism. Communism has also been advocated as one of Nature's lessons; and although there is no trace of it in the teaching of the physiocrats Hippias and Prodicus, it was a standing article in the creed of their Cynic successors, who lectured concurrently with Plato in the fourth century at Athens. We may fairly assume, then, that his aim was to limit and utilise a proposal with which, considered as a mere extension of individual licence, he could have no possible sympathy. And doubtless his aristocratic predilection for Lacedaemonian institutions would make him the readier to profit by some indications of a similar tendency observable on the banks of the Eurotas.

But it would be a mistake to treat Plato's *Republic* as an idealisation of Sparta, or, in general, of the old Greek city-state. Its affinities are at least as strongly

marked with the theocracies of the East, and especially with Egypt, a land whose institutions Plato may have studied on the spot. His philosophy, although purely Greek, raises him above the limits of Greek political experience, and almost enables him to anticipate the substitution of the class for the clan, and of common pursuits for a common ancestry as a bond of union, which was to mark the social constitution of the Middle Ages.

With all his comprehensiveness, his subtle discrimination, and his inherited dislike for confusion and excess, Plato himself exemplifies in an extreme form that principle of specialised activity which was the inspiration of his constructive philosophy. We have already seen in the former chapters of this book how the greatest Greek thinkers were wont to seize on one side of the truth, and to proclaim it in an aggressively paradoxical spirit as the whole truth. Plato was well aware of this tendency, and has called attention to it particularly in the case of Heracleitus and Parmenides, believing that their opposite points of view were reconciled in his own ideal theory. The dialectic method did, in fact, seem bound to secure harmony and balance, at the risk perhaps of condemning speculation to a vacillating and barren scepticism. But this very scepticism issued in a passionate desire to realise ideas in life, a passionate over-estimate of what might be done in the direction of practical reform. Plato once incidentally defines

reality as the capacity for acting or for being acted on. In that dynamic conception the whole of his genius stands revealed. For to him the very type of existence, so understood, was mind; and he immensely overrated both the power of the individual mind to impress itself on the world, and the plastic adaptability by which other minds are enabled to receive the impress of a commanding genius. Here we can detect the influence, not only of the practical instincts which were so strong among the Athenians, but also of their supreme artistic endowment. All around him, on the Acropolis, in the painted Stoa, in the Dionysiac theatre and the Odeon, in the Agora and the Pnyx, in the gymnasia and in the racecourse, were evidences of the consummate mastery and shaping power that mind had actually exercised over its material, whether the material was marble and bronze, or gold and ivory, pigments or lyre-strings or flute-stops, the images evoked by language or the modulated intonations of the actor's voice, the muscles of the athlete as they were moulded by the trainer, or the passions of the multitude as they were wielded by the orator at his will. So, and with only such a residue of inevitable imperfection as these might exhibit, had the living universe been framed by an eternal Spirit; so also should life be regenerated when kings were philosophers or when philosophers were kings. And this is just the reason why Plato regards imitative art with

such jealousy and suspicion. It was doing in a transitory, superficial, and illusive way the work which with him was wholly vital, serious, and sincere. But while its work was actually done, his remained in the condition of a promise and a programme, a suggestion or a dream.

So understood, the Platonic system remains an achievement of the highest interest and value, whether considered historically as a ferment of subsequent speculation, or, under the form of eternity, as a stimulus to all future schemes of reform. So thoroughly did Plato study the springs of social action, that it is far easier to reckon up those possibilities of progress which he has omitted than those which he has divined. The former, as it happens, are just what excite most hope in the widest circles among ourselves—the multiplication of labour-saving contrivances, and an increasing spread of the democratic spirit under the form of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Plato would have found his aristocratic prejudices irreconcilable with either of these. Of machinery he had very little experience; but we may safely conjecture that its future development would not have struck him as contributing very much to the beauty or happiness of human life. His experience of democracy, on the other hand, was very great; but the salvation of society was the last effect that he would have anticipated from its more general diffusion.

Plato's later speculations can here receive only the briefest mention. His practical and artistic tendencies led him more and more to conceive—or to represent—the world as shaped out of some very shadowy material after a pre-existing pattern by a creative intelligence, the pattern itself being variously figured as a logical, a geometrical, or an organic arrangement. With a keen appreciation of what was central in Greek thought, he would sometimes distribute all existence under the four heads of the Limit, the Unlimited, their combination, and the cause of their combination. In morals he leant more and more towards the physiocratic school, seeking for the standard of right conduct in natural law. In basing the study of science on mathematics, and the teaching of morality on ethical Theism, he forecast, and to some extent prepared, the course which Western civilisation was to follow for thousands of years to come. For the one method he was indebted to Pythagorean influences emanating from the Greek cities of Southern Italy; for the other to his Socratic training and to his Athenian home.

CHAPTER VIII

ARISTOTLE AND THE RETURN TO SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY

All forms of thought to which the Greek nation had given birth were represented in Platonism, but it represented them in very different proportions. The Athenian spirit, with its religious, ethical, artistic, and practical interests, furnished not only the largest contingent of ideas, but also the dialectic method which enabled Plato to assimilate and organise contributions levied from other schools of philosophy. Among these the Western schools, with their curious combination of mystical passion, voluptuous dreaming, high-wrought rhetoric, and exact mathematical investigation, were by nature and circumstance most attractive to his subtle genius and to his ardent temperament. There remained the great cosmologies which East Hellenic, or what we more especially call Ionian speculation, had thrown up in such profusion from the time of Thales to the time of Democritus. Among these, nothing greatly interested him but the flux of Heracleitus, and that interested him less as a

physical theory than as a dissolving dialectic of sensuous perception, an instrument for discrediting materialism, won over to the new spiritualist cause from the camp of its most formidable opponents.

But in Plato's later dialogues there is already a distinct decline of the Western influence, an increasing preference for the things of sense and experience, more akin to the old Ionian than to the Italian and Sicilian methods, a more appreciative tone in reference to pure naturalism, a tendency to soften down what was excessive in the demands formerly made on life and thought. Advancing years may account for much; but there seems to have been also a personal attraction at work. We can hardly suppose that Aristotle, the most powerful mind in the Academy, and acknowledged as such by its master, remained without influence on Plato. The results of his criticism may perhaps be traced in certain modifications of the Ideal theory indicated by the *Parmenides*, the *Sophist*, and the *Philebus*, in the cosmology of the *Timaeus*, and in the compromise with tradition represented by the *Laws*. But such concessions could never entirely satisfy one who felt the usual Greek ambition to found a school and a system of his own, and who, once he had asserted his independence, was bound by heredity and environment to move in a direction entirely different from that pursued by his Athenian teacher.

Aristotle (384-322) was a theoretical, not a practical

genius. Born at Stageirus, a small Ionian settlement on the northern shore of the Aegean, and belonging to a family in which the medical art was hereditary, he would feel naturally drawn first of all towards the sciences of observation and description; nor were the affairs of his native city likely to distract him from that pursuit. Stageirus was no Athens; it was not even a Miletus or an Ephesus, a Croton or an Acragas. It neither preserved the traditions of a great public life, nor did it offer opportunities for extended political action. The example of Democritus, whose mind was formed in somewhat similar circumstances, had already shown what theory of life was likely to be adopted under their influence. A number of ethical precepts bearing his name have been preserved, and they all point towards the same ideal of passionless calm. He who wrote them down had no thought of framing a moral law for all rational beings, but only for those who, like himself, wished to follow the calling of a speculative philosopher undisturbed by worldly cares.

As time went on, the course of Greek history seemed to enforce the necessity of such a retiring attitude on all philosophers. Military power, as exhibited in the careers of such men as Epameinondas, Timoleon, Philip, and Alexander, was rapidly becoming the decisive factor in political evolution, and was making even the skill of the rhetorician utterly futile, except as instrumental to its ends. To oppose the

phalanx was like opposing the elemental forces of nature. Plato, with his usual profound prescience, had indeed seen that there was more than one way of escape open from the reign of brute force. If philosophers could not become kings, kings might become philosophers; and at a later period salvation was actually found, as it will always be found, in that conversion of the great to the cause of the good. But at present the possibility was hardly dreamed of; and there is not a single passage in all the philosophical writings of Aristotle which would lead us remotely to suspect, did we not otherwise know it, that he had himself been the tutor of Alexander.

The Stageirite's personal character was in perfect harmony with his circumstances. Aristotle had neither the robust constitution nor the vigorous autocratic individuality of his predecessors in the school of Athens. There are indications that his was an affectionate, clinging, rather worshipping nature. His continual criticism of Plato tends to conceal his real dependence on the master wherever his own essentially naturalistic genius did not come into play. And what most alienated him from Plato was his extreme deference towards another guide—that public opinion, or 'common sense of most,' which the author of the *Republic* had held in such scorn. His uncompleted ideal of a city-state seems to have been planned as a compromise between the two. In point of fact, it is the ideal of a university town, and for

that reason it attracts great admiration among the denizens of academic retreats. For a similar reason his *Ethics* is very dear to college tutors, being, in fact, a manual for that excellent but not very large nor supremely influential section of the community, and to some extent also for the youths under their care. 'Faults of sensuality and faults of temper,' to use the words of a late eminent educationist, are no doubt the chief temptation in those circles, and Aristotle's rule of moderation guards us against these; his distributive justice is well represented by the system of marking at examinations, and might advantageously be represented by the appointments to academic dignities; friendship, about which he is so enthusiastic, is nowhere so fervent or so constant as between college companions; and his crowning virtue, devotion to the theoretic life, has a somewhat better chance of appreciation in a university than in the world.

Aristotle is not famous among us moderns for his eloquence or for the beauty of his style; but when he, the born theorist, speaks in praise of theorising, he finds accents incomparable for their pathos and their power. If such is not their effect on the English reader, let him blame the translation rather than the original:

'If happiness consists in the appropriate exercise of our vital functions, then the highest happiness must result from the highest activity, whether we choose to call that reason or anything else which is

the ruling and guiding principle within us, and through which we form our conceptions of what is noble and divine; and whether this be intrinsically divine or only the divinest thing in us, its appropriate activity must be perfect happiness. Now this, which we call the theoretic activity, must be the mightiest; for reason is supreme in our souls and supreme over the objects which it cognises; and it is also the most continuous, for of all activities theorising is that which can be most uninterruptedly carried on. Again, we think that some pleasure ought to be mingled with happiness; but of all our proper activities, philosophy is confessedly the most pleasurable, the enjoyments afforded by it being wonderfully pure and steady; for a life-long possession of knowledge is naturally more delightful than a life-long search after it. Of all virtues this is the most self-sufficing; for while, in common with every other virtue, it presupposes the indispensable conditions of life, wisdom does not, like justice and temperance and courage, need human objects for its exercise; theorising may go on in perfect solitude, the co-operation of other men, though helpful, not being absolutely necessary to its activity. All other pursuits are exercised for the sake of some end lying outside themselves: war entirely for the sake of peace, and statesmanship in great part for the sake of honour and power; but theorising yields no extraneous profit, great or small, and is loved for

itself alone. If, then, the energising of pure reason rises above such noble careers as war and statesmanship by its independence, by its inherent delightfulness, and, so far as human frailty can permit, by its untiring vigour, this must constitute perfect human happiness; or rather, such a life is more than human, and man can only partake of it through the divine principle within him; wherefore let us not listen to those who tell us that we should have no interests except what are human and mortal like ourselves; but, so far as may be, put on immortality, and bend all our efforts towards living up to that element in our nature which, though small in compass, is in power and preciousness supreme.'

We have seen in the last chapter what a radically different view of the world Plato took, how with him the fundamental interest was not theoretical but practical. We also saw to what an extent his theory was shaped by his practice, how the imperious moral need of rising above experience and custom and of presenting new ideals of conduct for our imitation—not without a strong side-influence from his artistic surroundings—led to the doctrine of eternal and self-subsistent Ideas. Now, it was precisely against this ideal theory that Aristotle waged continual war—a war resulting in his complete severance from the Academy. Nor was this the only fundamental difference. His theology also was radically unlike that of his master. Plato conceived God as a

creative Power, rejoicing to communicate His own perfections, assimilating all things to Himself. The language of the *Timaeus* may be figurative and mythical; but it shows, at least, what Plato wished to be believed. Aristotle, on the contrary, conceived God as pure self-thinking thought, as totally absorbed in the contemplation of His own perfection. He moves the universe as an object of love which it longs to resemble, not as loving it and desiring to raise it to Himself.

'On this principle the heavens and nature hang. This is that best life which we possess during a brief period only, for there it is so always, which with us is impossible. . . . Of all activities, theorising is the most delightful and the best, so that if God always has such happiness as we have in our most exalted moments it is wonderful, and still more wonderful if He has more.'

At the very summit of his metaphysical system Plato put the ideas of Identity and Difference, the great principles of all classification. After these comes Being; and, as we have seen, he defines Being in terms of action. Thus in the most abstract developments of his philosophy its social and practical character stands out clearly defined. Aristotle, on the other hand, places pure Being, or, in his phraseology, Being *as* Being, at the apex of his system, and defines it as self-thinking Thought. Never before had the first condition of personality

been brought out so clearly; but it is, so far, an isolated and inactive personality, whose existence, so far from being wonderfully happy must, one would think, be inexpressibly tedious.

Whatever Plato himself really taught, there can be little doubt that his followers regarded the Ideas as separate existences, distinct both from concrete reality and from mental conceptions; and Aristotle was entirely right when, in the interests of natural science, he restored them to the world of living experience. But while the exclusively theoretic endowment of this great thinker and observer saved him from some pitfalls, it also limited his vision to the surface of things. It seems a paradoxical assertion, but it is a fact that, to theorise perfectly, something more than theoretic faculty is needed: he who would pierce below experience and explain it must have a spirit above mere experience—he must have that passion for reshaping the facts of life, or at least for imagining their possible arrangement in new combinations, which only practical interests, only the inspiration of the ideal can give. Aristotle himself, with his admirable faculty for coining phrases, has hit off this connexion between the ardour of the reformer and the divination of the discoverer when he says that the Pythagoreans wanted to 'syncosmify,' to have a hand in the making of the universe. It was meant for a sneer; but to us who remember that Pythagoreanism, moving from hypothesis to hypo-

thesis, led on at last to the heliocentric system of astronomy, it sounds like the happiest of compliments; especially when we associate their daring cosmology with their schemes of political regeneration. In modern times also much cheap ridicule has been poured on the Spanish astronomer-king who observed that had he been consulted at the creation he could have given some useful hints. But he too was on the right track; for nothing could well be clumsier than the system of epicycles which astronomers, who were observers and nothing more, had felt themselves obliged to assume as an interpretation of the planetary movements.

Aristotle, in common with other Greek thinkers, used to be superciliously rebuked by modern critics for his *à priori* constructions, in which abstract reasoning had to do duty for patient and humble observation of Nature carried on according to the Baconian method. He is now as often praised for his devotion to observation and for his anticipation of the inductive method, in which, as is implied, he stood alone among the Greeks. Of these views the more recent estimate comes much nearer to the truth, but it still involves a large element of misapprehension. Aristotle and the Greek philosophers in general used to ask themselves two questions: first, How is the universe constructed as a whole and in its various parts? secondly, How comes it to be so constructed? That such questions should be put at all was due to Hellenic,

or rather Ionian, curiosity, and to the Hellenic love of order and law. The answers also were dictated by certain forms of thought imposed by nature and history on the Ionian race; with such wide variations as also inevitably resulted from the individuality of the Ionian genius, from its passion for what was startling and paradoxical. A people so keenly observant, so little dreamy, so interested in the external world, could not but arrive at views of its construction which were partially correct, and which furnished a secure basis for all subsequent enquiry. A people so ingenious could not but sometimes divine the underlying causes and laws of phenomena; and this will be especially obvious if we consider that they generalised from their knowledge of political societies, which was immense, and that the laws of politics are, in the last analysis, laws of nature. A people so critical and so in love with moderation could not but correct the excesses of individual thinkers by a process of synthesis and reconciliation. As a consequence of all these tendencies, the path of speculation from Anaximander on, if it is encumbered with crudities and absurdities, is also strewn with the most remarkable anticipations of modern science. Now, the striking thing is that Aristotle, to whom we largely owe our knowledge of these anticipations, rejected them as false, without a single exception, whenever they were in opposition to the opinion of the majority, or whenever there was an

alternative view more in accordance with superficial appearances. In the course of his own studies he made original generalisations which modern science has confirmed; but they are, so to speak, the generalisations of a naturalist rather than of a physicist; they deal with the relations of phenomena to one another, not with hidden machinery by which phenomena are produced.

Aristotle believed the universe to be an immense system of Forms, all, except the supreme Reason, associated with a certain amount and kind of Matter, but separable from it in thought—a view unquestionably suggested by Plato's Ideal theory. But, unlike Plato, he believed that these Forms were discovered, and could only be discovered, by induction from sensible particulars; a process performed by the Reason within us which has a natural aptitude for receiving the imprint of the Reason without us. Now, as all men are continually using their reason, and embodying the result in language and common opinion, we have a valuable register of truth in what is generally said and believed.

Thanks to this common-sense method, Aristotle stands alone among the ancient philosophers in his complete freedom from paradox, an immunity which has always strongly recommended him to a certain class of readers. It happens, however, that the great discoveries of science and the great steps in social reform have all been of a more or less paradoxical

character when they were first mooted—a clear proof that the induction and experience to which Aristotle appeals may be guides not less untrustworthy than the most hazardous reasoning. But in truth, what he called induction differed so widely from the experimental methods of modern logic that the two have hardly more than the name in common.

The power and interest of this philosopher—the greatest but one of antiquity—are not to be found in any miraculous anticipations of modern methods, nor in any imaginary exemption from the errors of his countrymen. It is just the systematic theorising for which he was formerly disparaged that makes him so great, his power of setting forth a mass of erroneous beliefs in such beautiful order and connexion that they seem to rest on a basis of impregnable demonstration. He first, and he alone, exhibits to us in their full concrete development the fundamental forms of Ionian thinking, all-embracing and all-penetrating, perfectly luminous, harmonious, and complete. All previous systems seem like tentative approaches to this magnificent construction, all after-systems seem to be built out of its ruins—if indeed we may speak of that as being ruined which will stand as the temple of Sophrosynê to all time.

We have seen how the constant preoccupation of Greek thought from the early years of the fifth century had been to reconcile Parmenides with Heracleitus, a preoccupation which, after unconsciously shaping the

theories of the minute philosophers, became conscious and avowed with Plato. In him the Italian influence still dominated; and it still retains a strong hold on his successor, notwithstanding his greater leaning towards the Ionian naturalism, and his far deeper acquaintance with its literature. First of all then, Aristotle, like Parmenides, conceives the world as strictly limited, as a perfect sphere with no void space either within or beyond it. To us this negation of infinity seems unintelligible: to a typical Greek it was the very condition of intelligence. Thought and extension are no longer identified, Plato's spiritualism having rendered such a confusion impossible for his disciple; but the supreme Reason, the self-thinking thought of which we have already heard, rests on the outer verge of the world in immediate contiguity with matter in its finest form, the aether or quintessence of which the celestial spheres are composed, spheres which are themselves the habitation of blessed gods. These are the eternal and incorruptible heavens to whose reality and constitution universal experience testifies. Aristotle combines in a curious manner the Parmenidean idea of a Limit with an appeal to the popular opinion which Parmenides so despised. 'We may trust,' he says, 'the traditions of old time, and especially of our own race, when they tell us that there is something deathless and divine about the things which, although moving, have a movement that is not bounded, but is

itself the universal bound, a perfect circle enclosing in its revolutions the imperfect motions that are subject to restraint and arrest; while this, being without beginning or end or rest through infinite time, is the one movement from which all others originate and into which they disappear. That heaven which antiquity assigned to the gods as an immortal abode is shown by the present argument to be uncreated and indestructible, exempt alike from mortal weakness and from the weariness of subjection to a force acting in opposition to its natural inclination.'

Parmenides would indeed have denied the reality even of that motion, simple, uniform, and eternal, which is here described. But Aristotle uses it with artistic skill to soften the transition from that absolute Reason, which alone, in the fullest sense, exists, to the sublunary world of mortality and change of which our earth is the centre. To a Greek that central position marked not, as has been fancied, great importance, but inferiority and degradation. This world, enclosed within the crystalline celestial sphere, has for its law the Heracleitean flux, the coexistence of contraries, the movement between opposites up and down from centre to circumference and from circumference to centre, the restless transformation into one another of perishable bodies. Here dwell the four elements of Empedocles, distinguished from the quintessence, the fifth element, the supernal

aether, by their subjection to manifold change, and by their restricted range of movement, ending with fire at the circumference, with earth at the centre. But Empedocles, according to Aristotle, was wrong in his absolute severance of the elements from one another as regards their ultimate constitution; and the first Ionians were better inspired when they reduced them to a common principle. Observe, however, that one element must not, as in their systems, be favoured at the expense of the rest: the common principle of which we are in search must be a mean between opposites, a something indefinable and unknowable except by its capacity for taking on all qualities in turn. It is potentiality as distinguished from actuality, the mean between that which is and that which is not.

A truly scientific philosopher like Democritus, or a practical reforming philosopher like Plato, seeks to understand matter by penetrating into its intimate molecular constitution. Not so the purely theoretic or artistic philosopher like Aristotle and his modern imitators Schelling and Hegel. To him matter resolves itself into the superficial and sensible qualities revealed to sight and touch. It is a more popular method and saves trouble. The Stageirite takes two pairs of antithetical qualities, borrowed from the old Ionian systems, Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry. Combine them by twos and you get the four elements. Hot and Dry make fire; Hot and Wet,

air; Wet and Cold, water; Cold and Dry, earth. The elements are transformed into one another by a process of substitution; the fundamental matter dropping one quality at a time and taking on its opposite. For example, water becomes earth by exchanging Wet for Dry. Nothing can be clearer or simpler; and those who will may look on the theory as an anticipation of modern chemistry. From our point of view it is perhaps more interesting as an application of the classic Greek method—the method of antithesis, swing, and balance.

Our artist-philosopher, working always on the surface, skilfully produces an appearance of solidity and depth by the use of shadow and aërial perspective. His way of explaining how the concrete things of experience come into existence, is to say that they are developed from Potentiality into Actuality by the influence of a pre-existing and embodied type of the specific Form which comes to be imposed on the passive material suited for its reception. Between the two he places, as usual, a middle term, Motion, which he grandly calls 'the immortal and irrestrainable life of things.' It is as if we were to explain how a fire is kindled by saying that the potential heat of the fuel is actualised by the contact of a lighted match, with the movement of the housemaid's hand as a connecting link between them. Description does duty for real science. The darkness and confusion of our ignorance are so combined with the high lights

of our most familiar experiences as to produce a beautiful picture, in which every artifice of series, symmetry, and contrast is used to enhance the effect of an imaginary elucidation.

But this master of illusive appearance is also, let us not forget, a consummate naturalist, anatomist, scholar, teacher, whose powers of observation, analysis, classification, description, memory, and illustration excite more and more admiration at every fresh perusal of his writings. These are the qualities that university professors, as a rule, most appreciate; and, since reputations are finally settled by them, it is not surprising that Aristotle should have been placed, relatively to other thinkers, a little higher than ever he deserves.

Whatever his admirers may say, Aristotle was not, like the early Greek philosophers, an evolutionist but he has arranged the phenomena of life, mind, and society in a certain sequence which only need projection into the form of time to furnish a very satisfactory system of evolution. For instance, when he tells us that the higher animals are distinguished from the lower by their increased structural differentiation, we need only think of the higher as connected with the lower by descent to obtain an important law of organic development, a law already suspected by Anaxagoras. What, in fact, constitutes the most obvious distinction between him and his predecessors is that they followed while he rejected this method of

projection. It was much easier for them to tell how things came into existence than to describe them as they actually are; according to a principle of logical classification, such as was suggested by the dialectical method of the Athenian school. But the essentially Greek habit of working up and down between the circumference and the centre of a supposed orderly sphere is common to the earlier and later school; and, as we have seen, it is particularly apparent in Aristotle.

The four elements are ranged round the centre of the universe in a manner rudely imitative of the perfect celestial circles; and their transformations are effected in a constant order resembling after a fashion that of the celestial revolutions on which they ultimately depend. The lower movement goes round in time as the upper movement goes round in space. A connexion between the two orders of movement is established through the obliquity of the ecliptic, to which the changes of the seasons are due. Imagine the working of a steam-engine reversed, so to speak, the wheels circling of themselves, and producing through the jointed parallelogram the up and down stroke of the piston, which again should alternately generate and condense the steam. That will give a sufficient idea of the manner in which the cosmic machinery is supposed to operate.

But the elements have another and more subtle

connexion with the world of eternity and of pure Reason. They contain in themselves a 'promise and potency' of organic life, which is being fulfilled and realised through infinite time. The present species of plants and animals have always existed in a fixed number, immutable, uncreated, and unevolved, except a few resulting from spontaneous generation. By reproduction they gain a simulacrum of that eternity for which all Nature longs; their power of assimilating inorganic matter is due to the potential life that is everywhere present. First homogeneous tissues are formed from the four elements, then out of these heterogeneous organs are developed; and the higher we rise in the animal series the greater is the differentiation; there is a physiological as well as a social division of labour, for no work can be done perfectly except by an instrument specially devoted to the purpose. The higher organisms are also distinguished from the lower by their increasing centralisation, determined by an increasing prominence of the heart, which has for its office to maintain the vital heat, while the brain and lungs supply the balancing principles of moisture and cold.

By virtue of this harmonious combination the living organism forms a little world; but it also imitates the universe in another way. The nutritive functions of the vegetable, the motor and sensory functions of the animal, and the rational functions of the human being follow one another like successive

spheres, the lower being incorporated and taken up into the higher. And on passing from physiology to psychology, from the world of life to the world of mind, we encounter the same scheme of antithesis, mediation, and circumscription. Each special sense represents a mean between two extremes—as sight between light and darkness—and is paralysed by an excess on either side. In cognition the senses furnish the raw material which reason works up into concepts, things that do not admit of excess; while memory and imagination act as mediators, spiritualising the data of sense before they are submitted to thought. And just as the inorganic elements are potentially living substance, so also sensation is potential thought, or concepts could never be elicited from it. Aristotle fully shares the theory of the early Greeks that like is known by like, and that there is a unity of composition between man and Nature; he differs from them by his spiritualism and by the greater elaborateness of his analysis.

Within reason itself the same analysis is carried on in accordance with the same invariable system. Aristotle is justly celebrated as the creator of logic; and no praise can be too high for his achievements in this direction. But the fact that many of his results have been embodied in our elementary manuals should not blind us to the profound differences that separate his conception of the science from ours. The plan of this work forbids me from entering into

a technical discussion of the subject, and I must content myself with saying that his Organon is not an instrument for discovering new laws of Nature, or for fitting new facts into laws already known; nor yet is it, except accidentally, a psychological explanation of the ratiocinative process, conducted with a view to carrying it on more correctly. Aristotle knew nothing about laws of Nature in our sense of the word, he only knew of Forms, represented in the most literal way by the celestial spheres, and, more metaphorically, by the four elements, by minerals, plants, and animal species, by types of character, political constitutions, and so forth. And in his dialectical philosophy, derived as it was from Platonism, the great object is first to define these forms, then to group them according to a system of contrast, series, and symmetry. Therefore scientific logic with him consists in the construction of such a system, in the determination of ultimate or limiting concepts on which the others depend, and, above all, in the discovery of intermediate terms by means of which higher and lower concepts are bound together in an unbroken series. Hence the immense importance of what has ever since been called the Middle Term in his analysis of the reasoning process, of the syllogism. If *A* is predicated of all *B*, and *B* is predicated of all *C*, then *A* is predicated of all *C*. All mammals are warm-blooded; all whales are mammals; therefore all whales are warm-blooded. If *A* is denied of all

B, and *B* is predicated of all *C*, then *A* is denied of all *C*. No mammals are fishes; all whales are mammals; therefore no whales are fishes. In both examples the middle term is 'mammals.' Observe that it is interpolated between the subject and the predicate of the conclusion for the purpose of definitely linking those terms together, or definitely disjoining them. Observe also that in the examples given, the middle term is the subject of the first or major premise, and the predicate of the second or minor premise. But, as Aristotle points out, there are perfectly valid syllogisms in which we find a different arrangement followed. For instance, if all *A* is *B*, and no *C* is *B*, it necessarily follows that no *A* is *C*. All whales are mammals; no fishes are mammals; therefore no whales are fishes. Here the middle term is the predicate in both premises. Or again, if all *B* is *A*, and all *B* is *C*, some *A*'s must be *C*'s. All whales are mammals; all whales are aquatic animals; therefore some mammals are aquatic animals. Here the middle term is the subject in both premises. These forms of reasoning are called the second and third syllogistic figures; and Aristotle shows us that from them nothing but negative or partial conclusions can be drawn. If we want universal affirmatives we must go to the first figure; and it is, in his opinion, the only satisfactory kind of syllogism—so much so that he gives us a number of rules for converting the other figures into it. I must apologise to such

of my readers as are already acquainted with formal logic for repeating what they already know, and to other readers for giving them so brief and dry an outline of the syllogistic theory; but so much at least was necessary for my present purpose, which is to point out that even here Aristotle has been guided by his fundamental point of view. The first figure follows the concentric arrangement of the celestial spheres. The second and third figures are not only defective, inasmuch as they yield no conclusions at once general and positive, but they also remove the middle term from the central position which it rightfully occupies in the first figure. To bring them into conformity with that figure is the great task of the formal logician; and he accomplishes it by an elaborate system of what is called 'conversion,' making subject and predicate change places in a manner that reminds us of the transformations suffered by the sublunary elements.

Applied logic illustrates the same general scheme. In Demonstration there is no place for contradiction or for doubt. Truth follows truth with the necessity and universality of the celestial revolutions; while at the summit of the series stand undemonstrated self-evident principles, answering to the supreme Reason, and apprehended by Reason in us. Then comes the sphere of Dialectic, embracing all matters of opinion, in which doubtful and problematic questions are bandied to and fro between opposing

disputants, as the First Matter oscillates between antithetical qualities.

In the world of human consciousness as mapped out by Plato, besides the contrasted spheres of reason and of sense, with opinion as a connecting link, there was also the antithesis of reason and desire, with passion as an intermediary. Aristotle's labours extend over the whole of this subject also; and the works devoted to it, his *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, and *Politics*, are those by which his reputation chiefly lives in our universities. But, owing to their disjunction from his great physical treatises, the key to their understanding has been lost; and a practical value which they do not possess is still attributed to them at the expense of their splendid systematisation, which is ignored. The genuine books of the *Rhetoric* throw no light on the art of literary composition; but they contain an admirable natural history of the passions, and of the means by which they are stimulated to excess. In the *Ethics*, conversely, moderation and the balancing of opposite impulses constitute the regulating principle of conduct, sophrosynê being erected into the supreme type of moral virtue; while moral habits are represented as resulting from the repeated performance of right actions, just as in the theory of knowledge right conceptions emerge from a repetition and comparison of the relevant particulars. In spite of himself, Aristotle here betrays the essentially theoretical character and the practical incom-

petence of his philosophy. To define virtue as a mean is really to insist on the large share played by knowledge in determining action, for nothing needs more wisdom and experience than the perception of what is just enough and no more. And to recommend the formation of moral habits is futile without the provision of an adequate machinery for enforcing them on the young, which is what the philosopher has failed to describe. Aristotle rounds off his ethical system with the glorification of theorising already quoted; but he nowhere brings theory into living connexion with practice: the beautiful disquisition on friendship, which, in our editions, furnishes a transition from the lower to the higher sphere, joins the two artistically, but does not weld them into an organic whole.

Nor is the needed complement supplied by Aristotle's *Politics*, a work never to be sufficiently admired as criticism and natural history, never to be consulted as a manual of practical statesmanship. Following the principle with which we are now tolerably familiar, it divides constitutions into two great classes, according as their object is to organise the State on the higher plane of an intellectual and moral life, or to organise it on the lower plane of material interests. The best government may be either a monarchy or an aristocracy. As men are now, the latter alone is practicable. Aristotle's whole philosophy, and also the circumstances of his age, pointed in the direction

of government by one man; but Greek tradition was still too strong to admit of it in theory. A sketch of the perfect State, left incomplete, shows that his ideal was really a university town under Macedonian protection. The industrial State, if such it can be called, oscillates between the opposite extremes of government by the few rich for their own benefit accompanied by spoliation of the poor majority, and government by the many poor, also for their own benefit, with accompanying plunder of the rich minority. The golden mean is government by the middle class, with due regard to the material interests of all classes.

So far as we can judge from the abridgment in which it has come down to us, the *Poetics* of Aristotle fully bears out the judgment which pronounces him to be a systematic anatomist without any deeper intelligence of the forces by which nature and life are moved. His analysis of tragic poetry into plot, characters, sentiment, diction, with the suggestion at least of what we call imagery and music, has been followed with advantage by critics ever since. But when he speaks of the plot as the soul and most important element of the piece, and when he recommends a certain moral mediocrity for the characters, not allowing them to depart very widely from nature on the side either of evil or of good, we may admire this ingenious application of his cosmic system, but we must deplore its narrowing effect on his percep-

tions, and regret that the example of Aeschylus and Sophocles could not inspire him with a healthier theory of aesthetics.

So far philosophy had been a conception of life, embodying the highest consciousness of the highest Hellenic race, and finding itself reflected from the whole face of Nature. This conception reached its consummation and its close in the Aristotelian system. Forms of thought which had grown up in and through the perfected polity of the aristocratic city-state, as administered by one or other branch of the Ionian race, could not long survive the dissolution of the polity, the class, the race to whose genius they gave a characteristic expression. Other causes of disintegration were also at work. There was the independent growth of positive science, by this time thoroughly well able to take care of itself, and seeking for truth irrespective of all systems. Under its influence Aristotle's own school, the Lyceum, tended more and more to become a museum of natural history. There was the continual stream of corrosive criticism directed against all dogma, which, inherited from the period of political debates, had grown into an inalienable habit of the Greek intellect. Before long Plato's Academy became the declared organ of this negative criticism and of nothing else. There was the profound religious interest of the Greeks, particularly strong at Athens, where philosophy had taken up its home, which demanded a fuller consider-

ation, even under the form of a hostile examination, than had been vouchsafed to it by Aristotle. This became a very important element in the later schools. Finally, there was the practical and moralising tendency, also native to Athens, which, after being developed with the utmost intensity by the two great Athenian thinkers, had been reabsorbed into pure theory by their successor, but which still clamoured through the mouths of the Cynics for more complete recognition as the very motive and justification of philosophy itself.

Even under its old self-imposed limitations, when subject to the traditional restrictions of sophrosynê, the Greek genius had found room for an almost inexhaustible variety of expressions; and when those limitations were finally transcended, the life within them did not die. The infinite elasticity and incomparable charm of Hellenism asserted themselves with new force as it poured in a flood over the barbarian world, and absorbed new material into its own substance. If the old philosophy had given ideal form and expression to the self-consciousness of a people that stood isolated in proud perfection from the lower races of mankind, a new philosophy might give expression, although with far less of classic purity and grace, to the self-consciousness of those later Greeks whose mission was to redeem and renovate the world.

CHAPTER IX

PHILOSOPHY OF THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD: THE STOICS, THEIR CRITICS, AND THEIR RIVALS

The conquests of Philip and Alexander, succeeded by the ascendency of Carthage and Rome in the West, definitely removed the axis of Greek civilisation and its centre of gravity to the coast of Asia Minor and the neighbouring islands. After Aristotle, nearly every Greek philosopher comes from that region, more especially from its northern and southern districts, as if Ionia had been exhausted by so many centuries of enormous productivity. A probable effect of this eastward trend was to put an end to the influence of the Italian schools, whence the element of stability and eternity in the systems of Plato and Aristotle had been derived; and, contrariwise, to restore the ascendency of the old Ionian naturalism to which it had so long served as a counterpoise. Already in Aristotle the reaction has begun: while still endeavouring to reconcile Heracleitus with Parmenides, he attributes less importance than his master to the Eleatic point of view; and with Aristotle's true successors, the Stoics, Heracleitus reigns

supreme. There were, however, certain other circumstances of a more specific character determining the choice of the Ephesian physics as the starting-point of a new philosophy.

Zeno, the celebrated founder of the Stoic school (about 358-260), was a native of Citium in Cyprus, and by birth probably at least half a Phoenician—that is to say, half a Semite. Much has been made of this circumstance; and the moral sublimity of Stoicism has been associated with something of the Hebrew spirit, which is supposed to run in the blood of all Semites, or, in this instance, to have been derived from some acquaintance with the Hebrew Scriptures. We need not examine the hypothesis, because it is entirely superfluous, besides being far-fetched. The Phoenicians were never particularly famous for their love of righteousness, any more than are the modern Jews, although the latter may be no more dishonest as traders than their Aryan neighbours; and Zeno is known to have imbibed his moral enthusiasm from the example of Socrates, as recorded in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, supplemented by the teaching of Crates, the last great chief of the Cynic school, whose exclusive Hellenism will hardly be denied.

Something has already been said of these Cynics and of their exclusive devotion to virtue. It will be remembered that their rule was to follow Nature, and that this preference of Nature to human law or

convention was itself a principle derived from the teaching of the Sophist Hippias, possibly combined with that of his illustrious contemporary Prodicus. The distinct formulation of Nature as a moral standard cannot be traced further back; but the principle itself is enunciated clearly enough by Heracleitus, and by him alone among the older philosophers, when he says that all human laws are nourished by the one divine law. Thus, in returning to Heracleitus, Zeno did but restore to naturalism the systematic completeness which it had lost in passing through the hands of popular moralists.

But Heracleitus was not the only philosopher whom the newcomer laid under contribution; and his enemies taunted him with applying the well-known commercial ability of his countrymen to theoretic pursuits by borrowing ideas from all quarters, and weaving them into a system of his own —an industry said to be not unknown among the Semites of the present day. But a similar eclecticism had been practised long before, especially by thinkers who were not of the Ionian race, such as Empedocles and Diogenes of Apollonia; and at all subsequent periods in the history of thought it has been an acknowledged principle of construction among systematists of the purest Aryan descent. And a philosophy which had for its avowed object the moral reformation of mankind on the basis of an encyclopaedic instruction in all useful branches of

knowledge could, less than any other, afford to dispense with intellectual assistance from whatever quarter it might come.

Stoicism, however, as organised in the first period of its existence—that is, under the reign of Zeno and of his two immediate successors, Cleanthes and Chrysippus—was marked by the application of a truly original method, which is interesting to us also as illustrating the general spirit of the age. Greek thought of the purely Republican period had been characterised by a pervading dualism, or at least by a love of antithesis and mediation, which, as we have seen reason to believe, was the abstract expression of Sophrosynê—of self-knowledge and self-restraint. Now, the Stoics made war on this dualism in every department of philosophy, and substituted for it a thoroughgoing system of monism. To begin with, they denied the distinction, on which Plato and Aristotle had so strongly insisted, between spirit and matter, and asserted the sole reality of the latter. They identified God with the world, thus bringing into clear consciousness the latent pantheism and hylozoism of the early Ionians. As the law of this Cosmos they proclaimed the universality and necessity of physical causation, thus leaving no place for the element of chance and free-will which Aristotle had maintained. Within the human mind they refused to distinguish between the various faculties assumed by Plato and Aristotle: there was only one

guiding principle, and that was reason. In their ethical theory they taught not merely that virtue was the highest good, but that it was the only good; such external possessions as health, wealth, and friends being, in their opinion, of no consequence to true happiness. In politics it was the ideal, at least of Zeno, that all mankind should be gathered into one fold, living under the same laws, without private property and without marriage.

It is possible that some at least of the Stoic chiefs may have brought with them from their Asiatic home that tendency towards absolutism which has always characterised the subjects of Oriental despotism, and which, at the present day, is so strikingly manifested by the leading intellects of Russia. But it is more certain that the general circumstances of their age were eminently favourable to this uncompromising method. Alexander and his successors would brook no opposition to their authority; they cherished dreams of universal empire, and they claimed to be worshipped as gods. It would be little to say that they anticipated Roman Caesarism, for Caesarism was no more than a later outgrowth of the same all-conquering spirit.

A nearer examination of Stoicism will show in a more subtle manner how it was conditioned by the tendencies of the age. Zeno, as we have seen, went back to the physics of Heracleitus, and made them his exclusive basis. It will be remembered

that Heracleitus took Fire as the primordial form of existence, out of which the other elements were developed and into which they returned. Zeno accepted this theory, but introduced into it two important modifications. Instead of identifying the primal element with the fire that burns on our hearths, he understood it to be a sort of heated and rarefied gas from which air, water, and earth were formed by cooling and condensation. All the Pneuma, as he called it, was not used up in this manner: a considerable portion remained in the empyrean, and acted as the governing principle of the whole. So far there is no advance on the early philosophy, or even on the mythology, of Greece. But now comes the original part of the theory. Particles of fiery matter, Zeno tells us, are continually descending from heaven to earth and mingling with the lower elements, within which they work as dynamic and formative principles by virtue of their superior elasticity. Through them inorganic bodies are held together, plants grow and propagate their kind, animals move and feel, human beings reason and act. Organic reproduction at once results from and illustrates their vitalising power: hence the Stoics spoke of them as 'seminal reasons' (*λόγοι σπερματικοί*), the Greek word translated reason being *logos*—a term destined to play a great part in the theology of the future, which, however, does not concern us here.

Fanciful as the theory of seminal reasons seems, and no doubt is, it is nevertheless organic; it supplies a definite link in the evolution of thought, and it is definitely related to the tendencies of the age. Aristotle had distinguished four different kinds of causes, and his classification is so useful that we still occasionally employ it. He divides them into material, motive, form, and end. Take, for example, a knife-blade. The material is steel, the motive or efficient cause is the cutler's hand, the form is a thin wedge pointed at one extremity, the end is to cut. In respect to artificial productions, the fourfold enumeration seems to answer to a real distinction in the things themselves; and yet, on examination, the last three causes tend to coalesce into one. The idea of a cutting instrument determines the shape of the knife, and guides the workman's hand: it even determines the material. To do its work properly the knife must be made of a very hard and tenacious substance, such as steel. But if this holds of artificial productions, much more does it hold of natural productions, and especially of living bodies. Here the organic type transmitted by generation is at once the moving cause, the form, and the end; while only a particular kind of matter, consecrated to that purpose, and having in itself the promise and potency of a certain type, can be developed into that type by a specific impulse from without.

If Aristotle had tended to spiritualise Matter in

order to make it an appropriate recipient for the Form, which was purely spiritual, the Stoics, on their side, interpreted the kinship between the two in an opposite sense, and resolutely materialised Form, making it, as we have seen, a quickening moulding effluence from the divine Pneuma. But, by dwelling more on the tension than on the extension of the fiery particles, they gave the theory a dynamic interpretation, and prepared that transition from form to force of which science stood in such need. At the same time, they preserved the idea of finality so long essential to physiology; and the linguistic connexion between tension, tendency, and intention seems to embalm in our common language a reminiscence of Stoic philosophy.

We owe to the practical genius of the school this conversion of quiet plastic form into vital self-developing energy. But it was a tendency by no means limited to Stoicism. The whole age of the Diadochi was a period not of sloth or retrogression, but of colossal creations, of exuberant and restless activity such as we still see reflected in the sculptures of Pergamus and Rhodes. It seemed as if the Titans were having their revenge on the gods, or as if the gods could only hold their own by summoning the terrific forces of Nature to their help, like those elephants which, on a decisive occasion, secured the victory of Greek civilisation over its Gallic assailants. Nor was civilisation content, as in the days of Themis-

tocles and Pericles, with merely holding its own against barbarism; it had become an expansive and aggressive impulse. From the Hellespont to the Himalayas innumerable Greek settlements were awakening the torpid Asiatics to new life; and this above all was the movement to which Zeno gave an ideal expression in his theory of seminal reasons. With him, as with Goethe's *Faust*, the *Logos* that was in the beginning has passed from a word into a deed.

By its conception of the world as a theatre of conquering, civilising, self-propagating energy, Stoicism suggested, if it did not effect, a radical change in the scientific point of view. For the tendency of such a view was to substitute the order of succession in time as an object of study for the order of coexistence, to substitute the law of universal causation for the hierarchic arrangement of natural kinds according to a system of logical classification. And it was quite in accordance with this revolution that the Stoic logicians should sweep away Aristotle's whole theory of the Middle Term, replacing it by the direct deduction of proposition from proposition; that they should refuse objective reality to the conceptions of the understanding; that, while basing conduct on knowledge, they should interpret belief as a state of the affections and the will, and therefore that they should make individual conviction the ultimate criterion of knowledge itself. So only could knowledge be verified as a vital, life-renovating power.

Individualism was consequently as much a note of Stoicism as absolute monism and universal necessity —so much so, indeed, that historians have been accustomed to dwell on it as the one all-important characteristic of the system, resulting from the destruction of the old Greek city-life with its ideals of obedience to law and devotion to the public good. And it is doubtless true that the turbulent times of the Diadochi did drive into studious retirement many citizens who, in happier circumstances, would have found a congenial employment for their energies in offices of public trust. But the message of Stoicism was not directed solely or chiefly to these recluses, whose voluntary withdrawal from the service of the State its noblest professors regarded as a misfortune or a crime. Individualism and subjectivity, as it understood them, were not necessarily dissociated from the idea of life in and for the whole. Rather did the constitution and purpose of Nature, as understood by the Stoics, demand an almost infinite diversity of individual aptitudes corresponding to the almost infinite variety of conjunctures created by the cosmic energy in the course of its inexhaustible manifestations. To the saying of Heracleitus that no man ever bathes twice in the same river, the Stoics added another saying, equally true, that no two leaves in a forest are exactly alike; and we may suppose that they extended the observation to human character, the greater complexity of which

gives scope for much greater differentiation than is possible in the vegetable world.

The age which produced Stoicism was, indeed, most fertile in new combinations of circumstances and in new types of character. Deducting mythical personalities, one-third of Plutarch's Greek heroes belong to the period after Alexander; and it produced other heroes whose lives he did not write. In view of the great king's achievements, there seemed no limit to what individual genius and daring might effect. Even the surrounding nations were roused to new life by the stimulating contact of Hellenism, and reasserted their original characteristics with astonishing energy. Nor was the old Hellenic spirit of independence and republicanism by any means crushed out. Only brute force could ever hold it down; and against that force it struggled repeatedly, on more than one occasion with success. Philosophy, too, began to exercise that influence on politics which was afterwards exemplified on a greater scale in the Roman world. In the Chremonidean war, men trained in the Stoic school headed the revolt against Macedon. Two disciples of Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, rid Megalopolis of her tyrant, helped Aratus to liberate Sicyon, and finally crossed the sea to establish a republican government in Cyrene. Cleomenes, in his brilliant though short-lived attempt to carry out an agrarian reform in Sparta, acted under

Stoic inspiration, and had as his coadjutor a Stoic philosopher.

It was, then, a very varied and stirring world—a world in which life was continually acting on ideas and ideas reacting on life, that world on which the Stoic chiefs looked out from the Painted Porch of Athens, gathering disciples from every quarter and sending them back as teachers, poets, generals, and statesmen, but always with the same message of righteousness on their lips; for, as Cleanthes said, 'Neither mortals nor gods have a higher privilege than meetly to hymn the praises of universal and eternal law.' In politics, as elsewhere, the heads of the school leant to absolutism, but they imposed no political creed on their disciples, who may be found in all parties alike: as beneficent despots with Cleomenes, as social democrats with the Gracchi, as conservative aristocrats with Cato and Brutus; resembling one another chiefly in their devotion to the public welfare, in the passionate earnestness that raised all party-struggles and all social vocations to a higher moral plane.

From the days of its first founder, Stoicism has been popularly associated with a peculiar moral rigour consisting largely in contempt for pleasure and unflinching endurance of pain—not, perhaps, always realised in the practice of its professors. But one might as well identify Calvinism with the popular conception of a Scottish Sabbath. Like

almost every other Greek school, the Porch had its paradoxes, its aggressive and exclusive ways of enunciating neglected truths. Among these was the paramount claim of the moral law to man's obedience, irrespective of the pleasure accompanying its fulfilment. Combine this principle with another principle, not doubted by any thinker of antiquity, that a man's business in life is the pursuit of happiness, and the conclusion seems inevitable that pleasure and happiness have nothing to do with one another, whence it will follow with equal cogency that one may be perfectly happy in agonies of pain. But really this means no more than that there are circumstances in which the good man will prefer a life of privation or a death of torment to any other possible alternative.

More paradoxical even than the self-sufficiency of virtue was the Stoic assertion of its unity and immutability. To be good at all was to be good in all things, and to be ever good was to be good for ever. Hence mankind fell into two sharply contrasted classes, known respectively as the wise and the foolish, the former being everything that was admirable, the latter everything that was the reverse; and all who passed for Stoics were naturally supposed to count themselves among the saved. Here again the combination of two principles, separately unobjectionable, leads to an incredible conclusion. That there is an ideal standard of conduct,

and that ideals exist only to be realised, are propositions which, when we put them together, seem to postulate the actual embodiment of the Stoic sage. But it is very doubtful whether any disciple ever claimed to be himself that realised ideal; and it is certain that the pretension, if it ever existed, was abandoned by the later Stoics. To them the conception of a perfectly virtuous man was, as it still is with the Christian, a source not of pride but of humility.

The ethical doctrine of the Stoics formed part of the teleology, derived from Socrates, which, by a remarkable inconsistency, they combined with the materialistic pantheism of Ionia. Everything in Nature has its appointed use and function, man among the rest, his office being to do consciously and voluntarily what other creatures do in blind obedience to law. Self-consistency is the ultimate test of right conduct; and to be true to ourselves implies consistency with the course of Nature. Thus physics, logic, and ethics are fused together, being, in fact, equivalent names for the same universal process. Within the narrower limits of morality, properly so called, the extreme individualism of the Stoic philosophy was happily reconciled with its world-wide comprehensiveness by the doctrine of providential vocations. Every man has a part to act, by the right performance of which he contributes to the general good, the welfare of the whole human

race; but the ultimate sanction of his social duties is to be found in the approval or condemnation of his own conscience, which again is a portion of the universal reason constituting his particular personality.

In the absence of full documentary evidence we cannot tell to what extent the three great ideas of conscience, duty, and universal humanity, so characteristic of the later Stoics, were realised by the first founders of the school. But when we consider how clearly their germs, or 'seminal reasons,' are already manifested in the teaching of the Sophists, and of Socrates and Plato, it seems likely that views substantially identical with those of Seneca, Epictetus, and Aurelius were current during the Hellenistic period. At any rate, there was no break in the continuous development of ethical reflection; and the dialectic method of Socrates furnished it with an unrivalled instrument for turning each fresh political revolution to the highest possible account.

True to the traditions of its Athenian birthplace, Stoicism lived on good terms with the popular mythology, which perhaps it regarded as a useful coadjutor in the work of public moralisation. Some sort of philosophical meaning was given to the old fables about the gods by an elaborate system of allegorical interpretation, which proved so useful that it was subsequently taken up by the Alexandrian Jews for the purpose of reconciling the

Hebrew Scriptures with Greek thought, and by the Christian Fathers for the purpose of reconciling the same Scriptures with Catholic theology. Divination, which by this time had come to constitute the most important element in the old polytheism, also received a pseudo-scientific support from the Stoics, a support subsequently extended to the more degraded priest-craft of pagan Rome.

No philosophical system has ever exercised authority over so wide an area and through so many centuries, as the doctrine of the Porch; and even in modern times, from the Renaissance to the Revolution, perhaps even to the middle of the present century, the events and characters of antiquity have influenced civilisation mainly through the interpretation put upon them by Stoic teachers. But the power and fertility of Greek thought were essentially conditioned by the critical opposition brought to bear on every system in turn; and Stoicism, more than any other philosophy, was exposed to this wholesome discipline through nearly the whole period of its duration. Confronted by Zeno's dogmatic naturalism, the Platonic Academy reorganised itself into a new school, the avowed and sole purpose of which was to discredit every system laying claim to the possession of absolute and final truth. Plato himself would scarcely have acknowledged these sceptics as his legitimate representatives; and, in truth, the spirit of their teaching was derived less from him than

through him from Protagoras and Gorgias, the great humanist Sophists, whom they closely resembled in their contention that the rule of probability and the ordinary experience of life furnished a sufficient basis for conduct without the aid of physical or metaphysical convictions.

Something like the old antithesis between Nature and Convention was in fact revived; but it was not formulated with the same sharpness as before. The New Academicians also claimed Nature as their ally; and Pascal's celebrated epigram, that she refutes the sceptics as reason refutes the dogmatists, would have left their position untouched; for they anticipated Butler in maintaining—as Pascal also did, without stating it in so many words—that probability is the guide of life. To go into a detailed examination of the arguments which their greatest champion, Carneades, brought to bear against the assumptions of Stoicism, and indeed of all dogmatic philosophy, would take us beyond the limits of the present sketch. It will be enough to mention that his polemic illustrates a fundamental law of Greek thought by showing that absolute truth is connected with absolute error through a series of infinitesimal gradations. And he forced the Stoics also to admit this law, to bridge over the deep gulf which they had fixed between wise men and fools, between the one thing needful and the worthless worldly goods that only fools could prize. To him likewise is due an

adverse criticism of theology, embracing not merely the superstitions of his age, but all belief whatever in supernatural beings, the most destructive that has ever appeared, the armoury whence religious scepticism ever since has been supplied. At the same time, we are assured that Carneades had no wish to deny the existence of the gods; he merely denied the validity of the arguments used to prove it. The religious atmosphere of Athens evidently affected even him. But his reasonings at least served to detach the Stoics from the compromising alliance with superstition which their first leaders had accepted, and to refine their theology into a more philosophic creed.

During the period of the Diadochi the greatest Greek intellects devoted themselves not to philosophy, but to mathematics, to physical science, or to history. Of those who philosophised, all the most eminent ranged themselves either on the Stoic or on the Sceptic side. There was, however, one teacher who, standing midway between them, struck out a line of his own, and, by a singular fatality, won for himself a place in the history of thought to which his speculative performances, measured by their intrinsic merit and originality, are quite inadequate. This was the celebrated Epicurus, a very remarkable, and in some respects a very gifted man, but, as a philosopher, utterly undeserving of the laudations that have been heaped on him both in ancient and modern times.

He can but claim whatever credit is due to the skilful populariser of theories in whose construction he had no share, and whose real authors he systematically vilified or ignored; to the religious reformer who rejects an old and exploded theology only to substitute for it a much more gratuitously absurd theology of his own invention; and to the moralist who identifies virtue with calculating selfishness.

Epicurus (341-270) was of Athenian parentage, a circumstance which in itself conveys a presumption of speculative inaptitude. The accident of his having been born and brought up in Samos gave him a certain acquaintance with the old Ionian physics, and an interest in cosmological questions which he never entirely lost, although, after the manner of his fellow-citizens, he subsequently made it subservient to purely practical ends. But at no time did he acquire so much as a superficial acquaintance with the truths of science, even as they were known a century before his birth. He denied the sphericity of the earth, which had been assumed by Parmenides and fully demonstrated by Aristotle. He refused to admit that eclipses and the phases of the moon had been referred to their real causes with a certainty that excluded all other explanations. Such was his confidence in the accuracy of sensuous perception, that he firmly believed the heavenly bodies to be no larger than they appear to our unassisted vision. Nevertheless, he not only accepted the

atomism of Democritus—a theory which sets the evidence of the senses at defiance—but made it the foundation of his whole philosophy, and insisted on its unconditional acceptance by his disciples. Epicurus was certainly not led to adopt this admirable theory by the arguments which had convinced Democritus of its truth. Had he been capable of so much scientific reasoning he would have been capable of a great deal more, and would soon have thrown his childish astronomy to the winds. Considerations of a quite different order determined his choice. Just as the Athenians of the Socratic period had rejected the new physical philosophy because it came into conflict with the old religion, so this Athenian of the decadence took up the hypothesis that seemed most completely to exclude the ideas of creation and divine providence from the world, and a life after death from the prospects of man. And just as the motive which induced Socrates and so many of his contemporaries to uphold supernatural religion was practical and moral, so the motive which induced Epicurus to make war on religion was practical and moral also. For him, as for all other Greek thinkers, the highest good was happiness; and by happiness he understood a life of ease, embracing every pleasure that is not followed by countervailing disadvantages, but, above all, free from pain, danger, and fear. Now, the greatest of all fears is the fear of death; and Epicurus thought that this king of terrors could be

most certainly dethroned by the conviction that his kingdom is non-existent, that with his presence all consciousness comes to an end. 'When we are, death is not; when death is, we are not.' Thus by a sort of shadowy idealism a seal of eternity and immutability was set on the happiness of the Epicurean sage. His calm acceptance of the inevitable recalls the associations of mortality in which Attic tragedy had been steeped, and the dignity with which its heroes faced their appointed doom.

At the same time, Epicurus strove to eliminate from human life two ideas on which tragedy had almost entirely hinged—the idea of unforeseen vicissitudes, and the idea of predestined fate. The one had been constantly associated with divine interference in human affairs; and it was, as we have seen, a primary object of his philosophy to render that interference unnecessary by referring all events to their natural causes. More than this, he found another reason for discrediting divine providence in the nature of the gods themselves. For, like the Stoics and Sceptics—nay, on still better grounds—he, the born Athenian living at Athens, thoroughly believed in the existence of the gods, and habitually joined in the ceremonies of the state-religion as a reverent and orthodox worshipper. But just as Plato's divine ideal was an activity having for its end the conformation of all things to its own likeness; as Aristotle's ideal was a self-thinking thought penetrating all things with the

love that it inspires; and as the Stoic ideal was a kindling, illuminating, provident, all-ruling fire—so the Epicurean ideal was a group of immortal though material beings, living at ease in the spaces between the transitory worlds formed by the clash of atoms and dissolved by their disjunction—beings, therefore, who did not expose themselves to danger by interfering with the course of mundane affairs.

Such also, so far as it could be imitated, was the life of the sage. Epicurus succeeded fairly well in showing that the negative prescriptions of morality coincided with the dictates of egoistic hedonism; a task made considerably easier by the masterly argument of Plato's *Protagoras*, from which, rather than from the Cyrenaic school, the basis of his ethical theory was derived. By recommending a life of extreme simplicity as that which was best calculated to yield the greatest pleasure and to incur the least pain, he incidentally removed the most ordinary temptations to injustice from the path of his disciples. Consistently with his principles, he could also say much in praise of friendship as a source of lasting happiness. But his philosophy supplied no motive either for ordinary ambition or for public-spirited devotion to the service of the community, dangerous and burdensome at all times, but especially so in the time of the Diadochi. Accordingly, self-isolation, either on the part of individuals or of small groups devoted to the mutual entertainment of their members,

has been always a note of consistent Epicureanism. This self-isolation has been associated by some critics with the acceptance of the atomic theory, as if there were a logical connexion between the two; but, in truth, such a timorous shrinking from the storms of public life would be equally compatible with any other physical theory, or, better still, with the refusal to commit oneself to any theory whatever.

The idea of absolute uniformity and unbroken sequence in the order of nature, such as Stoicism taught, was thoroughly hateful to Epicurus, who looked on it as even more objectionable than a belief in divine providence. Science was only valuable as a deliverance from the theological nightmare: after that it was contemptuously flung aside. It would have been easier and more logical at once to adopt the sceptical standpoint, which, as we have seen, was actually taken up by the more powerful minds whom Stoicism could not satisfy; and Epicureanism can only be rightly estimated as a halting compromise between the opposing tendencies inherited from Protagoras and Hippias. By a mere accident it first caught the eye of a few Romans who were craving for something to put in the place of the organised fetichism that constituted their own state-religion, but who had little aptitude for the elaborate apparatus of the rival schools. At a later period, for some unexplained reason, the greatest of Roman poets still clung to the discredited philosophy, and gave it

expression in immortal verse. No other man of genius ever supported a system inconsistent at once with the popular religion, with the established truths of science, and with the highest claims of life.

Epicurus has fascinated many modern readers by his recognition of the atomic theory, his utilitarianism, and his hostility to superstition, which admits of application to a wider field than the mythology of Greece. But, as we saw in connexion with Democritus, atomism was thoroughly uncongenial to the Greek mind, and never at any time became a part of Greek scientific teaching. Nor could the Greeks, much as they loved enjoyment, altogether sympathise with a morality which made war on voluptuousness in the name of pleasure, and inculcated selfish ease in the name of virtue. Least of all could they, as a profoundly religious people, accept a theology which preserved the mere shell of religion—the practice of public worship and the belief in supramundane divinities—while rejecting its inmost core, the sense of human fellowship with the invisible cause of things, which makes it a unifying principle of knowledge and of life.

Where Epicurus showed himself really great, and a genuine representative of the old Athenian spirit, was in the organising power that enabled him alone among all the ancient thinkers to build up a society which, during a period of some five centuries, perfectly fulfilled the intentions of its founder, and

maintained the tradition of his teaching intact. The Epicurean Church—for so we may call it—was the most conspicuous type of those numerous private associations which the Athenians were in the habit of forming among themselves, in complete independence of the State, for political, religious, recreative, convivial, gymnastic, or educational purposes. Its object was to bring together a number of like-minded persons, united by common beliefs, by reverence for a common master, and by a high ideal of mutual affection, to help one another in cultivating the art of happiness within limits which their founder had foreseen and prescribed. It would seem from the available evidence that this end was fully attained, and that the Epicureans were famed above other philosophers for their patience, cheerfulness, and mutual love. But the very first condition of their leading this life was, as the greatest Epicureans would readily have admitted, to withdraw from the general life of the world and, in Plato's phrase, to seek shelter behind a wall from the storms which desolate humanity. Such a course amounts to philosophical suicide no less surely than the more thorough indifference of the Sceptic; for philosophy is nothing if not absolute, necessary, and universal, in idea and aspiration, if not in accomplished result. And thus it came to pass that the great function of Epicureanism in the evolution of reason was to be on the positive and practical side what critical scepticism was on the

negative side—a foil, a relief, and a stimulus to the far nobler, truer, more fertile, and more progressive teaching of the Porch.

The last centuries of Greek thought are filled with mechanical combinations of the old theories, dignified with the name of Eclectic systems, corresponding to the sterile agitations and unstable alliances by which Greek political independence strove to maintain itself in the face of overwhelming foreign power. At last the few remaining sparks of national life were trampled out by the multitudinous hosts which the ambitions of rival Roman chiefs and the secular conflict of East and West flung against one another in that long agony extending from the siege of Athens by Sulla to the victory of Octavian at Actium. And with the national life the intellectual life of Greece came to a close, absorbed into the new splendours of Roman literature, but bequeathing to Rome a deathless heritage of ideas, destined to be her leading inspiration in an art of which she was still prouder than of that monumental literature, the art of imperial rule, the art of organising by just laws a dominion that disciplined arms had won.

At the head of this vast organisation stood an individual whose will was law, who was himself too often the slave of unworthy favourites or of his own unbridled appetite and caprice. Greek philosophy had always looked with especial horror on the irrational exercise of arbitrary power. What the experi-

ence of the city-state had presented in numerous examples was now reproduced on a colossal scale, but with such essentially identical features that Plato's picturesque psychology of the tyrant could be quoted nearly five centuries after it was written by the historian of the Roman empire as a telling characterisation of the worst Caesar. Thus the noblest Romans found themselves ready armed by their Stoic teachers for the seemingly unequal conflict they were now called on to wage—a conflict not only with brutal violence, but also with the debasing luxury that was its most efficient ally. By a piece of rare good fortune, the old Roman sense of public duty, stimulated into fresh activity by the searching dialectic of Athens, became fused with the death-defying self-devotion of that chivalrous and ardent Spanish race which was then contributing some of its worthiest citizens to the world-embracing state. For nearly fourscore years, with a few intermissions, the protest against tyranny was maintained by a line of martyrs against all the seductions of pleasure and all the terrors of ridicule, exile, confiscation, torture, and death. At last the protest took full effect. Even under a military despotism men are governed in the long-run not by force but by opinion; and philosophy at last created a public opinion which for more than fourscore other years made such a court as that of the earlier Caesars impossible. It raised to power a dynasty without parallel in history, a dynasty linked

together not by natural descent but by rational adoption, a dynasty named not after its founder but after its last representative, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in whom the constitutive principle of the whole series stood most clearly revealed, for in him philosophy itself mounted the imperial throne.

With the death of Aurelius philosophy ceased to exist as a practical force, because there was no longer any social group sufficiently educated to receive and sufficiently powerful to transmit its influence. Moreover, the rising Christian Church, itself saturated with philosophical tendencies, was rapidly succeeding to far more than the position once occupied by Stoicism in the guidance of public opinion, and was absorbing some of the best speculative ability of the empire. Yet, even in these untoward circumstances, the impulse towards a rational systematisation of life and thought did not suffer immediate extinction. In the decline of the schools that had followed, and for a long period almost eclipsed them, Plato and Aristotle were now more profoundly studied, and the abstract side of their teaching was better understood than ever before. At last a thinker arose of unknown race, who so analysed and recombined the highest theoretical ideas of the two great spiritualist masters, as to build up a substantially new system, which neither of them would have recognised as an adequate embodiment of the true Hellenic genius, of the passion for sophrosynê which had been their

guiding inspiration throughout. Plotinus wrote only in Greek (such as it was), and unquestionably regarded himself as a continuator of the pure Greek tradition; but a great part of his life was spent in Rome, and although he nowhere refers to the existence of the Roman empire, the idea of it pervades and profoundly biasses his speculations. That all things proceed from the One, and aspire to be reabsorbed into the One, is the master-thought of his philosophy; and in that thought the abstract unity towards which Rome had ever tended—towards which she still tends—found its triumphant metaphysical expression. Here, also, as at the beginning of philosophy in Ionia, we find exemplified the law according to which the regulative principles of life return from the corruption of their material manifestation to a more glorious existence in the ideal world. For it was during the frightful anarchy of the third century, when the Roman empire seemed to be on the verge of dissolution, when its provinces were being partitioned among a crew of petty adventurers, that the majestic thought of a super-essential unity, round which all existence circles through a series of orderly gradations, must have first taken shape in the mind of Plotinus; nor did he live to see the Roman administration reconsolidated more firmly than ever under the masterful hand of Diocletian.

I should have profited very little by the Greek lesson of self-limitation were I to pursue this topic

any further. I have touched on names and events so remote from my proper theme that they warn me to conclude. Neo-Platonism is a very interesting study as the bridge by which Greek thought passed into the mediaeval Church. But my object has not been to write the history of Greek thought either as an element of eternal truth or as a stimulus to deeper search. To say that Plotinus, where alone he can claim originality, was inspired, not by the political life of the Ionian city-state, but by the politics of imperial Rome, is to place him outside the scope of a work in which the philosophy of Greece has been interpreted as an expression of Greek national life—an expression, let me add, such as could only be reached by the most gifted men of the most gifted race that this world has ever seen.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

R.P. = Historia Philosophiae Graecae. Testimonia Auctorum conlegerunt notisque instruxerunt H. Ritter et L. Preller. Editio septima quam curaverunt Fr. Schultess et Ed. Wellmann, Gothae, 1888. (The references are to the sections.)

Zeller = Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung dargestellt von Ed. Zeller. (The references are to the fifth ed. of vol. i., to the fourth ed. of vol. ii. part 1, to the third ed. of vol. ii. part 2, and to the third ed. of vol. iii. part 1.)

F.P.G. = Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum, ed. Mullach, vol. i.

Ed. Meyer, II. = Ed. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums, Zweiter Band.

CHAPTER I

Page 2, line 24. '*knowledge and skill.*' Compare Maurice, *Ancient Philosophy* p. 83.

P. 3, l. 22. '*of Ionian race or culture.*' See Plato, *Prot.* 343 B. Plato can hardly be serious when he speaks of the seven sages as modelling themselves on Spartan standards. The language of the inscriptions seems to indicate an Ionian, or, what comes to the same thing, an Attic origin.

P. 3, l. 27. In Plato's *Charmides* Sophrosynê is defined (i) as doing one's own business' (161 B); and (ii) as 'self-knowledge' (164 E) by Critias. Socrates objects to both definitions, but Plato practically adopts them in their combination when he quotes as 'an old and true saying' (Tim. 72 A) the opinion that 'the σώφρων alone can do his own business and know himself.'

P. 4, l. 17. '*the true quality of a man.*' Thucydides, Book III. 82 (Jowett's translation, vol. i. p. 222).

P. 4, l. 26. '*boldly and at once.*' Thucydides, Book III. 83 (Jowett, 224).

P. 5, l. 12. '*Achilles.*' *Il.* i. 188 *ff.*

P. 5, l. 17. '*Achilles.*' *Il.* xxiv. 560 *ff.*

P. 6, last l. '*where he felt himself to be strongest.*' Euripides, *Antiope* xxvii. (Didot, *Fragmenta Tragicorum* p. 666, and Plato, *Gorgias* 484 E.)

P. 7, l. 8. '*Dolon.*' *Il.* x. 316.

P. 7, l. 10. '*Achilles.*' *Ib.* xviii. 105-6.

P. 7, l. 26. '*the physiological division of labour.*' Arist., *De Part. An.* iv. 6, p. 683 a 22 *ff.*

P. 8, l. 16. '*communicated by education.*' Isocrates, *Panegyr.* 51 A.

P. 9, l. 14. '*or even by a man.*' Heracleitus, *fr.* 27 (F.P.G., p. 318).

P. 11, l. 15. '*Greek scenery.*' Cp. Perrot et Chipiez, *Hist. de l'Art Antique* vi. p. 45.

P. 11, l. 20. '*thought-teaching form.*' George Eliot's *Spanish Gypsy*, *sub in.*

P. 12, l. 10. '*plastic groups.*' Cp. Collignon, *Hist. de la Sculpture Grecque* vol. i. pp. 49 and 97.

P. 13, l. 11. '*solely as a prophet.*' Aeschyl., *Eum.* 19.

P. 13, l. 22. '*Athenê.*' Ed. Meyer, ii. p. 728.

P. 15, l. 1. '*much wider ideas.*' Aeschyl., *Eum.*, *sub fin.*

P. 15, l. 9. '*being so blended.*' Rohde, *Psyche* p. 340 (first ed.).

P. 17, l. 28. '*Herê must have her revenge.*' *Il.* iv. 30 *ff.*

P. 18, l. 1. '*Helios.*' *Od.* xii. 377.

P. 18, l. 5. '*even Zeus.*' *Il.* xvi. 431 *ff.*

P. 18, l. 10. '*the episode of Xanthus.*' *Il.* xix. 418.

P. 18, l. 23. '*his mother Epicastê.*' *Od.* xi. 280.

P. 18, l. 27. '*not related to her by blood.*' Aeschyl., *Eum.* 203.

P. 19, l. 5. '*Heracleitus.*' *Fr.* 34 (F.P.G. p. 319).

P. 19, l. 16. '*Themis as the mother of the seasons.*' Pausanias, V. xvii. 1.

P. 19, l. 26. '*Stesichorus suggested.*' Carl Robert, *Bild u. Lied.* p. 25 *f.*; Pausanias, IX. ii. 3.

P. 20, l. 19. '*confusion of natural species.*' The same spirit is shown by the Greek poets in their punctilious guarding of metaphors, on which see Bury, *Pindar's Nemean Odes*, Introduction p. xvi.

P. 24, l. 2. '*not true Hellenes.*' 'The Ionians were the old pre-Hellenic or Pelasgian population, Hellenised by the Achaians.' Leaf, *Companion to the Iliad* (1892) p. 6.

P. 24, l. 6. '*imperfectly Hellenised barbarians.*' See Wilamowitz, *Herakles* 2te Bearbeitung (1895) pp. 6 and 18.

P. 24, l. 8. '*one scholar.*' Julius Beloch, *Gr. Geschichte* i. (1893) pp. 55-56, 146 *ff.*

P. 24, l. 12. '*another.*' Ed. Meyer, ii. p. 726 and elsewhere.

P. 24, l. 20. '*a central position.*' Cp. Collignon, i. p. 188.

P. 25, l. 23. '*Thucydides.*' i. 84. The translation given in the text is not my own, but I cannot remember where I found it.

P. 25, l. 27. '*says Pindar.*' *Olymp.* xiii. 7. (E. Myers' trans.)

P. 26, l. 1. '*Aristotle.*' *Pol.* vi. 5 *sub fin.*

P. 26, l. 3. '*modern historians.*' Ihne, *Hist. of Rome* (Eng. ed.) vol. i. p. 485 ; Liddell, *Hist. of Rome* (Student's ed.) p. 230.

P. 26, l. 9. '*Bacchylides.*' xiii. 153.

P. 27, l. 1. '*materialises life.*' Plato, *Rep.* 411 D.

P. 27, l. 9. '*Pindar.*' *Fr.* 87 (Böckh).

P. 27, l. 20. '*Sparta and Crete.*' Plato, *Laws* 836 B. Cp. Droysen's introduction to the *Wasps* in his translation of Aristophanes, vol. i. p. 246.

P. 27, l. 27. '*neglect of women.*' Wilamowitz, *Herakles* i. p. 18. Pindar, who generally addresses himself to a Dorian audience, nowhere records such an instance of chivalrous interposition on behalf of a woman as is celebrated in the seventeenth ode of the Ionian Bacchylides. In sculpture the female figure was systematically neglected by Dorian artists. It was 'almost entirely avoided' by the Aeginetans (E. Gardner, *Greek Sculpture* p. 206). 'In the list of the works of Lysippus there are hardly any female statues—none of any note, if we except a drunken flute-player' (*ib.* p. 412). The exception is characteristic of Dorian taste. On the other hand, the archaic draped female figure was a type created by Chiote sculpture, and subsequently transplanted to Attica (Collignon, i. pp. 53 and 338), where many examples of it have been found (E. Gardner, p. 195). The Lycian sarcophagus called 'les pleureuses,' 'from the eighteen beautiful figures which decorate its sides and top,' has an unmistakable Attic character. Still more instructive is the contrast when the same subject is treated by a Dorian sculptor, and by one trained under Attic in-

fluences. The wounded Amazon of Polycleitus is 'a self-controlled masculine woman retaining her brave bearing even when wounded. Kresilas represents the wounded woman natural and human, giving way to her pain and trying to lessen it.' In the drapery, also, 'his first aim is to be natural' (Furtwängler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture* p. 134, Eng. trans.).

P. 28, l. 8. '*the accumulation of landed property.*' In Aristotle's time two-fifths of the landed property in Sparta was held by women, and there is no reason for supposing that the proportion was very much less a generation earlier (*Pol.* ii. 9, 1270 a 23). The old and still generally accepted view of the position of Dorian women will be found in Müller's *Dorians* Bk. iv. chap. 4 (Eng. trans. of the first ed.).

P 29, l. 14. '*a powerful individualism.*' There is a suggestion of this idea in Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte* p. 325 (3rd ed.).

P. 30, l. 1. '*source and centre of its importance.*' Bergk, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte* vol. ii. p. 203.

P. 30, l. 24. '*the doing of field-work by women.*' Plato, *Laws* 805 D.

P. 31, l. 5. '*scorn of studied art.*' Pindar, *Olymp.* ii. 94-6; cp. Bacchylides, *fr.* 47 (Kenyon).

P. 31, l. 17. '*in schools.*' Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 28, and the reference to Diels given there.

P. 31, l. 27. '*Montesquieu.*' *Esprit des Lois* liv. iii. chap. 4.

P. 32, l. 7. '*extreme caution.*' Plato, *Rep.* 551 E.

P. 34, l. 1. '*by the friends of democracy.*' Herod., iii. 80; Thucyd., vi. 39.

P. 34, l. 28. '*Herodotus.*' Not strictly speaking an Ionian writer, and much inferior to the true Ionians in rationality, but sufficiently Ionicised to be mentioned as an example of the grouping method.

CHAPTER II

P. 38, l. 22. '*Plato has sketched.*' See especially *Rep.* 496 E and 519 E.

P. 41, l. 15. '*by dethroning his sire.*' Perhaps this myth may be an attenuated form of the widely spread superstition abund-

antly illustrated in Mr. Frazer's *Golden Bough*, according to which a god can only be kept in perpetual youth and vigour by the periodical slaughter of the person who temporarily represents him.

P. 42, l. 20. '*to establish a factory in Egypt.*' Beloch, i. p. 596.

P. 42, l. 24. '*Ionian commerce and industry.*' Ed. Meyer, ii. p. 550.

P. 43, l. 15. '*in the hands of the middle class.*' Herod., v. 29. The date conjecturally assigned by Max Duncker to this event is 565 B.C. (*Gesch. d. Alterth.* vi. p. 292).

P. 44, l. 1. '*advised the Ionian cities.*' Herod., i. 170.

P. 44, l. 24. '*an eclipse of the sun.*' Cantor, *Gesch. d. Math.* i. p. 127 (2nd ed.).

P. 45, l. 13. '*since Aristotle.*' *Met.* i. 3, 983 b 6; R.P., 9 A.

P. 45, l. 25. '*a Phoenician stock.*' Herod., i. 170.

P. 45, l. 26. '*the Semites.*' Sayce, *Hibbert Lectures* p. 144.

P. 47, l. 3. '*in Samuel and Kings.*' This observation is due to the sagacity of Wellhausen; see the sections on the historical books of the Old Testament contributed by him to Bleek's *Einleitung*, 4th ed., especially p. 223.

P. 49, l. 15. '*a Greek poet.*' Solon, *fr.* 12 (Bergk).

P. 50, l. 17. '*all things are full of gods.*' Arist., *De An.* i. 5, 411 a 7; R.P., 10 A.

P. 50, l. 21. '*Hippocrates.*' Gomperz, *Griechische Denker* i. p. 251, with the reference given to Littré's edition of H. on p. 454.

P. 51, l. 7. '*symmetrical distribution of land and water.*' This is inferred from the satirical criticisms of Herodotus; Berger, *Gesch. d. Erdkunde d. Gr.* i. p. 10.

P. 51, l. 21. '*hoops of fire.*' For Anaximander's physics see R.P., 13; for his theory of the origin of man, *ib.* 16; for the Infinite, *ib.* 12; for the evanescence of things, *ib.* 14 a, and Arist., *Phys.* iii. 8, 208 a 8; for worlds as gods, Diels, *Doxographi* p. 302.

P. 54, l. 3. '*identified it with air.*' *Dox.* p. 278.

P. 54, l. 26. '*a mechanical change.*' R.P., 20.

P. 55, l. 16. '*temple of Artemis.*' Preller, *Gr. Myth.* i. p. 253 (third ed.).

P. 55, l. 23. '*aristocratic family.*' R.P., 24.

P. 55, l. 24. '*neither with tyranny nor with democracy.*' Proved

by his reverence for νόμος (*fr.* 19 and 20 Mullach), and by his contempt for the people (*ib.* 57, 65, and 82).

P. 55, l. 28. '*knowledge as such.*' *Ib.* 14.

P. 56, l. 1. '*what he craved.*' *Ib.* 12 and 19.

P. 56, l. 8. '*in their dreams.*' *Ib.* 95 (Bywater).

P. 56, l. 12. '*the eternal order.*' *Ib.* 12 and 27 (Mullach).

P. 57, l. 2. '*the stars were fire.*' *Dox.* p. 561, 6 ; R.P., 21.

P. 57, l. 17. '*enter boldly.*' Arist., *De Part. An.* i. 5, 645 a 17.

P. 57, l. 20. '*dry soul.*' *Fr.* 72.

P. 58, l. 6. '*the same river.*' *Ib.* 21.

P. 58, l. 17. '*for gold.*' *Ib.* 49.

P. 58, l. 19. '*according to measure.*' *Ib.* 27 ; Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* p. 154.

P. 58, l. 28. '*transgress the measure.*' *Fr.* 34.

P. 59, l. 4-6. '*fire . . . water.*' *Ib.* 31 and 58.

P. 59, l. 7. '*coexistent contraries.*' *Ib.* 30, 37, 40, and 93.

P. 59, l. 13. '*following this method.*' *Ib.* 90, 85, 80, 47 (Mullach) and 60 (Bywater), R.P., 38 b.

P. 59, l. 21. '*war.*' *Fr.* 44. (The translation is Prof. Burnet's.)

P. 60, l. 2. '*hybris.*' *Ib.* 17.

P. 60, l. 5. '*bids the people.*' *Ib.* 20.

P. 60, l. 8. '*the supreme law.*' *Ib.* 19 and 96.

P. 60, l. 15. '*by fire.*' Opinions differ as to the meaning of the Heracleitean λόγος and the future conflagration. On both points I agree with Zeller, i. pp. 630 and 688.

P. 60, l. 17. '*distinguished between sense and reason.*' *Fr.* 23.

P. 60, l. 25. '*on his own authority.*' *Ib.* 92.

CHAPTER III

P. 63, l. 9. '*a form of government.*' Ed. Scherer, *La Democratie en France*, quoted by Maine, *Popular Government* p. 59.

P. 65, l. 6. '*bow and string.*' Her., *fr.* 38, παλίντονος ὁκωσπερ τόξου.

P. 65, l. 20. '*an archaic stage of thought.*' A mistake made by J. A. Symonds, *Greek Poets*, 2nd series, p. 131.

P. 67, l. 5. '*monumental evidence.*' Rohde, *Psyche* pp. 8-34 (1st ed.).

P. 69, l. 23. '*Pindar.*' For the Orphic theology see Ed. Meyer, ii. pp. 738 *ff.*; for the quotations from Pindar, *fr.* 102, and *Olymp.* ii. 62 *ff.*; for Aeschylus, *Supp.* 224-7 (Paley); Sophocles, *fr.* 753. Cp. also the relative sections of Rohde, *Psyche*, and Wilamowitz, *Homer. Unters.* pp. 199 *ff.*; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* i. pp. 240-241.

P. 70, l. 16. '*symptoms of a plot.*' Thucyd., vi. 27.

P. 70, l. 21. '*Periander.*' Max Duncker, *Gesch. d. Alterth* vi. p. 58.

P. 70, l. 23. '*Cleisthenes.*' Herod., v. 67.

P. 71. l. 4. '*this connexion.*' Ed. Meyer, ii. p. 736.

P. 72, l. 17. '*Elea.*' Herod., i. 167.

P. 72, l. 25. '*Democedes.*' Herod., iii. 125.

P. 72, l. 26. '*Pythagoras.*' R.P., 44.

P. 73, l. 28. '*California.*' See Gilman, *Socialism and the American Spirit.*

P. 74, l. 11. '*Heracleitus refers.*' *Fr.* 14 and 15.

P. 74, l. 18. '*Pythagoras.*' R.P., 40-46.

P. 76, l. 16. '*gave a new importance to reflection.*' Burnet, *Early Gr. Ph.* p. 254.

P. 76, l. 20. '*Antichthon.*' Arist., *De Coel.* ii. 13, 293 a 20; R.P., 68-69. This seems to me the only interpretation that the word *ἐναντίαν* can bear.

P. 76, l. 20. '*has been explained.*' Arist., *Met.* i. 5, 986 a 8.

P. 76, l. 28. '*we are told.*' Diog. Laert., on the authority of Parmenides.

P. 77, l. 18. '*Aristotle is very sarcastic.*' *De Coel.* ii. 13.

P. 77, l. 27. '*another point.*' *Met.* xii. 7, 1072 b 31 (the reference in R.P. prints a for b).

P. 78, l. 19. '*on this slender basis.*' For the authorities see Cantor, *Gesch. d. Math.* i. p. 142.

P. 79, l. 5. '*general notion of space.*' Burnet, *Early Gr. Ph.* p. 312.

P. 79, l. 11. '*necessarily followed.*' Cantor, p. 170.

P. 80, l. 2. '*antithetical couples.*' Arist., *Met.* i. 5; R.P., 55.

P. 81, l. 5. '*wandering about Hellas.*' Xenophanes, *fr.* 24 (Mullach).

P. 81, l. 11. '*than he was.*' *Ib.* 19.

P. 81, l. 15. '*Titans and Centaurs.*' Xenophanes, *fr.* 21.

P. 81, l. 17. '*what they had seen.*' *Ib.* 17.

P. 82, l. 2. '*uppermost in men's thoughts.*' *Ib.* 20 and 21.

P. 82, l. 8. '*to the gods.*' *Ib.* 7.

P. 82, l. 21. '*in their own image.*' R.P., 83 a.

P. 82, l. 25. '*asked by the people.*' *Fr. incert.* 8 ; R.P., 81 a.

P. 83, l. 8. '*vault of heaven.*' *Fr.* 1-4.

P. 83, l. 15. '*from the sea.*' Diels in *Archiv für Gesch. d. Philosophie* iv. p. 652.

P. 83, l. 16. '*all other things.*' *Fr.* 10.

P. 83, l. 24. '*impressions on mud.*' R.P., 86 a ; *Dox.* p. 566, 5.

P. 83, l. 28. '*worship of Demeter.*' Blakesley, *Herodotus* i. p. 123 note.

P. 83, l. 29. '*a young man.*' Parmenides, *fr.* l. 24.

P. 83, l. 29. '*of goodly presence.*' See the description in Plato's *Parmenides.*

P. 84, l. 1. '*high position.*' R.P., 91.

P. 84, l. 13. '*on good authority.*' *Dox.* p. 492, 17, and 377 ; Berger, *Gesch. d. Erdk.* ii. p. 30.

P. 85, l. 4. '*held by Xenophanes.*' R.P., 86 b.

P. 86, l. 12-23. '*Therefore . . . of all.*' Parm., 81-89.

P. 87, l. 2. '*an element of truth.*' Parm., 113 *ff.* ; Zeller, i. p. 567.

P. 88, l. 5. '*what* is *is what I wis.*' So I understand the words (Parm., 95-6) *οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος ἐν ᾧ πεφατισμένον ἐστὶν εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.*

P. 88, l. 27. '*as an argument.*' Parm., 43-51.

P. 89, l. 20-24. '*Justice . . . bound.*' *Ib.* 28, 14, and 88.

P. 89, l. 28—p. 90, l. 9. '*The daughters . . . believed by men. Ib.* 1-32.

P. 90, l. 11. '*storm of ridicule.*' Plato, *Parm.* 128 B ; R.P., 103 e.

P. 90, l. 24. '*Achilles.*' Arist., *Phys.* vi. 9, 239 b 14.

P. 91, last l. '*without limit in space.*' R.P., 111.

P. 92, l. 9. '*absolutely incorporeal.*' *Ib.* 114.

P. 92, l. 14. '*illusions of sense.*' *Ib.* 115.

CHAPTER IV

P. 93, l. 14. '*was a blank.*' Thucyd., i. 97.

P. 95, l. 28. '*sifted experience.*' Berger, *Gesch. d. Erdk.* i. p. 26, where, however, the reaction is, in my opinion, dated much too late.

P. 96, l. 13. '*merely conjectural.*' Xenophanes, *fr.* 14; R.P., 87.

P. 96, l. 21. '*organs of sense.*' Diog. Laert., viii. 5, 2; Gomperz, *Gr. Denk.* i. p. 119.

P. 97, l. 1. '*Empedocles.*' Bidez, *Biographie d'Empedocle* p. 105 (Gand, 1894).

P. 97, l. 6. '*luxury and sumptuousness.*' Diodorus Sic., xiii. 82-4.

P. 97, l. 12. '*it is conjectured.*' Schubring cited by Bidez, *ut supra* p. 107.

P. 97, l. 17. '*Pindar.*' *Olymp.* ii.

P. 97, l. 23. '*abode of Persephonê.*' *Pyth.* xii. 2.

P. 97. last l. '*we are told.*' Diog. Laert., viii. 64.

P. 98, l. 5. '*a god on earth.*' *Catharm.* 395.

P. 98, l. 11. '*raising the dead.*' Diog. Laert., viii. 59, 60, 67.

P. 98, l. 15. '*divine man.*' Plato, *Meno* 99 D.

P. 98, l. 26. '*metempsychosis.*' *Carm.* 11 and 12, and the *Catharmi* throughout.

P. 99, l. 18. '*pressure of the air.*' *Carm.* 352-63.

P. 99, l. 20. '*that light travels.*' Arist., *De Sensu* 6, 446 a 26. Professor Burnet observes, with unnecessary caution, that 'he can hardly have arrived at this knowledge experimentally' (*Early Gr. Ph.* p. 255).

P. 99, l. 24. '*centrifugal force.*' Arist., *De Coelo* ii. 1, 284 a 25.

P. 99, l. 25. '*combined in plants.*' Burnet, *op. cit.* p. 258.

P. 100, l. 12. '*probable conjecture.*' *Carm.* 45 *ff.*

P. 100, l. 26. '*the Ephesian style.*' *Ib.* 91-104.

P. 101, l. 14. '*the famous quartette.*' *Ib.* 79.

P. 101, l. 21-29. '*At one time,*' etc. *Ib.* 147-158, 175-180.

P. 102, l. 14. '*making up the number to six.*' *Ib.* 80-81.

P. 103, l. 10. '*more perfect union.*' *Ib.* 191-201. Prof.

Burnet has justly called attention to 'the interest in biological matters' which goes on increasing through the whole of this period (*op. cit.* p. 206).

P. 103, l. 14. '*equally to all six elements.*' *Carm.* 378-80.

P. 104, l. 8. '*double-dealing and hypocrisy.*' Herodotus, ix. 54; Euripides, *Andromache* 445. Blakesley (*Her.* vol. ii. p. 456) takes up the defence of Sparta, but offers no valid reason for differing from the popular opinion. Grote (iv. p. 268, ed. 1888) agrees with Herodotus, as also does Max Duncker (vii. p. 347), while Paley cordially indorses the view expressed by Euripides (*Eur.* ii. p. 268).

P. 104, l. 19. '*Anaxagoras.*' R.P., 112.

P. 105, l. 6. '*extremely silly.*' Herod., i. 60.

P. 105, l. 13. '*Orphic religion.*' Ed. Meyer, ii. p. 747.

P. 105, l. 21. '*an aristocratic conspiracy.*' *Supra* note to p. 70, l. 16.

P. 105, l. 25. '*were considered to rest.*' See the *Clouds* of Aristophanes throughout; the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus; Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, *passim*, and Plato's *Laws*, Bk. x.

P. 106, l. 9. '*to rationalise the calendar.*' Aristoph., *Clouds* 587.

P. 107, l. 14. '*what made life worth living.*' Diog. Laert., I. iii. 10.

P. 107, l. 18. '*a flat disc.*' *Dox.* p. 562, 5.

P. 107, l. 27. '*the Milky Way.*' *Ib.* pp. 20 and 28.

P. 108, l. 4. '*a meteorite.*' Plutarch, *Lysander* 12.

P. 108, l. 12. '*for impiety.*' R.P., 112.

P. 109, l. 27. '*in the blend.*' Anaxagoras, *fr.* 17, 14, and 9; *Dox.* p. 279; Diogenes of Apollonia, *fr.* 2; R.P., 123 a.

P. 110, l. 19. '*that snow was black.*' *Ib.* 128 b.

P. 110, l. 27. '*infinite and absolute,*' etc. *Fr.* 6.

P. 111, l. 5. '*extended substance.*' *Ib.*

P. 111, l. 14. '*some share of reason.*' R.P., 127 D.

P. 111, l. 27. '*bitterly reproached him.*' *Ib.* 123 C.

P. 112, l. 18. '*Aristotle's complaint.*' *Met.* i. 4, 985 a 20.

P. 114, l. 2. '*intelligence in its purest form.*' Aristoph., *Clouds* 229-30.

P. 114, l. 5. '*stupidity of the Boeotians.*' W. Smith, *Greece* p. 10. Mr. F. T. Richards suggests as the original authority for

this statement, Cicero, *De Fato* iv. 7, and *De Natura Deorum* i. 6. 17. Plato attributes the intelligence of the Athenians to the temperateness of the Attic climate (*Tim.* 24 D).

P. 114, l. 7. '*dissections of the human subject.*' Diog. Ap., *fr.* 8.

P. 114, l. 11. '*despised,*' but only, as would appear, in later times. F.P.G. p. 335.

P. 114, l. 15. '*Emerson*' in the lecture on Plato in his *Representative Men.*

P. 114, l. 22. '*his existence has been questioned.*' R.P., 143 b.

P. 115, l. 8. '*nothing existed.*' *Ib.* 147 *ff.*

P. 115, l. 21. '*a universe of atoms.*' *Ib.*

P. 116, l. 22. '*I came to Athens.*' F.P.G. 371 b, *fr.* 7.

P. 116, l. 24. '*boasted about himself.*' *Ib., fr.* 6.

P. 118, l. 12. '*a recent German critic.*' Karl Joel in a work entitled *Der echte u. d. Xenophontische Sokrates*, vol. i. p. 185.

P. 119, l. 4. '*a subjective illusion.*' F.P.G. 357 a.

P. 119, l. 11. '*as Aristotle objected.*' *De Gen. et Cor.* i. 8, 326 a 28.

CHAPTER V

P. 123, l. 5. '*our distinctions of right and wrong.*' *Olymp.* i. 35; *Isthm.* vii. 24 and 35.

P. 123, l. 14. '*the inventor has done all.*' *Olymp.* xiii. 17 *ff.*

P. 123, l. 17. '*merely taught.*' *Nem.* iii. 39-40.

P. 123, l. 19. '*by nature skilled.*' *Olymp.* ii. 94.

P. 125, l. 21. '*an imitator of Aeschylus.*' Plutarch, *De Prof. in Virt.* 7.

P. 126, l. 20. '*Protagoras.*' R.P., 177; Diog. Laert., ix. 50-56.

P. 126, l. 24. '*the first to practise.*' R.P., 176 A a.

P. 127, l. 8. '*according to Plato.*' *Prot.*, 318 E.

P. 128, l. 3. '*virtue could not be taught.*' *Ib.*, 319 E.

P. 128, l. 12. '*Antiphon.*' Thucyd., viii. 68.

P. 128, l. 24. '*from Theognis to Isocrates.*' Theog. 438; Isocr., *Contra Soph.* 295 D.

P. 129, l. 10. '*a new and brilliant idea.*' What follows is based on a combination of the two apologies put into the mouth of Protagoras by Plato (*Protag.* 320 C *ff.* and *Theaet.* 166 A *ff.*).

P. 130, l. 4. '*Aeschylus had said.*' *Choeph.* 305-306.

P. 130, l. 20. '*disputing with Pericles.*' Gomperz, *Gr. Denk.* i. pp. 358 *ff.*, where the great philosophical importance of the conversation mentioned by Plutarch (*Per.* 36) has been pointed out I believe for the first time.

P. 131, l. 20. '*vindicates his innocence.*' Soph., *Oed. Col.* 988 *ff.* For the date of the play see Prof. Lewis Campbell, *Sophocles* ii. pp. 276 *ff.*

P. 132, l. 3. '*Plato . . . repudiates.*' *Theaet.* 167 A.

P. 132, l. 11. '*Protagoras shook his head.*' Diog. Laert., ix. 51.

P. 132, l. 18. '*our choice must be determined.*' This view is obtained by combining the statement quoted by Diog. Laert., ix. 51, that there are two sides to every question, with the speech in the *Theaetetus* already referred to.

P. 133, l. 5. '*to make laws for . . . Thurii.*' Diog. Laert., ix. 50.

P. 133, l. 10. '*law is king of all.*' Herod., iii. 38.

P. 133, l. 25. '*his belief in progress.*' See the opening chapters of his history.

P. 134, l. 18. '*the school-children of Mycalessus.*' Thucyd., vii. 29 *sub fin.*

P. 134, l. 22. '*the identification of right with might.*' Thucyd., v. 105.

P. 135, l. 13. '*unreal assumptions.*' R.P., 181.

P. 135, l. 18. '*Democritus wrote a book.*' Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1109 A.

P. 136, l. 2. '*quaint formula.*' *Fr. phys.* 1 (Mullach).

P. 138, l. 23. '*comparative anatomy.*' Aristoph., *Clouds* 143 *ff.*, and Plato, *Protag.* 315.

P. 139, l. 10. '*Hippias.*' For authorities see Zeller, i. pp. 1064 *ff.*, and Dümmler, *Akademika* pp. 247 *ff.*

P. 139, l. 15. '*Nature and Law.*' Plato, *Protag.* 337 C.

P. 139, l. 26. '*contributed to geometry.*' Cantor, *Gesch. d. Math.* i. pp. 181 *ff.*

P. 139, last l. '*a teacher of natural philosophy.*' Aristoph. *Clouds* 361 *f.*; *Birds* 692. It has been objected that Aristophanes is no more to be trusted when he is speaking of Prodicus than when he is speaking of Socrates. But it makes all the difference that Aristophanes was a professed admirer of Prodicus, and

therefore would not have called him a 'meteorologist' had not his physical studies been notorious. Moreover, the Protagoras of Plato speaks of every Sophist but himself as teaching physics (*Protag.* 318 E).

P. 140, l. 19. '*self-sufficiency.*' Suidas quoted by Paul Leja, *Der Sophist Hippias* (Sagan, 1893).

P. 140, l. 20. '*that he used to boast.*' Plato, *Lesser Hippias* 368 A.

P. 141, l. 12. '*should denounce calumny.*' Stobaeus, *Floril.* xl. 40, quoted by Leja, *op. cit.* p. 16.

P. 141, l. 15. '*should exalt Achilles.*' Plato, *ut supra* 364 E.

P. 141, l. 17. '*Prodicus distinguishes.*' Plato, *Protag.* 337 B.

P. 141, l. 22. '*as the gods.*' Xenophon, *Mem.* II. i. 27.

P. 142, l. 2. '*poor fare and scant raiment.*' *Clouds* 416.

P. 142, l. 15. '*Eteocles flings justice to the winds.*' Eurip., *Phoen.* 499-506.

P. 143, l. 2. '*the Aeschylean Eteocles.*' *Sept. con. Th.* 659-668.

P. 143, l. 7. '*the reply of Jocasta.*' *Phoen.* 536-548.

P. 143, l. 25. '*as Aristophanes has shown.*' *Clouds* 1290-1295.

P. 145, l. 15. '*the eloquence of the Attic stage.*' Wilamowitz, *Homer. Unters.* p. 313.

P. 145, l. 17. '*the art of persuasion.*' Plato, *Gorgias* 456.

P. 146, l. 11. '*to deny that there was any Nature at all.*' For the arguments of Gorgias see R.P., 184-187.

P. 147, l. 3. '*in his public declamations.*' See the fragments given in Didot's *Oratores Attici* ii. p. 217.

P. 147, l. 9. '*his disciple Agathon.*' Plato, *Symp.* 196 C (Jowett's trans.).

P. 147, l. 28. '*law and justice.*' *Medea* 536.

P. 148, l. 1. '*incest and polygamy.*' *Androm.* 173-180, and 465.

P. 148, l. 5. '*Spartan men and women.*' *Ib.* 445 and 600.

P. 148, l. 5. '*upholds against Thebes.*' *Supp.* 526-530.

P. 148, l. 9. '*by the Theban Alcmênê.*' *Heracl.* 965 *f.*

P. 148, l. 15. '*the voice of Protagoras.*' *Orest.* 508 *ff.*, 523 *ff.*

P. 149, l. 2. '*Alcidamas.*' *Or. Att.* ii. p. 318 b.

P. 149, l. 6. '*the great word.*' *Ib.* p. 316 a.

P. 149, l. 9. '*Lycophron.*' Arist., *Pol.* iii. 9, 1280 b 10 ; *Phys.* i. 2, 185 b 28 ; *fr.* 82, 1490 a 10.

P. 151, l. 5. '*to replenish the treasury.*' Beloch, *Attische Politik* p. 10, where references to Aristophanes and Lysias will be found.

P. 151, l. 23. '*the privileges of a Greek tyranny.*' Plato, *Gorg.* 466 B.

P. 152, l. 10. '*telling little epigrams.*' Plato, *Apol.* 19 C.

P. 153, l. 14. '*Nature . . . has her law.*' Plato, *Gorg.* 483 E. This, it may be observed, is the 'Herrenmoral' of Fr. Nietzsche.

CHAPTER VI

P. 157, l. 15. '*sensuality of Syracuse.*' See the Seventh Platonic Epistle 326 C ; *Rep.* 404 D.

P. 158, l. 28. '*the pivot of its political life.*' Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens* 9, and Mr. Kenyon's note.

P. 159, l. 11. '*in imitation of a trial.*' Cp. Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* vii. p. 19.

P. 159, l. 16. '*a recognised game.*' Xen., *Mem.* I. ii. 46.

P. 161, l. 9. '*three contemporaries.*' Eupolis may be added as a fourth, but the few and brief fragments of his comedies in which Socrates figures as a beggarly and thievish parasite seem to echo without confirming the taunts of Aristophanes.

P. 163, l. 8. '*Xenophon's account.*' *Mem.* I. vi.

P. 163, l. 18. '*the same as prostitution.*' *Loc. cit.* 13.

P. 164, l. 13. '*its historical value.*' For an excellent summary of the whole controversy see Döring, *Die Lehre des Sokrates* (Munich, 1895), and for a still more recent opinion E. Pfleiderer, *Sokrates u. Plato* pp. 104 *ff.*

P. 165, l. 26. '*the authority of Law.*' *Mem.* IV. iv.

P. 166, l. 16. '*personifications of natural objects.*' Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* ix. 52.

P. 166, l. 20. '*the argument from design.*' *Mem.* I. iv.

P. 170, l. 13. '*Demetrius Poliorcetes.*' Holm, *Gr. Gesch.* iv. p. 80, and the passage from Mahaffy's *Problems of Gr. Hist.* quoted on p. 81, *op. cit.*

P. 170, l. 27. '*fond of looking through books.*' *Mem.* I. vi. 14.

P. 170, last l. '*could not answer his questions.*' This is a Platonic touch (*Phaedr.* 274 E); but it is one which seems to suit the genuine Socrates.

P. 171, l. 16. '*Athenian gentlemen.*' οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί.

P. 171, l. 24. '*to quote one of Aesop's fables.*' Aristoph., *Wasps* 1140.

P. 172, l. 3. '*if necessary by force.*' *Mem.* I. ii. 58.

P. 172, l. 6. '*Plato's brother Glaucon.*' *Ib.* III. vi. 1.

P. 173, l. 22. '*as some have held,*' particularly Schleiermacher followed by Zeller.

P. 174, l. 16. '*says Aristotle.*' *Met.* xiii. 4, 1078 b 28.

P. 174, last l. '*a disgraceful scene.*' Grote, *Aristotle* p. 375 (2nd ed.).

P. 175, l. 19. '*a good citizen.*' *Mem.* IV. vi. 14.

P. 176, first l. '*Xenophon tells us.*' *Ib.* 15.

P. 179, l. 15. '*if Xenophon is to be believed.*' *Ib.* i. 2-4.

P. 180, l. 13. '*if we are to believe Plato.*' Plato, *Crito* 50.

P. 181, l. 6. '*an entire mistake.*' Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* vol. vii. p. 170.

P. 181, l. 11. '*three philosophers.*' Anaxagoras, Diagoras of Melos, and Protagoras.

P. 181, l. 13. '*a corrosive solvent.*' The view taken by Hegel, *Gesch. d. Ph.* ii. pp. 100 *ff.* (1st ed.).

P. 182, l. 10. '*a certain soreness.*' Curtius, *Gr. Gesch.* iii. p. 113, (3rd ed.). Whether the amnesty covered the case of Socrates does not seem very clear. But, at any rate, the popular tribunal was above such considerations (Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* ii. p. 192).

P. 182, l. 23. '*sovereign canaille.*' 'Richterpöbel' is the expression used by the socialist philosopher Eugen Dühring (*Gesch. d. Ph.* p. 87, 1st ed.).

P. 182, l. 25. '*cruel and ignorant dotards.*' See the *Wasps* of Aristophanes throughout.

P. 183, l. 4. '*a rhetorical exercise.*' Döring, pp. 86 and 290; on the other side see Zeller, II. i. p. 212 note 3.

CHAPTER VII

P. 184, last l. '*personally a sybarite.*' Plato, *Protag.* 315 D.

P. 185, l. 2. '*appearance and pursuits.*' See above, p. 140.

P. 185, l. 9. '*avowed and only model.*' R.P., 205.

P. 185, l. 10. '*Aristippus.*' *Ib.* 204 *ff.*

P. 185, l. 19. '*severely condemned.*' Xen., *Mem.* II. i.

P. 185, l. 22. '*with the Good.*' R.P., 223 *f.*

P. 186, l. 8. '*Plato.*' *Ib.* 239.

P. 186, l. 23. '*to abandon poetry.*' *Ib.* 240 B.

P. 186, last l. '*repudiated by Critias.*' Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.* ix. 54. Cp. Zeller, i. p. 1133 note 3.

P. 187, l. 26. '*sketched a plan.*' *Laws* x. *sub fin.*

P. 188, l. 20. '*visits to strange countries.*' Cp. *Phaedo* 78 A.

P. 189, l. 28. '*to reach their soul.*' Cp. Burnet, *Early Gr. Ph.* p. 370, on Plato's wonderful insight into the earlier philosophies.

P. 191, l. 26. '*authentic reports.*' The names of the interlocutors would on this hypothesis have been changed in some instances where the conversation is supposed to have been held before the birth of Plato.

P. 192, l. 2. '*the subjects dealt with.*' In the *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*.

P. 193, l. 4. '*most practical of all philosophers.*' Cp. Maurice, *Anc. Ph.* pp. 179 *ff.*

P. 193, l. 14. '*not the best life.*' *Rep.* 496 E.

P. 193, l. 21. '*identifies the statesman with the philosopher.*' *Politic.* 292 D., illustrated by *Rep.* 429 A.

P. 194, l. 16. '*pleasure and pain.*' *Protag.* 351 B-361 A.

P. 195, l. 4. '*in the Laws.*' 663 B and 732 E (here and elsewhere the translation is Jowett's).

P. 195, l. 24. '*chronological order.*' The order here assumed is in the main that first established on philological grounds by Prof. Lewis Campbell in the general introduction to his edition of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* (1867). But I am inclined to believe with Paul Natorp that the *Theaetetus* was written before the *Republic*, and I should myself place it immediately after the *Protagoras*. Of course it may have come down to us in a much later recension.

P. 195, l. 28. '*as a Heracleitean.*' R.P., 242 A.

P. 195, last l. '*easily allied itself.*' *Theaet.* 156 *f.*

P. 196, l. 10. '*a secret kinship.*' *Meno* 81 C.

P. 196, l. 15. '*of divine race.*' *Rep.* 364 B.

P. 196, last l. '*even the Pythagoreans.*' A. Döring in the *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Ph.* v. p. 523.

P. 198, l. 18. '*eternal justice.*' *Meno* 81 A-86 A ; *Phaedr.* 246 A *ff.* ; *Symp.* 207 A-212 A ; *Phaedo* 65 E-67 A ; *Gorg.* 523 *f.*

P. 199, first l. '*to repudiate.*' *Laws* 838 E-839 A.

P. 199, l. 13. '*Justice and Temperance.*' *Phaedr.* 247 D ; *Parm.* 151 E-132 D.

P. 200, l. 6. '*limits of space.*' *Phaedr.* 247 C illustrated by the cosmology of Aristotle.

P. 200, l. 8. '*above existence.*' *Rep.* vi. 509 B, *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.*

P. 200, l. 19. '*a law of Nature.*' *Gorg.* 483 E.

P. 200, l. 28. '*Socrates shows.*' *Ib.* 474 C-480 E.

P. 201, l, 10. '*most powerful party.*' *Ib.* 488 E.

P. 201, l. 16. '*the right . . . to rule.*' *Ib.* 491 C-D.

P. 201, l. 22. '*after death.*' *Ib.* 493 A *ff.*

P. 202, l. 2. '*Iphicrates.*' Xen., *Hellen.* IV. v. 13-17.

P. 202, l. 11. '*Dionysius.*' Diod. Sic., xiii. 94.

P. 202, l. 28. '*an ordered system.*' *Phaedr.* 265 E-270 A.

P. 203, l. 13. '*grossly unfit.*' *Rep.* 433 A-434 C.

P. 203, l. 22. '*family and property.*' *Ib.* 416-417 A.

P. 203, l. 24. '*to be arranged.*' *Ib.* 449 A-464 A.

P. 203, last l. '*religion.*' *Ib.* 377 E-391 E.

P. 204, first l. '*puritanical art.*' *Ib.* 392 A-402 A.

P. 204, l. 5. '*on the average inferior.*' *Ib.* 455 D.

P. 204, l. 6. '*to be educated like them.*' *Ib.* 451 D *ff.*

P. 204, l. 8. '*a smaller number.*' *Ib.* 429 A, 535-537 D.

P. 204, l. 14. '*their virtue is Wisdom.*' *Ib.* 442 A. For their correspondence to the head see *Tim.* 44 D.

P. 204, l. 17. '*answers to the heart.*' *Tim.* 70 A-B.

P. 204, l. 22. '*fight down impulses.*' *Rep.* 441 A.

P. 204, l. 27. '*Temperance belongs to all three classes.*' *Ib.* 431 E-432 A, and 442 D ; but see Zeller, II. i. p. 884 note 2, and Pfleiderer, *Sokr. u. Pl.* p. 220.

P. 205, first l. '*organs of nutrition.*' *Tim.* 70 D-E.

P. 205, l. 29. '*by which phenomena are connected.*' *Rep.* 477 D *ff.*

P. 207, l. 2. '*return of Reason on itself.*' *Tim.* 36 C.

P. 207, l. 11. '*not the faintest reference to Plato.*' The *Republic* must have been written long after the *Ecclesiazusae* was performed. For as Beloch observes (*Gr. Gesch.* ii. p. 32), the way in which Ismenias is mentioned *Rep.* 336 A seems to date Book i. as not earlier than 382 B.C., the year in which that personage was put to death by the Spartans ; and from internal evidence one must pronounce Book i. to be the oldest portion of the *Republic.*

P. 207, l. 16. '*a standing article.*' Diog. Laert., vi. 72, and R.P., 219 D.

P. 208, l. 22. '*reconciled in his own theory.*' *Soph.* 237 A, 259 E, and the *Cratylus, passim.*

P. 209, l. 2. '*acting or being acted on.*' *Soph.* 247 D-E.

CHAPTER VIII

P. 214, first l. '*at Stageirus.*' For authorities see R.P., 297.

P. 214, l. 15. '*a number of precepts.*' They will be found collected in F.P.G. pp. 340 *ff.*

P. 214, l. 20. '*a speculative philosopher.*' 'Im wissenschaftlichen Leben glaubte er (Demokrit) das Ziel aller Eudämonie gefunden zu haben.' Fr. Nietzsche, *Leben*, vol. i. p. 342.

P. 215, l. 3. '*more than one way.*' *Rep.* 473 D.

P. 215, l. 19. '*a worshipping nature.*' See his elegy on Hermias, his lines on Plato, and his will.

P. 216, l. 26. '*if happiness consists,*' etc. *Eth. Nic.* x. 7 (condensed).

P. 217, l. 17. '*possession more delightful than . . . search.*' Aristotle would not have agreed with Lessing's famous choice.

P. 219, l. 3. '*the language of the* Timaeus.' 29 E.

P. 219, l. 11. '*on this principle,*' etc. Arist., *Met.* xii. 7, 1072 b 13.

P. 219, l. 20. '*Identity and Difference.*' *Tim.* 35 A.

P. 219, l. 27. '*Being* as *Being.*' *Met.* iii. 1, 1003 a 21 ; *ib.* 2, 1003 b 16 *ff.* ; xii. 6 and 7.

P. 220, l. 26. '*syncosmify.*' *De Coel.* ii. 13, 293 a 27.

P. 222, l. 27. '*rejected them as false.*' A collection of instances will be found in my *Greek Philosophers* vol. i. pp. 312-17.

P. 223, l. 16. '*by induction from sensible particulars.*' *An. Post.* ii. 19, 100 b 3 ; *De. An.* iii. 4.

P. 223, l. 22. '*generally said and believed.*' Although it is perfectly true that, as Grote points out in his answer to Sir W. Hamilton (*Aristotle* App. ii.), Aristotle opposes science to opinion or common sense, the fact remains that he uses his demonstrations largely to justify the reigning opinions (*τὰ δοκοῦντα*).

P. 225, l. 9. '*no void space.*' *De Coel.* i. 2 and ii. 4.

P. 225, l. 16. '*outer verge.*' *Ib.* i. 9, 279 a 18-28.

P. 225, l. 25. '*we may trust.*' *Ib.* ii. 1.

P. 226, l. 22. '*this world.*' See the whole treatise *De Gen. et Corr.*

P. 227, l. 4. '*Empedocles was wrong.*' *Ib.* i. 1, 315 a 3.

P. 227, l. 8. '*a common principle.*' *Ib.* ii. 1, 329 a 5.

P. 227, l. 14. '*potentiality.*' *Ib.* ii. 1, 329 a 24.

P. 228, l. 3. '*a process of substitution.*' *Ib.* ii. 2-4.

P. 228, l. 19. '*specific Form.*' *Met.* vii. 7, 1032 a 13.

P. 228, l. 23. '*life of things.*' *Phys.* viii. 1, 250 b 14.

P. 229, l. 21. '*when he tells us.*' *De Part. An.* iv. 6, 683 a 22 ; *ib.* ii. 10, 656 a 1-5.

P. 230, l. 13. '*imitative of the celestial circles.*' *De Coel.* iv. 4 and 5.

P. 230, l. 15. '*resembling after a fashion.*' *De Gen. et Corr.* ii. 10, 336 b 26 *ff.*

P. 230, l. 20. '*obliquity of the ecliptic.*' *Ib.* a 32.

P. 231, l. 5. '*the present species have always existed.*' This results from the priority of *ἐνέργεια* to *δύναμις* insisted on throughout Aristotle's First Philosophy, from his general doctrine of the eternity of the world (Zeller, ii. 2 pp. 431 *ff.*), and more particularly of the human race (*op. cit.* p. 508).

P. 231, l. 7. '*spontaneous generation.*' For references see Zeller, ii. 2, p. 524 note 6.

P. 231, l. 9. '*for which all Nature longs.*' *De An.* ii. 4, 415 a 29 ; Zeller, p. 511 note 2.

P. 231, l. 11. '*homogeneous tissues.*' *De Part. An.* ii. 1 *sub in.*

P. 231, l. 16. '*division of labour.*' *Pol.* i. 2, 1252 b 4.

P. 231, l. 20. '*increasing prominence of the heart.*' *De Part. An.* iii. 4, 665 b 15.

P. 231, l. 21. '*to maintain the vital heat.*' *Ib.* iii. 7, 670 a 24.

P. 231, l. 22. '*the brain.*' *De Part. An.* ii. 7, 652 b 20.
P. 231, l. 22. '*and lungs.*' *De Resp.* 10, 475 b 17.
P. 232, l. 2. '*taken up into the higher.*' *De An.* ii. 3 *sub in.*
P. 232, l. 10. '*do not admit of excess.*' *De An.* ii. 11, 424 a 4; 12, 424 a 28.
P. 232, l. 10. '*memory and imagination.*' *Ib.* iii. 4.
P. 232, l. 15. '*potential thought.*' *Ib.* 430 a 7.
P. 234, l. 11. '*as Aristotle points out.*' *An. Prior.* i. 5 and 6.
P. 234, l. 27. '*the only satisfactory . . . syllogism.*' *Ib.* 4, 25 b 32.
P. 234, l. 28. '*rules for converting.*' *Ib.* 5 and 6.
P. 236, l. 2. '*antithetical qualities.*' *An. Post.* and *Top.* throughout.
P. 237, l. 26. '*the best government.*' *Pol.* v. 10, 1313 a 3.
P. 238, l. 3. '*a sketch of the perfect State.*' Books iv. and v. (new style).
P. 238, l. 5. '*the industrial State.*' *Ib.* iii. 7, 1279 b 7.
P. 238, l. 11. '*the golden mean.*' *Ib.* vi. 11 (new style).
P. 238, l. 23. '*the plot as the soul.*' *Poet.* 6, 1450 a 22.
P. 238, l. 25. '*a certain moral mediocrity.*' *Ib.* 6, 1450 a 38; 13, 1453 a 8.

CHAPTER IX

P. 242, l. 6. '*about* 358-260.' These dates are highly problematic (Zeller, iii. 1 p. 27), but they seem to agree best with the chronology of Diog. Laert., vii. 1.
P. 242, l. 22. '*Xenophon's* Memorabilia.' Diog. Laert., vii. 1, 3.
P. 243, l. 15. '*his enemies taunted him.*' *Ib.* 25.
P. 243, l. 27. '*its avowed object.*' For authorities see Zeller, iii. 1, pp. 51 *ff.*, and R.P., 389.
P. 244, l. 20. '*sole reality of matter.*' R.P., 396 A *ff.*
P. 244, l. 21. '*they identified God with the world.*' Zeller, p. 146.
P. 244, l. 25. '*universal causation.*' R.P., 398 C; Zeller, p. 157.
P. 244, l. 28. '*to distinguish between the faculties.*' R.P., 410 C b; Zeller, p. 199.
P. 245, l. 3. '*the only good.*' R.P., 415 b; Zeller, p. 208.
P. 245, l. 6. '*the ideal of Zeno.*' R.P., 421 A a.

P. 246, l. 12. '*the governing principle.*' Ludwig Stein, *Psychologie d. Stoa* vol. i. pp. 23 *ff.*; 88-91.

P. 246, l. 19. '*as dynamic and formative principles.*' *Ib.* pp. 41, 51, 61, 116.

P. 247, l. 5. '*Aristotle had distinguished.*' *Phys.* ii. 3, 194 b 16.

P. 248, l. 28. '*its Gallic assailants.*' In the great victory won by Antiochus Soter over the Galatians (place and date unknown). (Droysen, *Gesch. d. Hell.* iii. 1, p. 258.)

P. 249, l. 7. '*an ideal expression.*' Cp. the passage in Philo, *De Mundi Opificio* p. 46, where the divine πνεῦμα breathed into the first man is called a 'colony' (ἀποίκιαν) from the nature of God (I borrow the reference from Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures* p. 177).

P. 249, l. 20. '*the Stoic logicians.*' Zeller, iii. 1, pp. 109 *ff.*

P. 249, l. 23. '*refuse objective reality.*' R.P., 397 A a.

P. 249, l. 26. '*a state of the affections and the will.*' Zeller, pp. 82 *ff.*

P. 250, l. 27. '*no two leaves are alike.*' Seneca, *Epp.* 113, 13.

P. 251, l. 22. '*the Chremonidean war.*' Droysen, *op. cit.* iii. 1, p. 225.

P. 251, l. 25. '*Megalopolis.*' *Ib.* p. 337.

P. 251, l. 26. '*Sicyon.*' *Ib.* p. 339.

P. 251, l. 27. '*Cyrene.*' *Ib.* p. 402.

P. 252, l. 2. '*a Stoic philosopher.*' *Op. cit.* iii. 2, p. 75.

P. 252, l. 10. '*as Cleanthes said.*' *Hymn to Zeus* 37-38 (F.P.G. p. 151).

P. 253, l. 23. '*the wise and the foolish.*' R.P., 420 e.

P. 254, l. 17. '*consciously and voluntarily.*' *Ib.* 413 b.

P. 254, l. 28. '*a part to act.*' Epictet., *Diss.* I. xxix. 39 *ff.*, and M. Aurelius, vi. 42, may be cited from among a number of similar passages. See my *Greek Philosophers* ii. p. 33.

P. 255, l. 3. '*conscience.*' Sen., *Epp.* xli. 1.

P. 255, l. 8. '*universal humanity.*' *Ib.* xcv. 51-53.

P. 255, l. 23. '*the popular mythology.*' The subject is exhaustively treated by Zeller, pp. 309-345.

P. 257, l. 10. '*claimed Nature as their ally.*' Cicero, *Academ.* II. xlii. 131, quoted by Zeller, iii. 1, p. 518 note 3.

P. 257, l. 16. '*probability as the guide of life.*' *Ib.* xxxi. 99; Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.* vii. 158; R.P., 435; Zeller, p. 514.

P. 257, l. 25. '*infinitesimal gradations.*' Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math.* vii. 408 ; Zeller, 501 *f.*

P. 257, l. 26. '*to bridge . . . the gulf.*' Zeller, 256 *ff.*

P. 258, l. 1. '*adverse criticism of theology.*' Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* Bk. iii.

P. 258, l. 7. '*to deny the existence of the gods.*' *Ib.* xvii. 44 ; Zeller, 522.

P. 259, l. 4. '*vilified or ignored.*' For references see R.P., 366.

P. 259, l. 6. '*absurd theology.*' *Ib.* 379.

P. 259, l. 8. '*calculating selfishness.*' *Ib.* 381.

P. 259, l. 9. '*Athenian parentage.*' *Ib.* 365.

P. 259, l. 21. '*denied the sphericity of the earth.*' Lucretius, *De Rer. Nat.* i. 1067.

P. 259, l. 23. '*eclipses.*' Diog. Laert., x. 96.

P. 259, l. 23. '*phases of the moon.*' *Ib.* 94.

P. 259, l. 28. '*no larger than they appear.*' *Ib.* 91 (confirmed by Lucretius).

P. 260, l. 4. '*unconditional acceptance.*' See the Epistle to Herodotus in Diog. Laert., x. 24.

P. 261, l. 2. '*his kingdom is non-existent.*' *Ib.* 125.

P. 261, l. 14. '*vicissitudes.*' *Ib.* 80-82.

P. 261, l. 14. '*predestined fate.*' *Ib.* 133.

P. 261, l. 26. '*a reverent and orthodox worshipper.*' Philodemus quoted by Zeller, 437 note 2. The busts of Epicurus give one the idea of a pure and high-minded but somewhat narrow and fanatical character.

P. 262, l. 8. '*by interfering with mundane affairs.*' Zeller, 436.

P. 262, l. 22. '*in praise of friendship.*' For instance, Diog. Laert., x. 148.

P. 265, l. 16. '*famed above other philosophers.*' For the authorities see Zeller, 462 note 5.

P. 265, l. 20. '*in Plato's phrase.*' *Rep.* 496 D.

INDEX

Abdera, 114, 126.
Academy, Plato's, 218, 239; the Middle, 251; the New, 256 *f.*
Achaian colonies in Italy, 72.
Achilles, a pattern of Greek virtue, 7; shield of, 16; references to, 5, 14, 16, 18, 29, 47, 141.
'Achilles and the tortoise,' 90.
Acragas, sumptuousness of its inhabitants, 97; temples of, *ib.*; Chthonian divinities worshipped at, *ib.*; change of government at, *ib.*; Empedocles still remembered at, 100; reference to, 157.
Acropolis of Athens, 47, 209.
Actaeon, story of, 19.
Actium, battle of, 266.
Actuality in Aristotle, 227, 228.
Adonis, 68.
Aegina, good government of, 26; references to, 15, 94.
Aeginetan sculpture, 158.
Aeschylus on the supremacy of Zeus, 41; on a future life, 69; historical significance of his tragedies, 94; connects morality with nature-worship, 105; relation to Nature, 122; on the law of retaliation, 130; irreverence towards certain gods, 167; references to, 28, 124, 125, 239.
Aesop, 171.
Aethiopians, 82.
Agamemnon, 18.
Agassiz, 43.
Agathon, a disciple of Gorgias, 147; agrees with Protagoras, *ib.*; may represent Alcidamas in Plato, 149.
Agora, 209.
Air, made the first principle by Anaximenes, 54.
Ajax, 12.
Alcestis, 29.
Alcibiades, 179, 190, 191.
Alcidamas, succeeds Gorgias, 148; denounces slavery, 149.
Alcmaeon, agnosticism of, 96; surmises brain to be the organ of mind, *ib.*
Alcmênê, 148.
Alexander of Troy, 12.
Alexander the Great, 214, 215, 245.
Algol, 77.
Altis of Olympia, 47.
Amateurs in philosophy, 96.
Amazons, 20.
Amour rentré in Sophocles, 124.
Anaxagoras, birth and origin, 104; migrates to Athens, *ib.*; friendship with Pericles, *ib.*; astronomical speculations, 107; driven from Athens, 108; constructs his philosophy under the influence of Empedocles, but in opposition to him, *ib.*; theory of infinite qualities, 109; differentiating function of the Nous, 110; reconciliation of Heracleitus with Parmenides, *ib.*; the Nous as an

extended substance derived from Parmenides, 111; physiological suggestions, *ib.*; absence of a true teleology, *ib.*; mistaken criticisms of Plato and Aristotle, 111 *f.*; vortical movement set up by the Nous, 112; *modus operandi* of the Nous considered as pure extension, 113; references to, 121, 126, 174, 229.

Anaximander, a disciple of Thales, 50; draws the first map of the world, 51; astronomical theories, *ib.*; views on the origin of man, 51 *f.*; doctrine of the Infinite, 52; idea of universal justice, 52 *f.*; ironical polytheism, 53; taught by implication the infinity of space, 79; references to, 35, 54, 222.

Anaximenes, Ionian characteristics of, 53; makes Air the infinite principle, 54; incipient subjectivity of his method, *ib.*; interpretes phenomena in terms of mass and movement, *ib.*; reference to, 113.

Andromachê, 28.

Animism of Parmenides and his predecessors, 88.

Antichthon imagined by the Pythagoreans, 76.

Antigonê, 28.

Antiphon, 128.

Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school, 185; relation to Prodicus and Hippias, *ib.*; to Socrates, *ib.*

Antithesis, Greek love of, 12, 175.

Aphroditê, 12, 27.

Apolline religion, 40, 66.

Apollo, prophet of Zeus, 13; a central figure in the Pythagorean religion, 75; reference to, 71.

Apollonia, 113.

Apologia of Plato, account of Socrates in, 162.

Aratus, 251.

Arcesilaus, 251.

Archilochus, 64.

Ares, 12.

Aretê, meaning of, 128.

Arêtê of Homer, 28.

Argos, Heraeum of, 19.

Aristeides, 193.

Aristippus, relation to Protagoras, 185; and to Socrates, *ib.*

Aristocracies, their love of moderation, 32; not favourable to individuality until they are approaching dissolution, 64.

Aristophanes, his satire on philosophy, 50; unable to dissociate morality from nature-worship, 105; satirises the theory of Diogenes, 113; his love of nature, 139; on the physiocratic movement, 141; on the abuse of naturalism, 143; his account of Socrates, 161 *f.*; satirises communism, 207; references to, 153, 190.

Aristotle, on Tarentum, 26; first distinguishes the different kinds of causation, 46; on the Pythagorean astronomy, 77; on the Nous of Anaxagoras, 111; on Leucippus and atomism, 114; limited appreciation of Democritus, 116 *f.*; criticism of the atomic theory, 119; teleology, 167; on Socrates, 174; on knowledge and virtue, 179; his genius theoretical, not practical, 213 *ff.*; deference to authority, 215; his *Ethics* dear to college tutors, 216; panegyric on the theoretic life, 216 *ff.*; attack on the Platonic Ideas, 218; his theology contrasted with Plato's, 218 *f.*; his highest metaphysical principle, 219; inability to go below the surface, 220; rejection of

truths discovered by his predecessors, 222; doctrine of Forms, 223; freedom from paradox, *ib.*; systematising power, 224; influence of Parmenides on, 225 *f.*; place given to the Heracleitean flux, 226; the Four Elements and their origin, 227 *f.*; Potentiality, Actuality, and Motion, 228; mastery of illusive appearance, 229; not an evolutionist, 229 *f.*; connexion between the higher and lower spheres of the universe, 230; theory of organic life, 231; psychology, 232; place of logical theory in the general system, 233 *ff.*; the *Rhetoric*, 236; the *Ethics*, 236 *f.*; the *Politics*, 237 *f.*; the *Poetics*, 238; tendency of his school towards natural history, 239; his reaction against Western influences, 241; assumes different faculties, 244; fourfold division of Causes, 247; demonstrated the earth's sphericity, 259; contrasted with Epicurus, 261; references to, 7, 23, 45, 174.

Art, early Greek, its respect for natural distinctions, 19; Athenian, how it acted on Plato, 209.

Artemis, 19; of Ephesus, 55, 87.

Aspasia, 29.

Athenê, 5, 12, 13, 71, 90, 105.

Athenian law-courts, dangers incurred in, 150 *f.*; their proceedings a lesson in psychology and logic, 159.

—— nobles, dangers that threatened them, 150; what they hoped to learn from the Sophists, *ib.*; decimated and cowed, 182; their close study of foreign affairs, 188 *f.*

—— people, their credulity and superstition, 104 *ff.*; owed their quick wits to the air in which they lived, 114; most religious in Hellas, 155; bulk of, ignorant, prejudiced, and sordid, 171; their ingratitude and religious intolerance, 181.

Athenian philosophy, necessary conditions of, 159 *f.*

Athens, 27, 94, 154; a nest of bigotry, 114; siege by Sulla, 266.

Athletes, idolatry of, among the Dorians, 26.

Atomic theory explained, 115 *f.*; why it failed to satisfy the Greek mind, 117 *ff.*; revived by Epicurus, 259 *f.*

Attic drama, female characters in, 28; a joint product of the Olympian and Chthonian religions, 69; a study of mind, 158; modelled on the procedure of the law-courts, 159.

—— oratory necessitated a close study of mind, 158.

—— sculpture, expressiveness of, 157 *f.*

Attica compared with Tuscany and Scotland, 155; climate and soil, 156; continuity of its political history, *ib.*; industrial development, 157.

Aurelius, Marcus, on the duty of dying, 53; a later Stoic, 255; gave his name to the dynasty of good Emperors, 268.

Babylon, 42.

Bacchylides, in praise of Aegina, 26.

Baconian method, 221.

Bankruptcy of science, alleged, 95; of philosophy in the fifth century B.C., *ib.*

Being *as* Being, Aristotle's highest principle, 219.

—— *See* Parmenides, and Thought.

Boeotians, 29; stupidity of, 114.

Brain. *See* Alcmaeon.
Bruno, Giordano, 36; how influenced by the Copernican system, 84.
Brutus, 252.

Caesarism, 245, 266 *f.*
California, theosophy and socialism cultivated in, 73.
Callicles, 201.
Calvinism, 252.
Carneades, his criticism on the Stoics, 257 *f.*
Carthage, 241.
Cato, 252.
Causation, universal, taught by the Stoics, 244.
Causes, first distinguished by Aristotle, 46; study of, why attractive to early speculation, 46 *ff.*; Aristotle's fourfold division of, 247.
Celestial spheres in Aristotle, 225, 233.
Central fire, Pythagorean doctrine of, 76.
Ceos, 139.
Cerameicus, 90.
Chremonidean war, 251.
Christian Fathers used the allegoric method, 256.
Christianity and philosophy, 268.
Chrysippus, head of Stoic school, 244.
Chthonian divinities, 67.
—— religion, associated with democratic government, 105.
Church, the Epicurean, 265.
Citium, 242.
Civilisation, Protagoras on, 129 *ff.*
Clazomenae, 104.
Cleanthes, 244; his *Hymn to Zeus* quoted, 252.
Cleisthenes, 70.
Cleomenes, his agrarian reforms, 251; acts under Stoic influence, 252.
Clouds, importance of, in early Ionian speculation, 49.
Clouds of Aristophanes, account of Socrates in, 161; references to, 50, 143, 181.
Clytemnestra, 18.
Codrus, 186.
Cognition, Aristotle's doctrine of, 232.
Colophon, 80.
Communism, theories of, in Greece, 207.
Comte, Auguste, 74.
Concepts in Aristotle's logic, 233.
Convention opposed to Nature, 137, 185, 257.
Conversion, Greek religion unfavourable to belief in, 128.
—— in Aristotle's Logic, 235.
Corinth, good government of, 25 *f.*; its ministry of Aphroditê, 27; its connexion with the dithyramb, 70, 123.
Cosmos, thought of, as a realisation of temperance and justice, 121.
Courage, its place in Plato's *Republic*, 204.
Crates, last great chief of the Cynic school, 242.
Crete, unnatural passion encouraged in, 27.
Critias, 179; kinsman of Plato, 186; head of the oligarchical party, *ib.*, repudiates religion, *ib.*
Croton, 72, 157, 214.
Crusades, 28.
Cynic school, 185, 240, 242.
Cyrenaic school, 262.
Cyrene, 251.

Dante, 122, 158.
Death, the Epicurean view of, 260 *f.*
Deidameia of Sophocles, 28.
Dekad of heavenly bodies made up by the Pythagoreans, 76.
Delphi, oracle of, 2; inscriptions on

temple-wall of, 3; worship of Apollo and Dionysus combined at, 15.
Delphic theology, 40.
Demeter, a Chthonian divinity, 67 *f.*; worshipped at Elea, 83, 87; at Acragas, 97; at Athens, 105.
Demetrius Poliorcetes worshipped at Athens, 170.
Democedes, 72.
Democracy, not merely a form of government, 63; closely associated with the Orphic religion, 70.
Democritus, closely associated with Leucippus, 114; his extensive application of atomism, 116; not appreciated by his countrymen, *ib.*; criticises Protagoras, 135; his use of the term Nomos, 136; ethical theory, 214; a truly scientific philosopher, 227; his atomism revived by Epicurus, 260; reference to, 212.
Demonstration in Aristotle, 235.
Descartes, 36.
Diadochi, 250, 262.
Dialectic as a game, 174; sphere of, in Aristotle, 235.
—— method of Socrates, 160; its ethical application, 180; its power in Plato's hands, 194; extended to mathematics, 196; reconciles Nature and Law, 200; applied to politics, 202; to physics, 206; and to speculation, 208.
Diderot, 138.
Difference, idea of, in Plato, 219.
Diocletian, 269.
Diogenes of Apollonia popularises physical philosophy at Athens, 113; identifies the Nous with Air, *ib.*; dissects the human subject, 114; an eclectic, 243.
Diomed, 12.
Dionysiac theatre, 209.
Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse, 202.
Dionysus, worshipped at Delphi, 15; a Chthonian god, 67 *f.*; in the Orphic religion, 68 *ff.*; worshipped at Athens, 105.
Dolon, 7.
Dorians, 23; preserved primitive customs, 25; their law-abidingness, *ib.*; their defects, 26; their hypocrisy, 104, 197.
Dorycleidas, 19.

Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes, no reference to Plato's *Republic* in, 207.
Eclectic systems, 266.
Education, literary *versus* scientific, 144; left to itself at Athens, 193; in Plato's *Republic*, 203 *f.*
Egypt, 42, 190, 208.
Elea, an Ionian colony, 72; devoted to the worship of Demeter, 83.
Eleatic school. *See* Parmenides.
Electra, 28.
Elements. *See* Empedocles and Aristotle.
Eleusinian mysteries, 69, 71.
Emerson quoted, 114.
Empedocles, birth and home, 97; espouses the popular cause, *ib.*; ostentatious character, 98; imbued with the Orphic religion, *ib.*; scientific *aperçus*, 99; reconciles Heracleitus with Parmenides, 100; discovers the indestructibility of matter, 101; doctrine of the Four Elements, *ib.*; makes Love and Strife cosmic agents, 102; attributes consciousness to all the elements, 103; self-contradiction and probable hypocrisy, 103 *f.*; causes a revival of speculation in Eastern Hellas, 104; unmoral view of Nature, 121; Aristotle's criticism on, 226 *f.*; type of an eclectic, 243.

Epameinondas, 29, 214.
Ephesus, 55, 75, 214.
Epicastê, 18.
Epicurus, over-estimated as a philosopher, 258; birth and parentage, 259; limited interest in physical science, *ib.*; reasons for accepting the atomic theory, 260; rejection of a future life and of providence, 260 *f.*; belief in the gods as philosophical ideals, 262; rejection of an invariable order of nature, 263; none of his disciples very eminent except Lucretius, *ib.*; his system not attractive to the Greek mind, 264; success of his school as a friendly society, 265; relation of his system to Stoicism, 265 *f.*
Epictetus, 255.
Erinyes, 18 *f.*, 67.
Eteocles, of Euripides, 142; of Aeschylus, 143.
Ethical theory of Stoicism, 245; of Epicurus, 259, 262 *f.*
Ethics of Aristotle, 216, 236.
Eucleides combines the Eleatic with the Socratic teaching, 185.
Eumenides of Aeschylus, 18.
Eumolpus, 71.
Euripides, female characters of, 29; love of nature, 139; reproduces the morality of the naturalistic school, 142 *f.*; as a Humanist, 147; on Greek civilisation, 147 *f.*; on the superiority of Athens, 148; repeats an opinion of Protagoras, *ib.*; reference to, 190.
Evolution not an Aristotelian doctrine, 229.
Exact sciences more cultivated in the Greek colonies of the West than in the mother country, 73.

Figures of the syllogism in Aristotle, 234 *f.*
Fire, place of, in the philosophy of Heracleitus, 57 *f.*, 60, 246; Aristotle's theory of, 227.
First matter in Aristotle, 227, 228, 236.
Flux of Heracleitus, 58, 212, 226.
Forms, doctrine of, in the Aristotelian philosophy, 223, 233.
Friendship in Aristotle's *Ethics*, 237; in Epicureanism, 262.

Geometry. *See* Mathematics.
Glaucon, 172.
Gods. *See* Religion, and Theology.
Goethe's *Faust*, 249.
Gorgias, a disciple of Empedocles, 145; creates a new style of rhetoric, *ib.*; denies the existence of Nature, 146; Panhellenic enthusiasm, 147; references to, 152, 171.
Gorgias of Plato, 200.
Gracchi, the, 252.
Greece, physical geography of, 10 *f.*
Greek culture, early, why superior to Italian, 42.
—— national life trampled out by the civil wars of Rome, 266.
—— philosophy, a creation of the Ionians, 23; flourished in schools, 31; a product of aristocratic societies, *ib.*; how influenced by monarchy and democracy, 33; decline of, after Parmenides, 93 *ff.*; renovated by the influence of Socrates, 184; reversion to speculative interests, 213; expresses the consciousness of the Hellenistic period, 240.
Greeks, their self-knowledge and self-control, 3 *ff.*; sometimes generalised too cautiously, 22; preferred sensuous experience to abstract reasoning, 118 *f.*; a religious people, 119; not favour-

able to Epicureanism, 264; most gifted of all races, 270.
Grouping, method of, characteristic of the Ionian family, 34.

Habits, moral, Aristotle's theory of, 236 *f.*
Happiness, Aristotle's theory of, 216 *ff.*
Heart, function of, in Aristotle's physiology, 231.
Hebrews, their interest in origins, 46 *f.*
Hecataeus, 96.
Hector, 21.
Hegel, 37, 40, 56, 227.
Helen, 28.
Helios, 18.
Heracleitus, on the Erinyes, 19; birth and character, 55 *f.*; attitude towards religion, 56; indebtedness to his predecessors, *ib.*; makes Fire the first principle, 57; interprets Nature as a process, *ib.*; idea of perpetual transmutation, 58; identity of contraries, 59; reverence for law, 60; the first to distinguish between sense and reason, *ib.*; illustrates all the characteristic notes of the Greek mind, 61; ends the first direct line of Ionian thought, *ib.*; his use of illustrations, 65; reference to Pythagoras, 74, 80; relation to Parmenides, 95; his principles employed by Empedocles, 100 *f.*; by Anaxagoras, 110, and by Leucippus, 115; accords with Aeschylus, 122, and with Pindar, 123; suggests the doctrine of relativity to Protagoras, 136, and the idea of Nature as an ethical standard to the physiocrats, 137; studied by Plato, 195, 212; place given to his principle by Aristotle, 226; his physics revived by Zeno, 241 *ff.*
Heraeum of Argos, 19.
Herê, 17, 18.
Hermae, mutilation of, 105.
Hermes, a Chthonian god, 67.
Herodotus on the personation of Athenê, 105; his attitude compared with that of Protagoras, 133; references to, 34, 96, 138.
Hesiod, his theology, 41; studies the beginnings of things, 46; references to, 29, 64, 67, 68, 72.
Hippias first distinguishes between Nature and Law, 139; teaches mathematics and astronomy, *ib.*; his self-sufficiency, 140; inculcates truthfulness, 141; took payment for teaching, 170; inconsistent attitude, 185; references to, 153, 202, 207, 243.
Hippocrates on the alleged divine origin of certain diseases, 50.
Homer, his use of contrast, 12; assimilation of opposites, 14; on the relation between Nature and man, 16 *ff*; illustrates the irony of fate, 21; his female characters, 28; theology, 39 *f.*; throws his descriptions into narrative form, 47; references to, 30, 34, 59, 67, 68, 72, 82.
Humanism, Greek, 147, 200.
Humanists, 147, 152, 194, 257.
Humanity, Greek sense of, 8; idea of, put forward by Protagoras, 129.
Hume, 56.
Hybrid, derivation of, 20.
Hybris, 20, 32.

Ideas, Plato's doctrine of, 199 *f.*; Aristotle's attack on, 218, 220.
Identity, idea of, stands at the summit of Plato's system, 219.
—— of opposites, an element of

Greek thought, 14; in the philosophy of Heracleitus, 59.
Iliad, the, owes its final form to the Ionians, 29; references to, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 28, 40, 41, 47, 67.
Immortality, belief in, among the Greeks, 67 *ff.*; taught by Pythagoras, 74; Plato's doctrine of, 197, 201.
Individuality, not favoured by aristocracies, 64; its rise among the Greeks, *ib.*; its place in Stoicism, 250.
Infinity, Greek aversion from, 118.
Ionian race, their intellectual supremacy among the Greeks, 23; exclusive aptitude for philosophy, *ib.*; favoured position of, 24; feminine ideals, 28; social consequences of their commerce and industry, 42 *f.*; cities reduced to vassalage by Lydia, 43; emigration to Italy, 72; Athens their metropolis, 154; their morality always rational and progressive, 181; their latent pantheism and hylozoism, 244.
Iphicrates, revolution in tactics effected by, 202.
Iphigeneia, 29.
Irony of fate, 21.
Isaeus, 190.
Isocrates, 128.
Italy, Greek colonies in, 72.

Jews, 242.
Jocasta, of Sophocles, 28; of Euripides, 142 *f.*
Juryman, as an illustration of Socratic ignorance, 177.
Justice, place of, in Plato's *Republic*, 205

Kant, 36, 37.
Knowledge, problem of, in Plato, 195; criterion of, in Stoicism, 249.

Lacedaemon, 25, 190. *See* Sparta.
Laius, 18.
Lampsacus, its hospitality to Anaxagoras, 108.
Law, reign of, suggested by republican institutions, 9; in the philosophy of Heracleitus, 60, 137; in the philosophy of Protagoras, 136; opposed to Nature, 139; praised by Agathon, 147; by Euripides, *ib.*; and by Alcidamas, 149; upheld by Socrates, 165.
—— of Nature, how understood by the Athenian aristocrats, 153, 200.
Laws of Plato quoted, 195; reference to, 213.
Lesbos, Greek lyrism originated in, 29; schools of, 30.
Lessing on Homer, 47.
Leucippus, founds the atomic theory, 114; his existence denied by Epicurus, 117; references to, 35, 121, 126.
Limit, idea of, in Greek thought, 14; with Thales, 45; with Anaximander, 52; with Heracleitus, 58; with the Pythagoreans, 79; with Parmenides, 85, 89; with Protagoras, 132; with Aristotle, 225 *f.*
Limitation, instinctive Greek passion for, 118; more marked among the Western than among the Eastern Hellenes, *ib.*
Locke, 135.
Logic, Aristotle's, a system for binding together higher and lower concepts, 233; of the Stoics, a system for connecting propositions, 249.
Logical method created by Socrates, 173.
Love, Platonic, 198 *f.*
Lucania, 72.
Lucretius, takes up atomism, 117;

ignorant of contemporary Greek science, 117; the only eminent Epicurean, 263 *f.*
Lyceum, 239.
Lycophron, his radical opinions, 149.
Lydia, 43, 81.
Lysias, his skill as a speech-writer, 158; reference to, 190.

Macaulay, 165.
Macedonians, 29, 30.
Man, relation of, to Nature, how conceived at present, 8; among the early Greeks, 15 *ff.*; by Anaximenes, 54; by Heracleitus, 57; by the Pythagoreans, 75; by Plato, 196.
'Man is the measure of all things,' 131 *f.*
Marathon, 181, 188.
Marcus Aurelius. *See* Aurelius.
Mathematics, brought from the East to Ionia, 42; studied in the Graeco-Italian colonies, 73; taught by Hippias, 139; their influence on Plato, 196; he bases the study of science on them, 211.
Mean, the idea of, 14, 44, 50.
Measure, in Pindar, 31; in Heracleitus, 58.
Melians, slaughter of, 134.
Melissus of Samos, defeats the Athenians, 91; takes up and improves the philosophy of Parmenides, 91 *f.*, 115.
Memorabilia. *See* Xenophon.
Mercury, the planet, 77.
Metaphysics of Aristotle, 219.
Metopes of Selinus, 19.
Michelangelo, 158.
Middle Term, in Aristotle's logic, 233; discarded by the Stoics, 249.
Miletus, connexion with Egypt, 42; supremacy in Ionia, 43; party-struggles, *ib.*; destruction by the Persians and subsequent restoration, 55; references to, 73, 75, 157.
Mohammedan contrasted with Greek religion, 1 *ff.*
Monarchy, its philosophical suggestiveness, 33; its place in Aristotle's political system, 237 *f.*
Montesquieu on the principle of a republic, 31 *f.*
Moon, devotion paid to, at Athens, 106.
Moriah, rock of, 3.
Motion in Aristotle's physics, 228.
Mottoes used as an architectural decoration, 1.
Mycalessus, massacre of, 134.
Mycenae, significance of the tombs found at, 66.
Mysticism easily allied with the study of mathematics, 73.

Nature, attitude of the Greeks towards, 9, 15 *ff.*; in the Homeric similes, 17; as an ethical standard, 137 *ff.*; in Plato's philosophy, 195 *ff.*, 202, 206; in the New Academy, 257. *See* Law.
Nausicaa, 28.
Nemesis, meaning of, 20 *f.*
Nicias loses an army by his superstition, 106.
Nomadic races, their relative freedom from superstition, 39.
Nomos, meaning of, in Greek philosophy, 136.
Nous, the, of Anaxagoras, its nature, function, and derivation, 110 *ff.*

Oaths as the basis of moral obligation, 41.
Oceanids of Aeschylus, 28.
Odeon, 209.
Odysseus, 12, 18, 141.
Odyssey, 28, 67.
Oedipus, 18, 131.

Olympian religions unsuited for the people, 66.
Organon, Aristotle's, 233. *See* Logic.
Orpheus. *See* sq.
Orphic religion, 68 *ff.*; allied to the teaching of Pythagoras, 74; its influence on Empedocles, 98.
Osiris, 68.

Paestum, 87.
Paley, 166.
Pandarus, 41.
Patroclus, 21, 67.
Parmenides, personality, 83 *f.*; geographical discoveries, 84; how they influenced his philosophy, 85; identification of earth and heaven, *ib.*; doctrine of the world as a sphere, 86; luminousness of pure Being, 87; influence of the Olympian religion on his philosophy, *ib.*; identifies Thought and Being, *ib.*; animism of his system, 88; opposed to the Pythagorean and Heracleitean systems, 89; his ethical passion and religious enthusiasm, *ib.*; his philosophy taken up by Melissus, 91; probable date of his poem, 93; relation to Heracleitus, 95; influence on Empedocles, 100; on Anaxagoras, 110 *f.*; on Aristotle, 225 *f.*; references to, 98, 113, 208, 224, 241.
Parmenides of Plato, 213.
Peiraeus, orgiastic cults of, 157.
Peisistratus, 105.
Pergamus, sculptures of, 248.
Periander, 70.
Pericles, his union with Aspasia, 29; friendship with Anaxagoras, 104, 108; dispute with Protagoras, 130; a high-born demagogue, 150; reference to, 193.
Persephonê, 67, 68, 97.
Persia, 190.
Persuasion, an instrument of popular government, 64.
Phanes, 68.
Pheidias, 34, 157.
Philebus of Plato referred to, 211, 213.
Philosophy, influences by which it is governed, 36.
Phocaea, 72.
Phocylides quoted, 43, 53.
Phoenicians, 25, 242.
Phoenissae of Euripides quoted, 142 *f.*
Phrygian music, 71.
Physical studies, enthusiasm for, among the youth of Athens, 138.
Physics, Aristotle's, 224 *ff.*
Physiocratic movement in Greece, 139, 141.
Physiology, interest of Empedocles in, 99, 102; influence on Anaxagoras, 111; attention paid to, in the fifth century B.C., 126; Aristotle's theory of, 231.
Pindar, on the good government of Corinth, 25; his apology for venal love, 27; an example of Aeolian genius, 29; recognition of limit and measure, 30 *f.*; characteristics, 31; studies the beginnings of things, 46; on the Eleusinian mysteries, 69; reflects the religious enthusiasm of victorious Hellas, 94; on the Chthonian cult of Acragas, 97; in praise of originality, 123; occasional scepticism, 167.
Plataeans, 134.
Plato, makes self-limitation a primary principle in his philosophy, 7; on the practical calling of the philosopher, 38; continues the Pythagorean tradition, 75; unable to dissociate morality from nature-worship, 105 *f.*; censure

of Anaxagoras, 111; never mentions Democritus, 116; indorses the views of Protagoras on punishment, 131; repudiates a false interpretation of Protagoras, 132; satire on Prodicus, 140; account of Socrates, 161 *ff.*; abandons the teleology of Socrates, 167; greatest thinker and writer of all time, 186; descent and early associations, *ib.*; obligations to Socrates, *ib.*; religious fervour, 187; wide acquaintance with the world, 188; insight into men and things, 189 *f.*; services to Socrates, 191; discards Socratic induction, 192; makes moral reformation his object, 193; interest in education, 193 *f.*; adopts and extends the views of Protagoras, 194; system of utilitarian hedonism, *ib.*; problem of knowledge, 195; combines the method of geometry with the Socratic dialectic, 196; takes up the doctrine of immortality, 197; doubtful sincerity, *ib.*; communication with the unseen world through birth, love, and death, 197 *f.*; purification of love, 198 *f.*; theory of Ideas, 199; reconciliation of Nature with Law, 200 *f.*; observes the rise of militarism in Greece, 201 *f.*; brings physics to bear on politics, 202; division of labour and its implications, 203; constitution of the ideal State, 203 *ff.*; how it illustrates the fundamental forms of Greek thought, 205; predominance of the ethical and reforming interest, 206; attitude towards communism, 207; affinities with the theocracies of the East and with the Middle Ages, 208; over-estimate of the possibilities of reform, 208 *f.*; how influenced by Athenian art, 209; later speculations, 211; possible influence of Aristotle on, 213; foresees a way of escape from the reign of brute force, 215; fundamental interest not theoretical but practical, 218; motive of his Ideal theory, *ib.*; contrast between his theology and Aristotle's, 218 *f.*; places Identity and Difference at the summit of his metaphysical system, 219; the identification of thought and extension made impossible by his spiritualism, 225; assumes a variety of mental faculties, 244; the ethical theory of Epicurus suggested by, 262; references to, 35, 147, 180, 215, 220, 227, 236, 255, 256, 265, 267.

Pleasure, Prodicus on, 142; as a motive, Plato on, 194 *f.*; as a part of happiness, Aristotle on, 217; in the system of Epicurus, 262, 264.

Plotinus, 269.

Plutarch's *Lives*, 251.

Pneuma, the, primal element in Zeno's system, 246.

Pnyx, 209.

Poetics of Aristotle, 238.

Politics of Aristotle, 237 *f.*

Polus, 200.

Polyneices, 142.

Positivism, approach to, in the fifth century B.C., 96.

Potentiality in Aristotle, 227 *f.*

Practical life, influence of, on philosophy, 36 *ff.*

Priestly Narrator in *Genesis*, 45 *f.*

Prodicus, position and origin, 139; a teacher of natural philosophy, *ib.*; and of philology, 140; a precursor of Stoicism, *ib.*; a teacher of truthfulness, 141; his *Choice of Heracles*, *ib.*; condemns un-

earned pleasure, 142; explanation of the gods, 166; personally a sybarite, 184; references to, 170, 207, 243.
Prometheus, 29.
Protagoras, career, 126 *f.*; the first Sophist, *ib.*; teaching, 127; prejudices encountered by, 127 *ff.*; idea of human progress, 129; rationale of punishment, 130; dispute with Pericles, *ib.*; 'man the measure of all things,' 131 *f.*; agnosticism, 132; commissioned to make laws for Thurii, 133; relation to Herodotus, *ib.*; and to Thucydides, 133 *f.*; disbelief in physical philosophy and in geometry, 135; his philosophy summed up in the word Nomos, 136; said to have maintained that all propositions may be disputed, 136, 152; depreciates naturalistic teaching, 144; influences Euripides, 148; an alleged boast of his discussed, 152; his scepticism extended by Aristippus, 185; his ethical teaching taken up by Plato, 194; a precursor of the New Academy, 257; references to, 152, 165, 166, 171.
Protagoras of Plato, 194, 262.
Pythagoras, settles at Croton, 72; referred to by Heracleitus, 74, 80; birth and date, 74; a religious teacher, *ib.*; ethical tendencies, 75; popular outbreak against his followers, *ib.*
Pythagoreans, physics of, 76; Aristotle's criticism on their philosophical method, 77; its relation to mathematics, 78; confusion of knowing and being, *ib.*; and of arithmetic with geometry, 79; infinite divisibility of space suggested by the Pythagorean theorem, *ib.*; recognition of the Limit as such, *ib.*; antithetical couples, 80; relation to Parmenides, 89; abandon the belief in immortality, 196 *f.*; their mathematical method adopted by Plato, 211; unjustly attacked by Aristotle, 220.

Qualities, their eternal pre-existence according to Anaxagoras, 109; sensible matter composed of, according to Aristotle, 227.

Reason, distinguished from sense by Heracleitus, 60; pure, failure of attempts to reform society by, 75; function of, in the philosophy of Socrates, 177; of Plato, 205, 207; of Aristotle, 223, 232; sole intellectual faculty admitted by the Stoics, 245. *See* also Nous and Thought.
Reflection (optical), importance ascribed to, by the Pythagorean astronomers, 76.
Relativity, doctrine of, suggested by the Heracleitean philosophy, 136 *f.*
Religion, of the higher classes in Homer's time, 66; Apolline, *ib.*; of the poorer classes in Greece, 67; Orphic, 68 *ff.*; of Pythagoras, 74; of Parmenides and Heracleitus, 87 *f.*; power of, in the fifth century B.C., 94; at Acragas, 97; at Athens, 105 *ff.*; preparation for its reconstitution, 120; necessarily respected by Athenian philosophy, 159; attitude of Socrates towards, 167 *f.*; influence on Plato, 186 *f.*; neglected by Aristotle, 240; influence on Carneades, 258; and Epicurus, 261.
Republic of Plato, 203 *ff.*
Rhetoric of Aristotle, 236.
Rhetoricians, professional, power of, at Athens, 151.

Rhodes, sculptures of, 248.
Rome, 241, 256, 266 *ff.*
Rousseau, 138.
Ruskin on Pheidias, 158.
Russia, tendency towards absolutism in the leading intellects of, 245.

Salamis, 181, 188.
Samos, 72, 91, 157, 259.
Sappho, 29, 30, 64.
Sarpedon, 18.
Scenery, influence of, on Greek thought, 11.
Schelling, 227.
Schools, Greek philosophy flourished in, 31.
Science, positive, defined, 36; its influence on philosophy, 36 *ff.*
Scotland compared with Attica, 155.
Semelê, 68.
Seminal reasons in the Stoic philosophy, 246.
Semites, importance ascribed by them to water, 45; their alleged passion for righteousness, 242.
Semitic culture, sobering influence of, 74.
Sicily, Greek colonies in, 72; dearth of philosophic genius in, 104, 144.
Sicyon, 70.
Socialism, its threatened establishment in Greece, 149.
Socrates, unable to dissociate morality from nature-worship, 105; date and parentage, 160; authorities for his teaching, 161 *ff.*; its matter and manner distinguished, 165; its conservative character, *ib.*; respect for law, *ib.*; idea of utility, 166; support given to theology, *ib.*; argument from design, *ib.*; conformity to the state-religion, 167; the art of life, 168; the teacher as an object-lesson, 168; reaction of the disciple on the master, 169; contrast with the Sophists as paid teachers, 170; the gratuitous system inapplicable to instruction in mathematics and philology, *ib.*; and to moral training when given by a foreigner, 171; its restriction to the leisured classes, *ib.*; aristocratic tendencies combined with the principle of democratic criticism, 173; dialectic as the method of the mental sciences, 174; general definitions, *ib.*; division, 175; reasoning as a method of discovery and of disproof, 176; the dialectician as such knows nothing, *ib.*; conception of reason as a universal power, 177 *f.*; identification of virtue with knowledge, 178 *f.*; account taken of natural aptitudes, 179; appeal to egoistic motives, 180; theory of moral obligation, *ib.*; trial and condemnation, 180 *ff.*; revolution in philosophy effected by his example, 184 *f.*; influence on Plato, 186, 190; its reward, 191; references to, 17, 39, 114, 186, 187, 188, 189, 192, 195, 196, 242.
Sophist, Plato's, 213.
Sophists, meaning of the word, 126; causes of their unpopularity at Athens, 152; influence on public opinion, 153. *See* under Gorgias, Hippias, Humanists, Nature, Physiocrats, Prodicus, Protagoras, and Socrates.
Sophocles, irony, 21; female characters of, 28; on a future life, 69; general characterisation of his genius, 123 *ff.*; estrangement from Nature, 124 *f.*; began as an imitator of Aeschylus, 125;

influenced by the spirit of the age, 126; accepts the views of Protagoras on moral responsibility, 131; reference to, 239.
Sophrosynê, a combination of self-knowledge and self-control, 3; characteristic virtue of the Greeks, *ib.*; a primary principle with Plato and Aristotle, 7; displayed by Homer's men, women, and gods, 17; opposed to hybris, 20; the Dorians not its most complete type, 26; an aristocratic virtue, 32; in the philosophy of Heracleitus, 58; threatened by the rise of democracy and the religious revival, 71; developed into new conceptions at Athens, 154; of the uneducated classes, according to Socrates, 171; imposed on thought itself by the Socratic method, 174; its place in Plato's *Republic*, 204; Aristotle's system a temple of, 224; the supreme type of moral virtue in Aristotle's *Ethics*, 236; receives its abstract expression in the dualism of Greek Republican philosophy, 244.
Space, infinity and infinite divisibility of, 79.
Sparta, praised by Thucydides for its law-abidingness, 25; unnatural passion encouraged at, 27; character of its women, 28; bacchanalian dances, 30; deceitful character of its people, 104; attacked by Euripides, 148; influence on Plato, 197, 198, 207.
Stesichorus, his rationalistic treatment of mythology, 19, 167; invents the choral ode, 26.
Stoics, ignored atomism, 117; continued the tradition of Prodicus and Hippias, 140; the true successors of Aristotle, 241; made war on dualism, 244; their tendency towards absolutism, whence derived, 245; materialism, 248; practical genius, *ib.*; reform of logic, 249; individualism and subjectivity combined with sociality, 250; they help to maintain the vitality of Hellenism, 251; universal applicability of their teaching, 252; moral paradoxes, 252 *ff.*; teleology, 254; later developments, 255; support given to mythology, 255 *f.*; modifications imposed on their system by the criticism of Carneades, 257; influence on Rome, 267 *f.*
Strepsiades, 143.
Syllogism, the, Aristotle's theory of, 233 *ff.*
Symposium of Plato quoted, 147.
Syncosmify, a word coined by Aristotle, 220.
Syracuse, 157, 190, 202.

Taygetus, 30.
Tecmessa, 28.
Teleology, 17, 111, 166 *f.*, 254.
Temples of Aegina and Athens, their historical significance, 94.
Thales, birthplace, 43; business capacity, *ib.*; political activity, 44; travels in Egypt, *ib.*; services to geometry, *ib.*; predicts an eclipse, *ib.*; founds philosophy, 45; makes Water the first principle, *ib.*; conception of the Limit and the Mean, *ib.*; attitude towards theology, 50; references to, 52, 83, 212.
Thebes, 30, 71.
Themis, 19, 30.
Theognis, 128.
Theology, defined, 36; influence on philosophy, 37; of Homer, 39 *ff.*; of Hesiod and Aeschylus, 41

promotes the study of causation, 48; of the Orphic poets, 68 *ff.*; of Xenophanes, 82 *f.*; of Socrates, 166 *ff.*; of Plato, 187, 196, 209, 218 *f.*, 261; of Aristotle, 218 *ff.*, 261 *f.*; of the Stoics, 254, 262; of Epicurus, 259, 262.
Theophrastus, 114.
Theron, 97.
Thought, identified with Being by Parmenides, 87 *ff.*; self-thinking, the definition of Being with Aristotle, 219.
Thrace, 30, 71.
Thracians, atrocity perpetrated by, 134.
Thucydides, on the demoralisation of public opinion, 4; on Spartan law-abidingness, 25; studies causes, 48; on the period after the Persian war, 93; in praise of Antiphon, 128; imbued with the principles of Protagoras, 133; belief in progress, *ib.*; hatred of barbarism, 134; on the causes of Greek corruption, *ib.*; belief in self-devotion, 135; favours diversity of customs, 138.
Thurii, 133.
Timaeus of Plato, 213.
Transition as an element of Greek thought, 13.
Triptolemus of Sophocles, 125.
Tuscany compared to Attica, 155.
Tyndareus, 148.

Unlimited, the, in Pythagoreanism, 79; in Plato's later speculations, 211.
Uranus, 115.
Utilitarian hedonism founded by Plato, 194.
Utility, idea of, with Socrates, 166.

Venus, the planet, 77.
Verse as a vehicle of philosophical exposition, 65.
Virtue, Greek views about the teaching of, 128.
Voltaire, 65.
Vortical movement in the system of Anaxagoras, 112.

Water made the first principle by Thales, 45.
Wisdom, place of, in Plato's system, 204.
Women, Spartan, character of, 28; position of, among the Ionian races, *ib.*; Plato's opinion of, 204; their place in his ideal State, *ib.*
Wordsworth quoted, 19.
Wrath of Achilles, supposed to have been an Aeolian poem, 29; original nucleus of the *Iliad*, 47.

Xanthus, 18, 19.
Xenophanes, mentioned by Heracleitus, 80; birthplace, *ib.*; characteristics, 81; religious opinions, 82 *f.*; scientific ideas, 83; visits Elea, *ib.*; occasional scepticism, 96; references to, 85, 88.
Xenophon, does not mention Protagoras and Gorgias, 153; his account of Socrates, 161 *ff.*; recent German criticism on his *Memorabilia*, 164; guarantees the orthodoxy of Socrates, 167; references to, 176, 179, 180, 242.

Zagreus, 68.
Zeller, 42.
Zeno of Elea, his loyal character, 90; defends the paradoxes of Par-

menides, 90; puzzle of 'Achilles and the tortoise,' *ib.*
Zeno, the Stoic, birth, and partly Phoenician origin, 242; Hellenic sources of his moral enthusiasm, *ib.*; return to Heracleitus, 243; eclectic tendencies, *ib.*; monistic method, 244; political ideal, 245; theory of the Pneuma and of seminal reasons, 246; gives an ideal expression to the Hellenistic propaganda, 249. *See* Stoicism.
Zeus, 13, 14, 18, 40, 41, 56, 68 *f.*, 115.

Printed by T. and A. Constable, Printers to Her Majesty
at the Edinburgh University Press


1144 00217409 1

Date Due

Library Bureau Cat. no. 1137

180
B469p
Benn, A. W.

191333

The Philosophy of Greece.

WITHDRAWN

Drew University Library
Madison, New Jersey

1. A fine of two cents a day will be charged on each book which is not returned by date stamped in book. No book will be issued to any person incurring such a fine until it has been paid.

2. All injuries to books beyond reasonable wear and all losses shall be made good to the satisfaction of the Librarian.

3. Each borrower is held responsible for all books charged to him and for all fines accruing on the same.

LIBRARY BUREAU CAT. NO. 1166.3

JQ
Dec 18
1906